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The history of counter-espionage during the early years of the French Revolution has been 
curiously overlooked by scholars and non-fiction writers alike. Until now, no single study 
has appeared, or indeed been published, charting the course of its development during the 
period in discussion. This thesis aims to fill this lacuna, not by offering an episodic account 
of its activities but by examining the precepts, perceptions and procedures that determined 
its conduct as it relates to la sûreté de l’état. Its objective, in other words, is to demonstrate 
how the pursuit and punishment of spies is not a simple cloak and dagger tale of hidden plots 
and secret agents but a fundamental question of national security. As this thesis will explain, 
the role that counter-espionage played is actually of central importance to our understanding 
of how the revolutionaries defended and securitized their embryonic state at a crucial 
juncture in its existence. Without the existence of a single state organ responsible for 
overseeing its operations, or a clandestine agency that conducted secret missions on the 
ground, this thesis will show that the measures to neutralize threats of espionage were not 
taken in isolation but formed part of a broader process that is otherwise known as 
securitization. In other words, it will attempt to demonstrate that, for all the overblown 
discourse of foreign plots and political conspiracies, counter-espionage played a significant 
role in not just attempting to neutralize the enemy within but also, in military and counter-
insurgency operations. With several state and government institutions involved in its 
operations, from paramilitary organizations such as the gendarmerie and national guard to 
militant structures such as the comités de surveillance, it should be possible to reveal how 
counter-espionage played an overarching role in thwarting all threats that compromised the 
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During the revolutionary period, the security of the French state was the prime object of 
attack from foreign and domestic espionage. Despite the absence of a single, permanent 
agency officially charged with superintending overall operations, the unprecedented and 
persistent instability of the interior situation, accentuated by insurrection, defection and 
foreign invasion led, arguably, to the early modern practice of counter-espionage in France.1 
The emergence of this security dispositive did not occur in isolation, however. Whilst the 
rampant spy-fever, fuelled by the outbreak of war, appears to have accelerated this 
development, the measures that the revolutionaries introduced to detect and neutralize spies, 
though sometimes targeted, nevertheless overlapped with the wider security controls which 
were imposed to consolidate and protect the revolutionary state against all perceived 
enemies, whether foreign, domestic or collusion of the two.2 Indeed, the perception that the 
 
1 Eric Denécé, ‘French Intelligence and Security Services in 2016: A Short History’, Note Historique, Centre 
Français de Recherche sur le Renseignement, 47 (2016). The first service in French history officially charged 
with counter-espionage dates back to the second of the 19th century with the formation of the Statistical Section, 
a subsection of the Deuxième Bureau created in 1873 following the restructure of the military high command 
(État-Major Générale). With the failure of intelligence being identified as one of the principal causes of defeat 
at the hands of Prussia, the President of the Minister of Councils, Adolphe Thiers signed a decree on 8 June 
1871, establishing a permanent foreign intelligence service charged with uncovering enemy designs and 
operations. Although originally subordinated to the army’s EMG, the Deuxième Bureau would, in reality, be 
more closely tied with the War Ministry, assuming a crucial role in the institutionalization, centralization and 
professionalization of France’s intelligence services. Yet, it was actually the Section de Statistiques et de 
Reconnaissances Militaires, together with the gendarmerie, that would from 1886 to 1899 be officially 
responsible for conducting espionage operations abroad and counter-espionage activities at home before it 
became a police responsibility with jurisdiction switching to the Ministry of the Interior. However, it was not 
until the end of World War II, after a series of permutations and increasing delineation of duties, that France’s 
contemporary intelligence services were formally established with The Service for External Documentation 
and Counter-espionage (Service de documentation extérieure et de contre-espionnage – SDECE) and the 
Directorate for the Surveillance of the Territory  (Direction de la Surveillance du territoire – DST) both formed 
in 1946, in charge of foreign intelligence and counter-espionage respectively. In 2008, the DST merged with 
the DCRG to create the Direction central du renseignement intérieur (DCRI). On 30 April 2014, however, 
responsibility for France’s counter-espionage operations was transferred to La Direction générale de la sécurité 
intérieure (or DGSI) where it remains to this day. John L Lewis, Etude de guerre: Tactique des renseignements 
(Paris: L. Baudoin & Ce, 1881), p.117. John Stead, Second Bureau (London: Evans Brothers Ltd, 1959), Jean 
Paul Mauriat, ‘Le Contre-Espionnage, élément de la défense’, Défense Nationale, (1967), 107. Roger Faligot, 
Rémy Kauffer, Histoire mondiale du renseignement, 1870-1939, 2 vols (Paris: Robert Laffont, 1993), I p.16, 
Gérard Arboit, Des Services secrets pour la France: Du Dépôt de la Guerre à la DGSE (1856-2013) (Paris: 







European powers were infiltrating the interior to promote violent counter-revolution from 
outside created the growing need for practices that were not only increasingly transnational 
but represented a gradual shift in onus and prioritization from information collection and 
deterrence to active pursuit and punishment. Although incoherent and imperfectly 
implemented, this emerging dispositive was not only firmly entrenched by the end of the 
Terror but the measures adopted to counter the threat of espionage were not only broadly 
effective, at least in certain pockets, but would ultimately prefigure the techniques and norms 




Until now, there has not been a single, academic (or popular) study focused squarely 
on the history of counter-espionage during the early revolutionary years and even, one could 
equally argue, throughout the Directorial period.3 This seems quite surprising given the 
undoubted spy-mania that subsisted throughout the period. The sole secondary sources 
which devote any sections on the hunt for enemy spies as far as the early revolutionary period 
is concerned, are the excellent articles written by Monique Mesyayer and the French 
academic historian, Hugues Marquis, both of whom place their research in the context of the 
war effort and less on the auxiliary, subversive activities underwriting the counter-
revolution.4 Otherwise, the only other secondary source which claims to treat the subject of 
counter-espionage at any length, albeit in relation to the punishment of spies, is a minor work 
published in 1930s, deceptively titled Le Châtiment des espions et des traîtres sous la 
 
3 The sole exception is a single chapter devoted exclusively to French counter-espionage during the Directorial 
period by the author for his Masters’ dissertation. Carlos Garcia de la Huerta, ‘Perceptions of British Espionage 
under the Directory’, Unpublished MA by Research dissertation, (Leeds: University of Leeds, 2012), 16-43.  
4 Monique Mestayer, ‘Suspects et espions en 1792- an II à Douai’, Revue du Nord 71, 282.3 (1989), 885-901., 
Marquis Hugues, ‘Espions et agents secrets pendant la campagne des Flanders (1793-1794)’, Revue du Nord 
75, 299 (1993), 121-32. The exception, of course, is the article written by Thomas Luckett which conceives 
spies as mouchards and not foreign or domestic enemies engaged in intelligence gathering or related subversive 
activities. Thomas Manley Luckett, ‘Hunting for Spies and Whores: A Parisian Riot on the Eve of the French 




Révolution française. Just sixty six pages long, and lacking academic rigour, it delivers a 
mostly pedestrian account of the Conspiration de l’Étranger and practically nothing on 
surveillance and enforcement.5 These examples aside, the historiography has mostly 
concentrated on the known espionage activities within France and its contiguous borders and 
not the revolutionaries’ efforts to combat them. This is not to say that these studies- notably 
by Alfred Cobban, Elizabeth Sparrow and Michael Durey - do not examine some of these 
counter-measures but that they do not provide a systematic assessment, or contextual 
framework, to further our understanding of counter-espionage during this period.6 This thesis 
thus seeks to redress this imbalance. Its purpose, in other words, is not to diminish the 
contribution made by the aforementioned scholars, but to complement their work with a 
parallel study on how and why France’s counter-espionage practice developed in the way it 
did. The picture that emerges will not necessarily be straightforward, especially during the 
Constitutional Monarchy period. The history of early modern counter-espionage is far more 
nuanced, characterizing, to some extent, the chaotic nature of revolutionary politics as well 





5 Jean Bruhat, Le Châtiment des espions et des traîtres sous la Révolution française (Paris: Au bureau 
d’éditions, 1937). 
6 For the most important academic works on foreign espionage in early revolutionary France, see Alfred 
Cobban, ‘British Secret Service in France, 1784-1792’, English Historical Review, 69.271 (1954), 226-261, 
Alfred Cobban, ‘The Beginning of the Channel Isles Correspondence’, 1789-1794, English Historical Review, 
77.302 (1962), 38-52., Michael Durey, William Wickham Master Spy: The Secret War Against the French 
Revolution, (London: Pickering & Chatto, 2009). Hugues Marquis, ‘L’Angleterre et les débuts de l’insurrection 
vendéenne’, Recherches vendéennes (Centre Vendéen de recherches Historiques), 5 (1998), 115-128, Hugues 
Marquis, ‘L’espionnage Britannique et la Fin de l’Ancien Régime’, HES (1998), 261-276; Hugues Marquis, 
Les Agents de l’Enemi: Les espions à la solde de l’Angleterre dans une France en Révolution (Paris: 
Vendémiaire, 2014)., Hugues Marquis, ‘Les Sevices de Renseignment britannique et la Révolution Française’, 
Revue historique, 286.2 (1996), 383-400., Elizabeth Sparrow, Secret Service: British Agents in France, 1792-
1815 (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 1999), Elizabeth Sparrow, ‘Secret Service under Pitt’s Administrations, 
1792-1806’, History, 83 (1998), 280-294, Elizabeth Sparrow, ‘The Alien Office 1792-1806’, The Historical 




One of the underlying difficulties in examining counter-espionage during this period 
is that the term itself did not appear in usage.7 This seems rather incongruous given that 
espion, a French word, dates back to circa 1200.8 It is perhaps no coincidence that the term 
first appeared in the Roberts Historical dictionary in 1899, one year following its official 
mention by General Gonse, the deputy head of the état-major.9 During his examination in 
the case against Colonel Picquart, the former chief of the Deuxième Bureau embroiled in the 
notorious Dreyfus Affair, General Gonse outlined the role of the French intelligence 
services, otherwise known as services de renseignements, as: 
 
1. La recherche de ce qui se prépare ou de ce qui se passe à l'étranger, dans l'intérêt 
de la défense nationale; 
2. Le service de surveillance le long de nos frontières;  
3. Le service de contre-espionnage en France et à l’étranger.10 
 
Gonse’s conception of counter-espionage, as an individual branch of the intelligence 
services, conformed to the emerging norms and precepts of the time.11 But to the 
 
7 The author has found only one mention in a letter dated 17 mai 1787, written by a Russian observer, that has 
been reproduced in M de Lescure (ed.), Correspondance Secrète inédit sur Louis XVI, Marie Antoinette, la 
cour et la ville de 1777 à 1792, 2 vols (Paris: Henri Plon, 1866), II, p.141. In it, he speaks of the former 
Lieutenant Générale de Police, ‘M. le Noir, chargé du comité d'administration, de la direction de l'agiotage et 
d'un contre-espionnage en faveur de M. de Calonne’. 
8 Etymologically, the word espion possibly derives from the Germanic spehon or Italian spione (from spia). In 
French, the first derivation appears to be the found in this quote ‘individu qui se mle aux ennemis pour les 
épier.’ Alan Rey, ‘Espion’, Dictionnaire historique de la langue française (Paris: Le Robert, 1994), p.727.   
9 Roberts defines counter-espionage as the ‘action d’espionner les espions’. The Littré dictionary of 1877 only 
mentions ‘espionnage’. The 1925 edition of Larousse Universel, on the other hand, defines the term as a 
function of the ‘police specialement chargée de la surveillance des espions’; Interrogatoire dans la procédure 
contre le colonel Picquart (le 15 juillet 1898), cited in Bertrand Warusfel, Contre Espionnage et protection du 
secret: Histoire, droit et organisation de la securité nationale en France (Paris: Lavauzelle-Graphic Éditions, 
2000), p.15. 
10 Invented in the 16th century, and appearing only rarely in French texts, the term renseignement can be defined 
in several ways. Not to be mistaken with the services de renseignments, the former can be regarded as the 
collection and analysis of information, whether in secrecy or in open, either to protect the security of the state 
or to gain an advantage over a hostile party; Paul McMahon, British Spies and Irish Rebels: British Intelligence 
and Ireland, 1916–1945 (Rochester: Boydell Press, 2008), p.2-3, Hugues Marquis, Les agents de l’enemi, op. 
cit., p.6. 
11 Importantly, professionalized intelligence in France was formed not by government decree, as was the case 




revolutionaries, who possessed neither a formal definition nor a doctrine, the question of 
how they conceived it becomes more nuanced. To be sure, one could argue that while the 
practice of counter-espionage has undergone successive transformations over time, the 
nature of it has not changed in any profound sense. And in the classical sense of the term, 
this is probably true. No matter the period, place or personalities involved, counter-espionage 
has traditionally revolved around 1) the act of detecting, deceiving and neutralising enemy 
spies and their networks and 2) the protection of state secrets.12 Yet, in charting the 
development of anti-spy activity during the revolutionary period, this thesis will demonstrate 
that the distinctions between the three branches of intelligence, as conceived by Gonse –
espionage, border surveillance and counter-espionage -was hazy at bet and that any 
discussion of the latter activity will invariably require consideration of the former. 
One of the reasons for this conceptual ambiguity is that the line between internal and 
external enemies in French history has not always been so easy to discern.13 This was 
undoubtedly the case during the revolutionary period where the enemy was perceived to be 
not just on the front, or in the person of the foreigner, but anyone engaged in conspiratorial, 
counter-revolutionary activity, whether from within the interior or from across its borders. 
In reality, the perception that the counter-revolutionaries were receiving material and 
pecuniary support from the belligerent powers was not actuated by irrational conspiratorial 
fear. The historiography on the contre-révolution is well documented, if not deserving of 
further study.14 The challenge of this thesis, however, is to identify the security measures 
 
‘Marianne is Watching: Knowledge, Secrecy, Intelligence and the Origins of the French Surveillance State 
(1870-1914)’, Unpublished PhD Thesis (University of California, 2013), p.41. 
12 The relationship between the protection of state secrets and counter-espionage is aptly demonstrated in the 
title of Bertrand Warufsel’s book, Contre-Espionnage et protection du secret, op. cit. Or, to paraphrase it 
differently, the history of the protection of secrets in the defence of the republic is impregnated with the 
obsessive fear of espionage. Philippe Ferlet, Patrice Sartre, ‘Le secret de défense en France’, Études, 412 
(2010/2), 165-175. 
13 Douglas Porch, French Secret Services: A History of French Intelligence from the Dreyfus Affair to the Gulf 
War (Farrar: Straus and Giroux, 2003), p.469. According to Eric Denécé and Gérald Arboit, ‘This fight against 
the enemy within is one of the salient features of the French cultural [intelligence] model.’ Eric Denécé, Gérard 
Arboit, ‘Intelligence Studies in France’, International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 23, 
(2010), 737-747. 
14 The major works on the counter-revolution are: Bernard Demotz, Jean Haudry (eds.), Révolution, Contre-




that were enacted to specifically target foreign and domestic spies within the broader 
counter-revolutionary struggle. For this, it would be necessary to draw attention to both 
counter-espionage activities conducted within the interior and the same practiced à la source 
or outside the national territory.15 Judging by the evidence and vocabulary of the time, this 
poses no small difficulty, foremost because the revolutionaries do not appear to have 
consistently drawn a real distinction between espionage and conspirational acts.16 On 3 
germinal an V (23 March 1797), for example, Jean-François Reubell, one of the members of 
the Directory, posed the following rhetorical question to the Council of Five Hundred; 
 
Est-il possible de conçevoir l’idée d’un embauchage ou d’un espionnage sans qu’il y 
ait simultanement conspiration?....N’est ce pas meme parce que le crime 
d’embauchage est essentiellement amalgame avec celui de conspiration…17 
  
Reubell was referring to the recruitment (ie embauchage) of émigré soldiers by enemy 
agents. In relation to the counter-revolutionary crime of treason, he was probably right 
because one of the core activities of espionage is the recruitment and nurturing of traitors.18 
 
and Counter-Revolution in France’, in Rewriting the French Revolution. The Andrew Browning lectures, 1989 
(New York: Clarendon Press of Oxford University Press, 1991). Jacques Godechot, The Counter-revolution: 
Doctrine and Action, 1789-1804 (London: Routledge & Regan Paul, 1972). François Lebrun, Roger Dupuy 
(eds.), Les résistances à la Révolution. Actes du colloque de Rennes, 17-21 septembre 1985 (Paris: Imago, 
1987), Gwynne Lewis, The Second Vendée: The continuity of Counter-revolution in the Département of the 
Gard, 1789-1815 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), Louis Madelin, La Contre-Révolution sous la Révolution 
(Paris: Plon, 1935), Jean-Clément Martin, Contre-révolution, Révolution et Nation en France, 1789-1799 
(Paris: Seuil, 1998), Jean Sentou (éd.), Révolution et Contre-Révolution dans la France du Midi (1789-1799) 
in Travaux de recherches historiques publiés dans le cadre du bicentenaire (Toulouse: Université de Toulouse-
le-Mirail, 1991) DMG Sutherland, Revolution and French Counterrevolution (London: Fontana Press, 1985), 
Émmanuel Vingtrinier, La Contre-Révolution (Paris: E. Paul frères, 1924-1925). 
15 Hugues Moutouh, Jérôme Poirot (eds.), Dictionnaire du Renseignement (Paris: Perrin, 2018), p.48. 
16 It was not until April 1886 that France passed a law formally defining the term ‘espionnage’. A full discussion 
of this subject, and the differences between it and the successive laws of 1793, will be found in chapters 1 and 
2.   
17 M Peltier (ed.), Paris Pendant l’Année 1797 (Paris: T Baylis, 1800), XII, p.451. In the arrêté du 4 ventôse, 
‘concernant la manière juger les embauchers’, the Directory phrased it similarly, ‘Bien sûrement l'espionnage 
est un acte de conspiration; et il est impossible qu'il se pratique à d'autres fins que de conspirer contre le 
gouvernement’, Jean-Baptiste Duvergier (ed.), Lois, Décrets, Ordonnances, Réglemens, et Avis du Conseil 
d’État, 24 vols  (Paris: A. Guyot et Scribe, 1825), IX, p.42. 
18 Geoffrey B Demarest, ‘Espionage in International Law’, Denver Journal of International Law and Policy, 




It is tempting to argue that if the revolutionaries did conceive conspiracy to be synonymous 
with espionage, then the obvious corollary is that they also used similar methods to contain 
not just spies but all actors engaged in violent conspirational behaviour.19 In reality, this was 
not necessarily true, as this thesis will set out to demonstrate. The revolutionaries’ treatment 
of the émigrés- certainly the most intransigent of all the counter-revolutionary groups- was 
not always consistent with the punishment of suspected spies. Yet, notwithstanding these 
exceptions and conceptual nuances, this thesis will chart the development of counter-
espionage, at least within the context of the counter-revolution and the associated obsession 
with conspiracies, as an evolving ‘function’ of French renseignement, which, whilst 
employing new methods and resources, nevertheless possesses historical precedent dating 
as far back as the ancien régime.20 Olivier Forcade puts it thus: 
 
Avant d’être une affaire d’État, le renseignement est en premier lieu une affaire de 
l’État. L’espionnage et le contre-espionnage plongent en effet leurs racines dans une 
double histoire du secret dans l’État et de l’État. Celle-ci débute sous l’Ancien 
Régime et sous la Révolution française.21 
 
 
19 Howard Brown distinguishes between two grades of counter-revolution. As he wrote, ‘The most serious 
crimes of opposition fit easily under the heading violent counter-revolution. These are high crimes against the 
state such as treason and espionage, as well as efforts to overturn the constitution, and using force against the 
legislature, electoral assemblies, or official bodies such as courts or municipal councils.’ Non-violent counter-
revolution, on the other hand, ‘reflects the Republic’s ‘lois de circomstances’ against harboring refractory 
priests, refusing to taking a clerical oath, contravening political exile, making counter-revolutionary statements 
in public, and vandalizing republican symbols like liberty trees’. Howard G Brown, Ending the French 
Revolution: Violence, Justice and Repression from the Terror to Napoleon (Charlotesville: University of 
Virginia Press, 2006), p.366. 
20 Soullez explains this ‘function’ as follows: ‘Le renseignment a donc plusieurs fonctions: le contre-
espionnage chez l’adversaire pour connaître les capacités et les intentions de celui-ci, le renseignement intérieur 
alimentant le contre-espionnage défensif et préventif pour assurer la sécurité et la protection de l’État et du 
pays, et le renseignement intérieur et extérieur alimentant le contre-espionnage répressif pour mettre hors d’état 
de nuire les agents ennemis et leurs souviens.’ Christophe Soullez, Le Renseignement: Histoire, Méthodes, et 
Organisation des Services Secrets (Paris: Groupe Eyrolles, 2017), p.9. 
21 Olivier Forcade, ‘Considération sur le renseignement, la défense nationale et l’État secret en France aux 




Forcade is among the few scholars who are turning the study of renseignement into a serious 
area of academic inquiry. Along with Gérard Arboit and Eric Denécé, he has also published 
articles on the growing historiography on renseignement, a field which, since the end of 
1990s, has led to the convening of symposiums, the publication of multiple monographs and 
from the turn of the new century, the foundation of the Centre Français de Recherche sur le 
Renseignement (Cf2R).22 Yet, unlike Forcade or Sébastian Laurent, who has written 
extensively on the relationship between renseignement and the growth of state power, the 
vast majority of researchers have focused on the individual branches with 20th century 
military and diplomatic espionage attracting the widest academic and popular interest.23 By 
contrast, scholarly studies on counter-espionage - as an individual topic - are far less 
preponderant with the very few conducted in the field taking the period circa 1870-1871, as 
their starting point, namely from the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War and the formation 
of the Deuxième Bureau.24 In other words, these few individuals have focused their work on 
the institutionalization of counter-espionage as a professionalized branch of France’s 
intelligence services and have otherwise committed a few paragraphs at most to its historical 
roots.25 In fact, the only serious publications that devote sections specifically to the French 
 
22 Olivier Forcade,  ‘Objets, approches et problématiques d'une histoire française du renseignement: Un champ 
historiographique en construction‘, Histoire, économie & société, 2 (2012) 99-110., Olivier Forcade, ‘Histoire 
militaire et renseignement: état des recherches’, in Pierre Lacoste (ed.), Le Renseignement à la française (Paris: 
Économica, 1998), pp.49-78, Eric Denécé, Gérard Arboit, ‘Intelligence Studies in France’, op.cit., Peter 
Jackson, ‘Intelligence and the State: An emerging French school of intelligence studies’, Intelligence and 
National Security, 21:6 (2006) 1061-1065. 
23 The most important works of these two experts are Olivier Forcade, Sébastien Laurent, Secrets d’État. 
Pouvoirs et renseignement dans le monde contemporain (Paris: A. Colin, 2005), Sébastien Laurent, Politiques 
de l’ombre: État, renseignement et surveillance en France (Paris: Fayard, 2009), Sébastien Laurent, ‘Pour une 
autre histoire de l’État. Le secret, l’information politique et le renseignement’, Vingtième Siècle. Revue 
d’histoire, 83 (2004), 173-184., Sébastien Laurent, ‘La naissance du renseignement étatique en France au XIXe 
siècle, entre bureaucratie et politique’, Revue d'histoire du XIXe siècle, 35 (2007), 109-124, Alain  Dewerpe, 
Espion: Une anthropologie historique du secret d’État (Paris: Gallimard, 1994).  
24 See Eric Denécé, Renseignment et Contre-Espionnage: Actions clandestines, technologies, services secretes 
(Paris: Hachette Pratique, 2008); Bertrand Warusfel, Contre Espionnage et protection du secret, op. cit., 
Bertrand Warufsel, ‘Histoire de l’organisation du contre-espionnage française entre 1871 et 1945’, Cahiers du 
Centre d’Histoire de la défense, 1 (1996), 13-40. Laurent Lopez, ‘Quand nous serons à mille, nous ferons une 
croix , Contre-espionnage, un nouveau terrain de coopération entre gendarmes et policiers à la fin du XIXe 
siècle (1870-1914)’, Histoire, économie & société, 4. (2013), Émilie Berthillot, ‘Renseignement et contre-
espionnage entre Dublin, Londres et Edimbourg de 1845 à 1945’, Unpublished PhD Thesis, (Université 
Toulouse le Mirail - Toulouse II, 2014). 
25 Since the Middle Ages, for example, England was known to have spied on France’s military and naval 




practice of preemption and deterrence during the ancien régime, albeit from the reign of 




In tracing these roots, Bély’s books make for interesting reading. Although 
approached from the perspective of diplomatic and military espionage, his work has 
nevertheless shown how, during fifty years of almost uninterrupted warfare, the pressures 
on Louis XIV’s kingdom had created the conditions necessary for the development of 
counter-espionage activities. Recalling the collective climate of suspicion that marked the 
Terror, any individual who manifested atypical, non-conformist behavior, or whose 
appearance was judged unconventional, was perceived to be a potential subversive. And just 
with the revolutionary period, spies were thought to be everywhere and possibly anyone. 
They could be masquerading as a priest, a soldier or a noble.27 If they frequented dangerous 
places, travelled abroad, corresponded regularly, were unemployed, had doubtful financial 
resources, performed alchemy and magic, or circulated information emanating from an 
enemy country, no matter how innocuous, they were determined to be a potential spy or 
 
Yet, almost nothing is known about the French’s effort to neutralize these networks. Arthuson does, however, 
provide one example of disinformation whereby the French responded by flooding the English postal system 
with fake letters to confound the military authorities. Ian Arthuson, ‘Espionage and Intelligence from the Wars 
of the Roses to the Reformation’, Nottingham Medieval Studies, XXXV (1991), 134-154. Alternatively, far 
more research has been conducted on the French practice of espionage itself during that period.  See, for 
example, André Leguai, ‘Espions et propagandistes de Louis XI arrêtés à Dijon’, Annales de Bourgogne, 
(1952), 50-55. R. A. Griffiths, ‘Un espion breton à Londres, 1425-1429’, Annales de Bretagne (1979), 399-
403, Ivan Gobry, Louis XI: La force et la ruse (Paris: Éditions Tallandier, 2001). For an earlier history of 
renseignement,  see Eric Denécé, Patrice Brun, (eds.), Renseignement et Espionnage pendant l’Antiquité et le 
Moyen-Âge (Paris: Ellipses, 2019). Equally, other than the employment of unofficial informers and the 
temporary deployment of intendants, we possess little knowledge of the surveillance structures that were put 
in place during the reign of Louis XIII, a period when French renseignement was supposed to have undergone 
substantial expansion. For piecemeal information see Denis Avenel (ed.), Les Lettres, instructions 
diplomatiques et papiers d’État du Cardinal de Richelieu (1624-1627) 2 vols (Paris: Imprimerie  impériale), 
1856. Sébastian Laurent, Politiques du Renseignement, op. cit., pp.43, 45, 50 and J Caillet, De l’Administration 
en France sous le ministère du cardinal de Richelieu (Paris: Firmin Didot Frères, Fils et Cie, 1857). 
26 The major works of these historians are Lucien Bély, Espions et ambassadeurs au temps de Louis XIV (Paris: 
Fayard, 1990); Lucien Bély, Les Secrèts de Louis XIV: Mystères d’état et Pouvoir absolu (Paris: Éditions 
Tallandier, 2013). Stéphane Genêt, Les espions des Lumières: Actions secrètes et espionnage militaire sous 
Louis XV (Paris: Nouveau Monde éditions, 2013). 




agitator. Bély notes how even people, whose handwriting was ‘bizarre’ or exhibited a ‘fort 
espirit’ were cast in similarly doubtful light and investigated.28 Indeed, a defeatist comment 
or imprudent remark, could result in denunciation and subsequent imprisonment for 
espionage. In 1701, for example, the former Gendarme de la Garde du Roi named 
Galemberg ou Celleneuve, was ‘soupconné d’intelligence avec les ennemis de l’État et de 
filouter au jeu’, after having spoken derisively of the Prince de Conti in front of the French 
ambassador of Poland.29 This climate of suspicion, which gradually permeated the kingdom, 
was further exacerbated by the existence of religious opponents within, whether protestants 
or Jansenists, colluding with enemies without.30 Not only individuals but groups were turned 
into objects of distrust and denunciation. Naturally, the perennial foreigner, with their 
strange accents and manners, were rendered suspect. Letters sent to and from abroad and/or 
written in a foreign language were routinely intercepted, opened, deciphered (when 
necessary), recopied and resealed before being forwarded to the recipient. To be sure, 
monarchs had long appreciated the importance of cryptanalysis, employing mathematicians 
to decode secret messages sent by their adversaries, especially during wartime, but it was 
not until Louis XIV that the interception and decryption of suspect correspondence was first 
bureaucratized with the creation of the famous cabinet noir.31 Firmly established by Louis 
XIV’s Minister of War, the Marquis de Louvois - but with origins possibly tracing back to 
Cardinal Richelieu- it had two core purposes: to discover ties between France’s foreign and 
domestic enemies and to protect the inviolability of the court’s own confidential diplomatic 
 
28 According to the Lieutenant générale de police he was a ‘veritable espion et qu’il en a ‘tous les talents’. 
Lucien Bély, Les Secrèts de Louis XIV, p.600.  
29 Denounced ‘comme soupçonné d’être un espion’, it was only in 1714, at the conclusion of peace, that he 
was finally released. ibid, p.612, Espions et Ambassadeurs, op. cit., p.73. 
30 Dale K Van Kley, Les origines religieuses de la Révolution française (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 2006). On 
suspicion of Protestants and Jansenists as ‘outside’ the Catholic State see, Marisa Linton, ‘Dissent and 
Toleration’, in William Doyle (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Ancien Régime (Oxford: OUP, 2011), 337-
53. 
31 For a comprehensive, if imperfect, study of this instrument of state, see Eugène Vaillé, Cabinet Noir (Paris: 




and military missives.32 Surviving until the Third Republic, and perhaps beyond, the Cabinet 
Noir (or Bureau Dedans) thus exercises a significant influence on the history of French 
counter-espionage, constituting perhaps the first, permanent institution engaged in routing 
out spies.33  
Bély’s contribution to the historiography is also notable, not least in demonstrating 
the role of the lieutenant général de police in the ‘travail de contre-espionnage’, as he 
expressed it.34 Whilst this institution has been the subject of many studies, his work is among 
the very few that discusses at length the police’s hunt for enemy spies as opposed to the 
traditional focus on the employment of mouchards.35 Yet, significantly for this discussion, 
Bély has made clear that counter-espionage was not the sole preserve of the police, which is 
often erroneously claimed, but that responsibility for the security of the overall kingdom 
during Louis XIV’s reign was actually diffused through a highly decentralized patchwork of 
ministerial jurisdictions with the Secrétaire d'État de la Maison du Roi exercising, in the 
 
32 Jacques Aubert, Michel Eude, Claude Goyard, (eds.), L’état et sa police en France (1789-1914) (Genève: 
Librairie Droz, 1979), p.46, Eric Denécé, ‘The Intelligence Services’ Historical and Cultural Context, op. cit., 
p.135.  
33 On occasion, the monitoring of letters sent to and from abroad did lead to the successful dismantlement of a 
spy network. During the War of the League of Augsburg (1688–1697), for example, postal officials intercepted 
all known correspondence sent to and from Holland belonging to Etienne Caillaud, the head of a spy ring 
financed by England, enabling his correspondents to either be arrested or their movements monitored within 
France. Lucien Bély, Les Secrets de Louis XIV, op. cit., p.237. 
34 ibid, p.598, Jacques Michel, Du Paris de Louis XV à la marine de Louis XVI: l’oeuvre de Monsieur de 
Sartine, 2 vols (Paris: Éditions de l’Erudit, 1983), I, p.38. Le Bureau de la Sûreté centralized ‘toutes les 
questions de sûreté publique immediate et ‘comporte une émbauche du service que l’on appelle aujourd’hui le 
contre-espionnage.’   
35 Gilles Malandain, ‘Les mouches de la police et le vol des mots’, Revue d’histoire moderne et contemporaine, 
42.3 (1995), 376-404, Marc Chassaigne devotes a chapter of his book on domestic spies, Marc Chassaigne, La 
Lieutenance Générale de Police à Paris (Paris: 1906), Jean Chagniot, ‘La Lieutenance générale de police de 
Paris à la fin de l’Ancien Régime’ in Yves Durand (ed.), Les Institutions parisiennes à la fin de l’Ancien Régime 
et sous la Révolution française, Actes du Colloque de l’Hotel, (Paris, s.d. 1989). Otherwise, to understand how 
the police operated in 18th century, see Nicholas Delamare, Traité de la police, 4 vols (Paris: 1705-1738), 
Robert Darnton, ‘The Memoirs of Lenoir, Lieutenant de Police, 1774-1785’, English Historial Review, 
LXXXV (1970), 532-559, Maxime De Sars, Lenoir: lieutenant de police, 1737-1807 (Paris: Hachette, 1948), 
Vincent Milliot, Un Policier des Lumière, suivi de. Mémoires de J.C.P. Lenoir ancien lieutenant général 
de police de Paris, écrits en pays étrangers dans les années 1790 et suivantes (Paris: Champ Vallon, 2011), 
Antoine Sartine, ‘Rapports du lieutenant général de police Sartine’, Mémoires de la Société d'histoire de Paris, 
v (1879). For a modern account of the French police, see Alan Williams, The Police of Paris, 1718-1789 (Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1979), Steven L Kaplan, ‘Note sur les commissaires de police de 
Paris au XVIIIe siecle,’ Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine 28 (1981), 669-86, Paolo Napoli, 




absence of a coordinating body, the leading role.36 For this section of his research, Bély has 
drawn extensively from the printed Archives de la Bastille, as compiled by François 
Ravaisson, which alone, remain a rich source of information for any future researcher 
interested in counter-espionage during the ancien régime.37 
Bély’s work has been developed further by Genêt who devotes the final third part of 
his book on the French response ‘face aux espions ennemis’, as it is titled.38 More than one 
hundred and forty pages long, and dividing his chapters thematically between ‘la réalité 
d’une menace’, ‘les motifs de suspicion’ and the methods to ‘déjouer les espions ennemis’, 
this section of Genêt’s work constitutes, as far as this author could identify, the most 
comprehensive study of counter-espionage during the ancien régime. Also drawing 
considerably from the Archives de la Bastille, and containing a number of detailed (but 
perhaps overlong) case studies, Genêt traces the process of neutralizing an enemy spy, 
whether they were ‘foreign’ or treasonous subjects of the king, from the initial denunciation 
(normally from an anonymous source) through to the investigation, interrogation, 
incarceration and ultimate judgement, arguing that it tended to follow a succession of 
stages.39 Expounding at length on the methods to ensnare a spy, from the installation of 
fictive postal boxes and other ‘ecrans de fumée’ to the adoption of specific interrogation 
techniques to extract a confession, Genêt’s also raises several interesting points about 
 
36 For further information on the emergence of ministerial departments and their role in information gathering, 
see also, Jacob Soll, The Information Master. Jean-Baptiste Colbert’s Secret State intelligence System (Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2009). In relation to the police’s inflated role, de Polnay claims that it 
‘controlled all spying and counter-espionage’ in the Republic’s attempt to ‘frustrate English plots and intrigues, 
royalist plots and machinations’. Peter de Polnay, Napoleon Police (London: W.H.Allen, 1970), p.7. Other 
secondary works that overestimate the role of the police, especially under Joseph Fouché’s superintendence, 
include Ernest Daudet, La Police et Les Chouans sous le consulat et l’empire 1800-1815 (Paris, E Plon, Nourrit 
et cie, 1895). Ernest D’Hauterive, Napoleon et sa Police (Paris, Flammarion, 1944).  
37 Francois Ravaisson-Mollien (ed.), Archives de la Bastille d’après des documents inédits. Règne de Louis 
XV,   recueillis et publ. par François Ravaisson (Paris: A Durand  et Pedonne-Lauriel, 1891). 
38 Stéphane Genêt, Les espions des Lumières op,cit.  
39 Briefly put, these stages were as follows: i) The investigation was usually prompted by an anonymous 
denunciation, ii) The suspect was thereupon placed under surveillance and a record of their visits kept. iii) All 
correspondence to and from the suspect was intercepted, iv) To contain the threat, the suspect was imprisoned 
and interrogated (often in the Bastille) for a month, the object of which was to either trick them into a confession 
or ‘turn’ them into a double agent. v) After a month’s detention, the suspect was released or, on the rare 




‘preventative imprisonment’, localization and jurisdiction, all of which will contribute, at 
various points, to the contextual framework of this discussion.40 
Unfortunately, from the period covering the fall of the Bastille to the inception of the 
Constitutional Monarchy, no comparable insight is available. The closest studies, at least as 
far as counter-revolutionary plots are concerned, naturally centre on the role of the National 
Assembly’s Comité des Recherches, and its municipal counter-part in Paris, most notably 
the doctoral thesis by Maia Kirby or the more incisive publications by the American 
historians, Barry Shapiro and Kaitlyn Carter.41 Whilst these studies contain theoretical 
discussions on the comités’ relation to conspirational fears, procedural secrecy and the 
criminal justice system respectively, any researcher interested in delving into the mechanics 
of the comité’s intelligence gathering operations- whether in terms of the surveillance of 
suspects, the employment of agents, the transmission of denunciations, the seizure of 
correspondance etc are better served by consulting the records of the National Assembly’s 
comité themselves, as compiled and classified by the former archivist, Pierre Caillet.42 
Conveniently, Caillet has transcribed and annotated a large number of the letters, many of 
which have been cited in extenso by Kirby to substantiate sections of her thesis.43 Yet 
curiously, in charting the comité’s mission to defend the Revolution against threats to its 
existence, neither he, nor the aforementioned historians, make any specific reference to the 
hunt for enemy spies, foreign or domestic, an observation that can be similarly applied to 
the historiography on political policing before 1792, in particularly the early research 
 
40 Stéphane Genêt, Les espions des Lumières op,cit. pp.303, 395 & 410. 
41 Maia Kirby, ‘The Democratic Sphere Communications with the French National Assembly's Committee of 
Research, 1789-1791’, Unpublished PhD Thesis (Queen Mary, University of London, 2017), Kaitlyn Carter, 
‘The Comités des Recherches: Procedural Secrecy and the Origins of Revolutionary Surveillance’, French 
History, 32.1 (2018), 45-65. Barry Shapiro, ‘Revolutionary justice in 1789–1790: “The Comité des 
Recherches, the Châtelet, and the Fayettist coalition”, French Historical Studies., 17 (1992), 656–69.  
42 Pierre Caillet, Les Français en 1789, d'après les papiers du Comité des recherches de l'assemblée 
constituente (1789-1791) (Paris: Éditions du CNRS, 1991) and Pierre Caillet, Inventaire analytique de la sous-
série D XXIX bis (Paris: Archives Nationales, 1993).  




conducted by David Andress.44 Whether the reason is that the connection between counter-
revolutionary activities and espionage is implicitly understood in their work is arguable, 
either way any discussion on ‘spies’ invariably centre on the inherited, but discredited, 
practice of employing mouchards. Indeed, it is probably no coincidence that, in the first three 
years of the Revolution, the sole instruction that was made to suppress ‘espionage’ was 
directed against them, as found in the papiers du district de Saint-Roch titled ‘État des 
mesures proposées pour garantir la sûreté publique, comprenant notamment la suppression 
de l'espionnage et l'expulsion des inspecteurs de police.’45 In approaching this study, the 
search for mouchards, informers or even the spies employed by the rivalrous Girondin and 
Jacobin factions in their political struggle will play no part.46 Instead, referring back, this 
thesis will limit itself to examining the revolutionaries’ efforts to neutralise the threat of 




The question as to whether France was made a hard target for espionage is fraught with 
difficulty. According to Christopher Andrew, the inherent problem with evaluating counter-
espionage is that its success is ultimately not based on demonstrable facts but rather on what 
is not produced. As he argues, ‘It is apparently a paradox, but it is none the less true, and a 
most important truth, that the efficiency of a counter espionage service is not to be measured 
 
44 For the nuanced view of the Paris police on general political discontent, the counter-revolution and other 
politically motivated crimes see David Andress, ‘Order and Democracy in Paris from the Oath of the Clergy 
to the Tricolour Terror, January-August 1791’, PhD thesis, University of York, (1994), p.15.; D. Andress, 
‘Social prejudice and political fears in the policing of Paris, January–June 1791’, French History, 9, (1995), 
202–26; D. Andress, Massacre at the Champ de Mars: Popular Dissent and Political Culture in the French 
Revolution (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2000), 84. 
45 Alexandre Tuetey, Répertoire général des sources manuscrites de l'histoire de Paris pendant la Révolution 
française (Paris: Imprimerie Nouvelle, 1892), II, p.91 (Bulletin 859). Minute, Bibliothèque Nationale, Mss., 
nouv. acq. fr. 2670, fol. 11 (Papiers de la Section de la Butte des Moulins). 
46 The sole exception will be a brief discussion on the revolutionaries’ failed attempt to arrest the Baron de 
Batz in chapter 3. 




chiefly by the number of spies caught by it.48 By this, Andrew was referring to the deterrent 
effect of capital punishment, the imposition of stricter border and port controls, vetted access 
to government buildings etc, all measures that, combined together, contribute to ‘good 
protective security’.49 Of course, even if the success of counter-espionage was quantifiable, 
it is simply impossible to determine the ratio between the number of spies caught and the 
number operating from within or without, not least because complete, centralised registers 
of their arrests and executions do not exist at this stage of the Revolution.50 Whilst this thesis 
will provide a full interpretation of one surviving register, which can be found in appendix 
V, it will not trouble itself with compiling rough statistical analyses of arrests, releases or 
executions. Instead, this thesis will focus on the measures themselves- whether in terms of 
detection, prevention, investigation and punishment meanwhile asking itself the related 
questions: 
 
1. To what extent were these measures introduced in response to spy activity? 
2. Were they targetted or did they overlap with the state’s broader structures of 
surveillance and control? 
3. How did the revolutionaries perceive the efficacy of these measures and what steps 
were taken to strengthen or replace them? 
4. How far was the perception of enemy espionage crucial for the development of 
France’s overall national security system? 
 
 
48 Christopher Andrew, Defend the Realm: The Authorized History of MI5 (New York: A.A. Knopf, 2009), 
p.931. 
49 See the following article on MI5’s website written by Andrew, https://www.mi5.gov.uk/mi5-in-world-war-
i 
50 For the inherent problems on producing statistics, see Richard Louie, ‘The Incidence of the Terror: A Critique 
of a Statistical Interpretation’, French Historical Studies, 3. 3 (1964) 379-389, Gilbert Shapiro, John Markoff, 
‘The Incidence of the Terror: Some lessons for Quantitative History’, Journal of Social History, 9 (1975), 193-




To answer these questions, this thesis will rely primarily on original archival research. Not 
surprisingly, given the fact that this work is concerned with matters of French security, it 
will draw from series AA of the Archives du Prefecture de Police, notably the procès-
verbaux des commissaires de police des sections, not to mention the immense F7 (and AFIV) 
series at the Archives Nationales where a large subset of the Comité de Sûreté Générale’s 
records are found.51 At the same time, attesting to the divers institutions involved in counter-
espionage operations during this period, this thesis will benefit from the archives at the 
Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, especially the subset Mémoires et Documents and 
Correspondance Politique, as well as the copious bulletins compiled by Alphonse Aulard 
and Pierre Caron, particularly relating to the often neglected role of the army in all branches 
of renseignement.52  Just as important, this thesis will rely heavily on both the print and 
digital collections of local municipal archives, such as those of the Alpes-Maritimes, La 
Vendée, Metz and du Haut-Rhin where records on the surveillance of frontiers, interception 
of correspondence, arrests and interrogations of suspects are mostly kept. In terms of 
secondary sources, most of the works consulted have invariably been of tangential interest 
only. The notable exceptions are the aforementioned articles written by Hugues Marquis and 
Monique Mesteyer, and the various studies on the Comités de Surveillance and Comités de 
Sûreté Générale such as by Michel Eude.53   
In relation to structure, the main body of this thesis is divided into three chapters of 
roughly equal length with each covering, more or less, a one year period. Whilst a number 
of themes run throughout its entirety, such as ‘securitization’, this thesis is nevertheless 
 
51 For a full explanation of the history and composition of these respective records see A. Soboul, Les Papiers 
des sections de Paris, 1790-An IV - repertoire sommaire (Paris: M. Lavergne, 1950) and Pierre Caron (ed.), 
Le Fonds du Comité de Sûreté Générale (AFII*, F7, DXLIII) (Paris: Impr Archives Nationales, 1954) 
52 Françoise Alphonse Aulard (ed), Recueil des Actes du Comité de Salut Public avec la correspondance 
officielle des représentants en mission et le registre du conseil exécutif provisioire, 28 vols, (Paris: Imprimerie 
Nationale, 1889-1951), Pierre Caron, (ed.), Paris Pendant le Terreur. Rapports des Agents secrets du Ministre 
de l’Interieur, 7 vols (Paris: 1910-1964). 
53 Michel Eude, ‘Le Comité de Sûreté Générale en 1793-1794’ in Annales historiques de la Révolution 
française, 261 (1985), 295-306, Michel Eude, ‘Le Comité de Surveillance de l’Assemblée législative (1791-




framed chronologically to demonstrate how counter-espionage evolved according to the 
exigencies of the moment. The first chapter, which spans the constitutional monarchy, 
establishes much of the conceptual framework for this study. It will begin with a discussion 
of the 1791 Penal Code and how the concept of la sûreté de l’état (or national security) was 
enshrined in its provisions (as indeed it equally was in the Constitution itself).  It will also 
discuss the Penal Code’s failure to address the semantic confusion between subversion and 
espionage, followed by an exposition on how the revolutionaries perceived the support that 
the émigrés, and their domestic agents, constituted for the counter-revolution. The chapter 
will then look at the revolutionaries’ response, both in immediate terms and within the 
overall framework of the state’s existing methods of surveillance and control. It will also 
identify the underlying factors that characterized localized counter-espionage operations, 
both before and after the outbreak of hostilities, as well as the preventative measures that 
were adopted to protect state secrets from infiltration and subversion. It will conclude by 
attempting to explain the reasons why no discernible national security policy emerged during 
this formative period and how calls were raised to address parts of this problem.    
Having established much of the thesis’ conceptual framework, chapter two will adopt 
a more narrative approach. Covering the period from the fall of the monarchy to the 
beginning of the Terror, it will begin with identifying some of the strict measures that the 
revolutionaries imposed to restore order, especially in Paris, and how they coincided within 
the broader process of restructuring and expanding the state’s security apparatus. Invariably, 
given its responsibility for security, an examination of the Comité de Sûreté Générale will 
ensue, especially in terms of its interaction with the divers municipalities, paramilitary 
bodies, comités de surveillance, revolutionary tribunals etc, all of which performed an 
essential role in the conduct of local counter-espionage operations. Equally significant, this 
chapter will show how the perception of espionage activity, especially practiced by 




specifically to punish spies. By its termination, the reader will be able to discern a shift in 
the revolutionaries’ approach to confronting the twin dangers of espionage and subversion 
from a primarily defensive footing to a more offensive one. 
Developing the theme of securitization, the third and final chapter will examine the 
period of the Jacobin Terror from September 1793 to July 1794. One of the most important 
functions of the Comité de Sûreté Générale was to apply the Loi des Suspects. This chapter 
will look at how rampant xenophobia, tied to the nationalisation of the war, drove Jacobin 
attempts to root out and punish foreign spies. Examining not only the evolving structures of 
surveillance and control, including the transnational measures to suppress counter-
revolutionary abroad, it will also examine some of the protective security measures that the 
revolutionaries put in place to try and make France a hard target for espionage. Equally 
important, it will discuss how counter-espionage was tied not just to the regular war effort, 
with the army assuming a central role in trapping spies, but also to counter-insurgency 
operations, especially in La Vendée and other hotspots. Despite the institutional confusion 
and jurisdictional rivalry that subsisted throughout, it should be possible to show the extent 










Dangerous Times: September 1791- September 1792 
 
 
By the time of its dissolution on 30 September 1791, the Constituent Assembly had 
established national security to be the prime aim, and special preserve, of the new 
revolutionary state.54 Under Title IV of the Constitution of 1791, the concept of sûreté de 
l’état was for the first time enshrined in French law, supplanting, although not entirely 
annulling, the principle of royal inviolability.55 Yet, just as the Revolution wrought great 
social and political changes, so too did it engender increasingly complex and unprecedented 
security challenges. Over time, the struggle for sovereign power would prove far more 
intractable than the framers of the constitution were able to settle. For one, the constituents’ 
efforts to consolidate the revolutionary state did not thwart the émigrés’ implacable 
determination to dismantle it. As this chapter will demonstrate, the relationship between state 
security and the counter-revolution was characterized by three key factors. First, the 
realization that the counter-revolutionary movement was not just a nuisance issue but an 
escalating threat to the existence of the embryonic, revolutionary state. Secondly, the 
widespread perception that hostile foreign policy efforts were inherently linked to domestic, 
 
54 On how security came under the exclusive responsibility of the revolutionary state, see Thierry Balzacq, 
‘Qu'est-ce que la sécurité nationale?’, Revue internationale et stratégique, 52 (2003), 33-50 (p.36), Alain 
Noyer, La Sûreté de l'État: 1789-1965 (Paris: Librairie générale de droit et de jurisprudence, 1966), Emma 
Rothschild, ‘What is Security?’, Daedalus, 124.3 (1995), 53-98 (p.61) and Bertrand Warufsel, ‘Les Notions de 
Défense et de Sécurité en Droit français’, Revue Droit & Défense, 94.4 (1994), 11-20.; Whilst these historians 
alternatively employ ‘sûreté’ and ‘sécurité’ to denote the same notion of ‘security’, as it is understood in 
English, others claim that a narrow distinction can be made in the French language with the latter indicating 
the feeling of being in a state of security whereas the former denoting the actual state itself. For a full 
explanation of this nuance, see Jean Delumeau, ‘Le sentiment de sécurité dans l'histoire’, Cahiers de la Sécurité 
intérieure, Documentation Française (Paris: IHESI, 1990), pp.19-26; Catherine Denys, Police et sécurité au 
XVIIIe siècle, dans les villes de la frontière franco-belge (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2002), 14-17.      
55 This notion of national security is inferred in Articles 7 & 13, Title IV of the Constitution. Article 7 reads: 
‘Toutes les parties de la force publique, employées pour la sûreté de l'état contre les ennemis du dehors, agiront 
sous les ordres du roi’. Article 13 reads: ‘L'armée de terre et de mer, et la troupe destinée à la sûreté intérieure, 
sont soumises à des lois particulières, soit pour le maintien de la discipline, soit pour la forme des jugements 
et la nature des peines en matière de délits militaires.’ J Desenne (ed.), Code Général Français (Paris: Ménard 
et Desenne, 1818), I, p.38; For comprehensive studies of the said constitution, see Guillaume Glénard, 
L’exécutif et la Constitution de 1791 (Paris: PUF, 2015); Michael P Fitzsimmons, The Remaking of France: 
The National Assembly and the Constitution of 1791 (Cambridge: CUP, 1994). Roberto Martucci, ‘Qu'est-ce 
que la lèse-nation? À propos du problème de l'infraction politique sous la constituante (1789-1791)’, Déviance 




counter-revolutionary movements. Third and finally, the growing readiness to see the 
counter-revolution as essentially a security problem which would be best resolved with 




Over the course of its evolution, the French system of counter-espionage has been 
based upon a legal framework that has, in piecemeal fashion, broadly defined and sanctioned 
the scope of its operations.57 Whilst it was not until 1886 that France first possessed a law 
that expounded at length ‘sur la repression de espionnage’, the enactment of the penal code 
of 6 October 1791 did accord the revolutionaries substantial latitude to incriminate and 
punish offenders for crimes that were judged to pose a threat to the security of the newly 
established, revolutionary state.58 As Vincent Petit explained, incrimination was deliberately 
‘souple et indéfinie, ce qui permet de prévenir les attentats et les complots, de dissuader les 
ennemis du régime, de comprimer les rumeurs...’.59 In other words, although intended as a 
departure from the ancien régime’s arbitrary procedures, the language of the text was 
consciously couched in ambiguous terms. The penal code contains twelve articles that 
imperfectly distinguish between crimes ‘contre la sûreté extérieure’ and ‘crimes contre la 
sûreté intérieure de l'état’ with the former (ie the first seven articles) targeting treasonous 
interaction with a foreign enemy and the latter, conspirational acts, albeit narrowly defined. 
 
56 This shift in focus mirrored the debate on the clergy which, according to Mitchell, had shifted from ‘freedom 
of worship to national security’. C J Mitchell, The French Legislative Assembly (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1988), p.53; 
Jules Mavidal, Émille Laurent (eds.), Archives Parlementaires de 1787 à 1860: Recueil Complet des Débats 
et Législatifs des Chambres Françaises (Paris: Librairie Administrative DePaul Dupont, 1869), XXXIV, 
p.330a. 
57 Bertrand Warufsel, Contre-Espionnage et Protection du Secret, op. cit., p.14; Sébastien Laurent, Politiques 
de l’ombre, op. cit., p.141.  
58 The entire penal code can be found in volume 31 of Archives Parlementaires, pp.326-339. In terms of 
defining offenses and pre-determining punishments, it marked a clear departure from the arbitrary procedures 
of the Ancien Regime, Pierre Lascoumes, ‘Le verso oublié du « catéchisme révolutionnaire: le code pénal du 6 
octobre 1791’, Cahiers de recherche sociologique, 13 (1989), 31-51.  
59 Jean-Christophe Gaven, Le Crime de lèse-nation: Histoire d’une invention juridique et politique (1789-
1791) (Paris: Presses de Sciences Po 2016), p.56. Carla Hesse, ‘La logique culturelle de la loi révolutionnaire’, 




Historically, high treason – whether by information sharing or otherwise – has long been 
considered a crime. For centuries, French rulers have acknowledged the importance of 
guarding state secrets and the need to protect sovereignty of the monarchy by prosecuting 
anyone contriving to sell, or trade, confidential information. In the 16th century, for example, 
François I (1494-1547) and Charles IX (1550-1574) both issued a series of royal ordinances 
which defined intelligence sharing as crimes of treason against the person of the monarch, a 
crime subsequently deemed by Shakespeare to be ‘worse than murder’.60  
Of course, treason does not necessarily imply the existence of a conspiracy. Whereas 
a conspirator is naturally a traitor, the opposite does not automatically hold true. Desertion, 
crossing enemy lines or professing infidelity to a cause does not signify that an individual is 
conspiring or secretly commissioning a hostile act. Treason can be an individual act unlike 
a conspiracy which, with its combined elements of secrecy, collusion and deception, is 
normally the result of collective action.61 The drafters of the penal code, deliberately or not, 
failed to adequately settle the distinction between treason and sedition, assigning the same 
predetermined sentence of death for both unequal offences.62 On the other hand, by indicting 
and awarding equal, mandatory penalties for the author and an accomplice of a political 
crime, - whether against the state, person or property - the penal code did empower the 
revolutionary authorities to avert a plot as soon as it could be determined that a group of 
individuals had entered into a treasonous arrangement, even if the design had not been put 
fully into effect.63 In other words, just planning or advocating a subversive act, without 
 
60 William Shakespeare, King Lear (2.4.28). For the royal ordinances, see the Ordonnance de Villers-Cotterets 
decreed by François I on 10 August 1539 and articles VII & IX of the ordonnance of Charles IX signed 16 
August 1563. Both are discussed in Adolphe Chauveau, Faustin Hélie (eds.), Théorie du Code Pénal, 2 vols 
(Paris: Librairie Alex Gobelet & Videcoq, 1836), II, pp.340-341.    
61 Geoffrey Cubitt, ‘Conspiracism, Secrecy and Security in Restoration France: Denouncing the Jesuit 
Menace’, Historical Social Research, 38.1 (2013), 107-128.  
62 The punishment of death for sedition was prescribed in article V, Title I and Section II of the Penal Code. 
63 See Article I, Part II, Title III, Complices des Crimes: ‘Or d’avoir sciemment, et dans le dessein du crime, 
aidé et assisté le coupable ou les coupables, soit dans les faits qui ont préparé ou facilité son exécution, soit 





actually executing it, constituted a political crime.64 As the German historian, Karl Härter, 
argues, this criminalization of conspiratorial/dissident groups, through the growing body of 
penal codes, statutes, edicts and ordinances, reflected a notable shift in the state’s security 
dispositive from punishment and retaliation for its own sake to ‘deterrence and prevention’.65    
Now, it could be argued that whilst the penal code was reasonably well formulated 
to tackle treason, interpreting its provisions as targeting espionage is to quote Robert 
Detourbet, ‘considerably forcing the meaning of the articles.’66 Detourbet, a late nineteenth 
century legal theoretician, was referring to the Penal Code of 1810. However, his 
interpretation of the text can justifiably be applied to its 1791 progenitor, of which the articles 
therein were reworded, almost verbatim, by Napoleon’s jurists.67 Indeed, the very vagueness 
of the terms found in the articles pertaining to crimes against the security of the state 
prompted legal theorists a century later to subsequently question the applicability of the 
Penal Code to legitimately combat espionage.68 For example, Article 76, the article under 
which Captain Dreyfus was notoriously convicted in 1894, troubled several judicial theorists 
who criticized its failure to provide a specific definition of what constituted ‘machinations’ 
with foreign powers.69 The problem of interpretation is also compounded by the fact that 
 
64 This doctrine of complicity, which Richard M Andrews credits as a ‘novelty’ in French penology, was not 
limited to actions but also to ‘discursive’ acts. Richard Andrews, ‘Boundaries of Citizenship: The Penal 
Regulation of Speech in Revolutionary France’, French Politics and Society, 7.3 (1989), 90-109 (p.93).; Other 
more or less public activities such as the manufacturing and distribution of seditious libels and pamphlets, 
protest gatherings and speeches and even ‘treason by word’ were penalised as well as political crimes, sedition, 
and treasonable speech, because, as Härter explains in his article, they could incite and even legitimize ‘political 
violence’. Karl Härter, ‘Political crime in early modern Europe: Assassination, legal responses and popular 
print media’, European Journal of Criminology, 11.2 (2014), 142 –168 (p.149). 
65 ibid, 149.   
66 Robert Detourbet, ‘L’espionnage et la trahison: Étude de Droit Français et de Législation Comparée’, 
Published PhD Thesis (Paris: L Larose, 1898), Deborah Susan Bauer, ‘Marianne is Watching: Knowledge, 
Secrecy, Intelligence and the Origins of the French Surveillance State (1870-1914)’, Unpublished PhD Thesis, 
University of California, 2013, 275. 
67 For a comparable study of the two penal codes see Anonymous, Étude de législation pénale comparée: Code 
français de 1810, avec les motifs, les Discussions au Conseil d’Etat et les dispositions correspondantes des 
codes de 1791 et de l’an IV (Paris: Librairie Auguste Durande, 1852).  
68 Victor Colonieu, L'Espionnage au point de vue du droit international et du droit pénal français (Paris: A. 
Rousseau, 1888), p.74.  
69 Deborah Bauer, ‘Marianne is watching’, op. cit., 298. Article 76 is an exact re-wording of Article I of Section 
I, Title I of the 1791 Penal Code: ‘Quiconque sera convaincu d'avoir pratiqué des machinations, ou entretenu 
des intelligences avec les puissances étrangères ou avec leurs agents, pour les engager à commettre des 
hostilités, ou pour leur indiquer les moyens d'entreprendre la guerre contre la France, sera puni de mort, soit 




nowhere in the Penal Code of 1791 can the term ‘espionage’, or a derivation of it, be found. 
Referring to it five years later, Merlin de Douai, the Directory’s Minister of Justice, claimed 
that even though the term ‘espionnage’ itself (or espion) does not exist anywhere within the 
code, it is ‘textuellement compris dans l'art. 4 de la 1ère section du tit. 1er. De là seconde 
partie’.70 Douai’s interpretation of the penal code, as it relates to the state security, requires 
qualification, however. Strictly speaking, Article IV does not punish espionage but 
subversion, which is semantically different. The term ‘subversion’ is quite nebulous, tending 
to broadly describe activities aimed at the attempted weakening or overthrow of an 
established authority from within. The recruitment of traitors, the incitement of rebellion, 
the promotion of civil war, the manipulation of electoral procedures etc are all subversive 
activities that would, to varying degree, ultimately threaten the integrity of the revolutionary 
state. Espionage, by contrast, is a more tangible concept, classically, although not 
exclusively, understood as the procurement and transmission to state enemies of 
unauthorized information by clandestine means. In other words, the acquisition and 
transmission of information is not in itself illegal. It is the nature of the intelligence which 
determines if its procurement is an act of espionage.71 Nevertheless, as the terminology in 
this chapter indicates- sometimes confusingly so- the revolutionaries did not appear to draw 
a consistently clear distinction between espionage, subversion and conspiracy at this 
juncture, perhaps perceiving, but certainly treating, the three to be inherently linked. Thus, 
whilst the Penal Code of 1791 was well conceived for punishing domestic, anti-subversive 
activities, it nevertheless offered a quite unsatisfactory legal framework for repressing 
espionage itself, especially when practiced by foreigners. After all, nowhere in the twelve 
articles pertaining to state security can reference to overseas actors be found. Moreover, even 
 
70 Arrête du Directoire exécutif, concernant la manière de juger les embauchers, 4 Ventôse an V cited in J B 
Duvergier (ed.), Lois, Décrets, Ordonnances, Réglemens, et Avis du Conseil d’État, 24 vols (Paris: A. Guyot 
et Scribe, 1825), IX, p.42. It was only when Napoleon’s jurists drafted the celebrated Penal Code of 1810 that, 
under article 78, the term espionnage was given a formal definition.  
71 This important distinction is made in Stéphan Hellin, ‘Espionnage et contre-espionnage en France au temps 




if it was implicitly understood in the text, espionage was not characterized as a political 
crime. In other words, while the code itself did not distinguish between a state of war or 
peace, the language contained in the articles suggests that the drafters anticipated future 
hostilities and intended to punish any Frenchman who could be deemed responsible for their 
outbreak. If anything, only articles 11 and 13 of the military’s justice code of 19 October 
1791 contained specific infractions for espionage but, again, they were just applicable to 




Either way, one person who did profess dissatisfaction with the penal code was the 
Girondin lawyer, Jacques Pierre Brissot. On 20 October 1791, in his address to the 
Legislative Assembly on the problems of emigration, Brissot denounced the moderate, if not 
negligent, policies of the constituents, arguing that the émigrés would not be deterred by any 
of the discriminatory laws, or statutory sentences, so far enacted against them.73 The 
problem, he reasoned, was that such legislative measures were essentially unenforceable as 
the émigrés- the Revolution’s most intransigent opponents- were mostly assembling beyond 
the Rhine, and by extension, beyond French jurisdiction.74 The threat, in other words, was 
transnational.75 Instead, Brissot proposed a two-pronged strategy: First, to pursue and punish 
them abroad and second, to compel, by force if necessary, these same powers to abandon 
 
72 Both articles are quoted in full in Bertrand Warufsel, Contre-Espionnage, op. cit., p.144; For more on the 
1791 military code, see Charles H Hammond, ‘The French Revolution and the Enlightening of Military 
Justice’, Proceedings of the Western Society for French History, 34 (2006), 134-146. 
73 AP, op. cit. XXXIV, p.310. The author stands in agreement with Mitchell who argues that the Constituent 
Assembly ultimately created its own problem with the émigrés and refractory clergy and then ‘largely ignored 
them’, C Mitchell, The French Legislative Assembly, op. cit., p.43;  
74 During his speech Brissot insisted that the émigrés would never accept France’s new order: ‘Leur coeur est 
endurci dès leur naissance; ils se croient et se croiront toujours les souverains nés du peuple, et chercheront 
toujours à le ramener au joug.’ AP, op. cit. XXXIV, p. 310. 
75 Transnational security has been usefully defined as a ‘paradigm for understanding the ways in which 
governments and non-state actors functioning within and across state borders interact and affect the defense of 
states and their citizens.’ Richard Shultz, Roy Godson and George Quester, (eds.), Security Studies for the 21st 




them.76 As he demanded, ‘c'est au-delà du Rhin qu'il faut frapper, et non pas en France.’77 
In hindsight, Brissot was not altogether wrong to complain about the assembly’s response to 
the emigration. For the first two years of the Revolution, the émigrés were treated with a 
degree of leniency by the constituents who were mostly relieved to see them leave France.78 
As Jean Michel Lacombe, the deputy du Tarn, declared, it was better to have ‘declared 
enemies’ abroad than ‘faithless servants’ in their midst.79 Equally, despite the avowed 
purpose of the National Assembly’s Comité des Recherches, and its municipal counterpart 
in Paris, to ‘démasquer les trames, complots et conspirations’ agitating the nation, only a 
relatively small number of individuals were ultimately investigated and prosecuted for the 
crime of lèse-nation during this same period, with scores among them even contesting the 
authority of the courts to hear their cases. Between July 1789 and the Autumn of 1791, of 
the hundred and seventy three individuals accused of high crimes, only forty two legal 
proceedings were initiated by the Châtelet and its successor, the provisional Haute Cour 
Nationale established at Orléans.80  
 
76 The perception that elements emanating from the ‘outside’ (ie society or abroad) posed a transnational threat 
to domestic security was, of course, not new in eighteenth century French history. As Härter has demonstrated, 
the spectre of marginal groups such as foreign vagrants and bandits freely traversing continental frontiers 
ultimately led to the imposition of several domestic security controls such as border patrolling, the formation 
of paramilitary forces, as well as the conclusion of extradition treaties, notably between France and the Swabian 
and Franconian Circles of the Holy Roman Empire in 1731 and 1741 respectively. The problem is that the 
ability to make incursions, or to respect the extradition treaties, largely depended on a measure of neighborly 
goodwill and cooperation, a relationship that was violently disrupted with the Revolution. Karl Härter, 
‘Security and cross-border political crime: The formation of transnational security regimes in 18th and 19th 
century Europe’, Historical Social Research, 38.1, (2013) 96-106. 
77 AP, op. cit. XXXIV, p.311. As Brissot declared, ‘Je vous l'ai déjà fait pressentir, messieurs, toutes vos lois 
et contre les émigrants, et contre les rebelles, et contre leurs chefs, seront inutiles, si vous n'y joignez pas une 
mesure essentielle, seule propre à en assurer le succès; et cette mesure concerne la conduite que vous avez à 
tenir à l'égard des puissances étrangères qui soutiennent et encouragent ces émigrations et cette révolte.’. 
78 Godechot goes so far as to state that the first law enacted against the émigrés dated 22 December 1790 was 
‘extrêmement bénigne’. It demanded their return to France or risk forfeiture of their private incomes and 
salaries. Jacques Godechot, La Contre-Révolution, 1789-1804 (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1961), 
p.154; Shapiro, meanwhile, argues that the early revolutionaries treated their opponents with ‘a degree of 
restraint and indulgence.’ Barry Shapiro, Revolutionary justice in 1789–1790 (Cambridge: CUP, 1993), p.223. 
79 Quoted in C Mitchell, The Legislative Assembly, op. cit., p.45.  
80 Until October 1790, crimes of lèse-nation were adjudicated by the Châtelet de Paris, the judiciary institution 
from the ancien régime. However, in April 1791, after six months during which the accused were left to 
languish in prison, the jurisdictional competence was transferred to the Haute Cour nationale provisoire 
d’Orléans. Jean-Christophe Gavet (ed.), ‘Les vigiles de la nation’, op. cit., 267-384.  Yet, it cannot be said that 
the Haute Cour dispensed punishment with any great zeal either. Among the individuals whose case was 
transferred there was Cardinal de Rohan, an arch-conspirator, but even he was only tried and condemned for 




Brissot’s demands for the deployment of preemptive actions were, during the course 
of the legislative sessions, seconded by Jean Antoine d’Averhoult, the deputy of Ardennes. 
Expressing concern with the build-up of the émigré army, the latter warned the assembly 
that ‘tout délai de notre part entretient l’inquiétude des bons citoyens, refroidit leur zèle, 
augmente l’espoir des ennemis secrets, occasionne des séditions et prépare à ceux d’outre-
Rhin cet instant favorable qu’ils guettent’.81 Whilst this perceived threat from the émigré 
army was naturally conceived in military terms, and thus required a military response if 
necessary, d’Averhoult nevertheless pressed ahead for coercive, diplomatic pressure to be 
exerted on the Germanic princes to force its disbandment.82 Although both their views were 
not universally accepted, even occasioning violent debate within the Assembly, Brissot and 
d’Avernoult were correct to point out that the strength of the emigration derived from the 
ostensible support it received from outside. No matter how much confidence they exuded, 
feigned or otherwise, the émigrés themselves never posed a real threat to the Revolution 
during the autumn and winter of 1791.83 Despite being augmented by German mercenaries, 
their army was fragmented, impoverished and incapable of pitching battle alone. Only with 
the pecuniary and material resources they solicited from their benefactors in Piémont, 
Worms, Savoy, London etc, not to mention the prospect of a military alliance as vaguely 
inferred in the Declaration of Pilnitz, was it possible for the emigration to be sustained at all. 
In any event, with the officer corps of the royal army in a state of disintegration, and 
mounting signs of religious and anti-seigneurial opposition within the interior, many of the 
deputies found persuasive the accusations that the real source of France’s instability derived 
from the complicit support that the émigrés, the non-juring priests, and the European powers 
 
81 Guillaume N Lallement (ed.), 1791-1792: Choix de Rapports, Opinions et Discours prononcés à la Tribune 
Nationale (Paris: A Eymery, 1819), VIII, p.251. 
82 That the threat was conceived in military terms was expressed by Jean-Antoine Lafargue de Grangeneuve, 
who estimated ‘qu’il nous faut une armée de cent cinquante mille hommes pour déjouer leurs desseins’. ibid, 
p.296. 
83 Jean-Clément Martin (ed.), La Contre-Révolution en Europe: XVIIIe-XIXe siècles. Réalités politiques et 




constituted for the counterrevolution.84 Pierre-Victurnien Vergniaud, a supporter of the 
Girondin faction, echoed Brissot’s rhetoric, arguing that the mobilization of the émigrés 
across the Rhine, purportedly directed by the French chancellery at Coblence, was prima 
facie evidence alone of a royalist plan to subvert the revolutionary state. As he rhetorically 
asked on 25 October 1791: 
 
S'il n'existe plus aucune espèce de danger, d'où viennent ces troubles intérieurs qui 
déchirent les départements, cet embarras dans les affaires publiques? pourquoi ce 
cordon d'émigrants qui, s'étendant chaque jour, cerne une partie de nos frontières? 
Qu'on m'explique ces apparitions alternatives de quelques hommes de Coblentz aux 
Tuileries, et de quelques hommes des Tuileries à Coblentz.85  
 
Whilst the counter-revolution was not guided by a single epicenter, it has been demonstrated 
how, during the Legislative period, the deputies consistently employed rhetoric which 
indicated that they now believed, or claimed belief, in the existence of a centrally 
orchestrated, grand conspiracy.86 During the National Assembly, conspirational fears appear 
to be more or less periodic with a number of deputies otherwise skeptical about the existence 
of purported plots and conspiracies that were being concocted either in the interior or from 
across its borders.87 As Tackett argues, it was only after the flight of Varennes, when 
 
84 According to one calculation, over 2100 noble officers left France between 15 September 1791 and 1 
December 1791 totaling 6000 for the whole year. Peter McPhee, The French Revolution, 1789-1799 (Oxford: 
OUP, 2002), p.76. 
85 AP, op. cit., XXXIV, p. 402. 
86 Jacques Godechot, La Contre-Révolution,op.cit., p.149, Timothy Tackett, ‘A Conspiracy Obsession in a 
Time of Revolution: French Elites and the Origins of the Terror’, American Historical Review, 105 (2000), 
691-713 (p.707).; On the Girondins and fear of a conspiracy by the monarchy and the ‘Austrian Committee’ 
see the work by Tom Kaiser including: Thomas E. Kaiser, ‘Who’s Afraid of Marie-Antoinette?  Diplomacy, 
Austrophobia, and the Queen,’ French History, 14 (2000), 241-271; Thomas E. Kaiser, ‘From the Austrian 
Committee to the Foreign Plot: Marie-Antoinette, Austrophobia and the Terror’, French Historical Studies, 
26.4 (2003), 579-617, Thomas E. Kaiser, ‘Entre les mots et les choses: le fantôme du “Comité Autrichien”’, in 
Anne Duprat (ed.), Révolutions et mythes identitaires: mots, violences, mémoire (Paris: CHCSC de 
l’Université de Versailles Saint-Quentin-en-Yvelines, 2009). 
87 As the deputy Jean François Gaultier de Biauzat declared, ‘I have never really placed any credence in them, 
and you have seen that (such beliefs) were totally unfounded.’ Quoted in Timothy Tackett, The Coming of the 




captured documents revealed the true extent of the royal government’s duplicity that many 
of them began to take seriously the possibility of an organized conspiracy.88 One person who 
did not underestimate the danger of the counter-revolution or the problem of combatting the 
espionage activity underwriting it, was the journalist, agitator and self-appointed 
‘surveillant’ of the nation’s enemies, Jean Louis Carra. On 12 November 1791, three days 
after the Legislative Assembly promulgated the decree declaring ‘les émigrés suspects of 
conspiration contre la patrie’, he delivered a long discourse during which he posed the 
following questions:     
 
Première question: Existe-t-il une conspiration contre la liberté, les droits, la 
constitution et le repos du peuple Français ?  
 
Deuxième question: Quels sont les conspirateurs et au nom de qui prétendent-ils agir? 
 
Troisième question: Quels ont été depuis la révolution quels sont aujourd’hui, et 
quels seront pour la suite immédiatement les projets et les moyens combinés des 
conspirateurs du dedans et du dehors?  
 
Quatrième question: Comment réprimer efficacement ces conspirateurs et arrêter la 
marche de leurs complots combinés avec certaines cours étrangères? 
 
Cinquième et dernière question: Qu'arrivera-t-il si, au lieu d'employer les moyens 
coercitifs de puissance nationale et souveraine et de droits naturels contre la 
 
evidence pointing to these purported plots, the deputy Amable-Gilbert Dufraisse-Duchey complained how ‘On 
nous parle sans cesse de conspiration sans nous donner la moindre preuve’. AP, X, op. cit., pp.168-169. 
88 Although subsequently annulled, the law prohibited anyone from emigrating, prescribed a passport to travel 





conspiration générale, on n'emploie que des palliatifs, des vaines menaces, des demi-
moyens, des décrets inexécutés ou interprétatifs au gré de ceux qui seront chargés de 
leur exécution?89 
 
Conforming to the spirit of Title 1 of 2nd part of the penal code, the decree against the émigrés 
was designed to be both punitive in nature and preventive in purpose.90 Yet, with the 
emigration continuing apace over the following months, it was clear, as Carra predicted, that 
the November decree would fail to deter the émigrés by such draconian measures alone.91 
As his questions imply, the revolutionary state was best preserved not just by the severity of 
its penal code but by the strictness of the measures to protect it. The problem, however, was 
not so much in identifying the militants ie the ‘rebelles ouverts’ who were, more often than 
not, publicly brandishing arms and boasting of their royalist plans. After two years, the 
revolutionaries (and royalist ministers) had gained a reasonable understanding of the 
émigrés’ activities abroad, mostly gathered from piecemeal intelligence. The inventory of 
papers deposited by the Constituent Assembly’s Comité des Recherches contain a number 
of reports from the (albeit not always reliable) agents that they dispatched abroad or from 
the individuals who volunteered to spy on the émigrés on the comité’s or assembly’s behalf.92 
At the same time, it gleaned much of its knowledge not only from double agents but from 
the letters which were intercepted from abroad.93 Between October and November 1790, for 
 
89 Jean-Louis Carra, Discours sur la conspiration d'Outre Rhin et sur les moyens les plus efficaces à employer 
relativement aux puissances étrangères qui accueillent et soutiennent cette conspiration par J.-L. Carra. 
(Paris: Société des Amis de la Constitution, 1791), p.34. 
90 The motion that the decree conformed to ‘titre ler de la seconde partie’ of the penal code was proposed by 
the législateur, Pierre-Édouard Lémontey. 25 October 1791, AP, XXXIV, op.cit., p.714. 
91 Godechot states that the departures from France during these months were ‘massifs’. Just how many 
Frenchmen emigrated throughout the Revolutionary period is not entirely certain with estimates ranging from 
100,000 to 150,000 in total. The official list of émigrés commissioned by Napoleon in 1800 cites 145,000, 
Jacques Godechot, La Contre-Révolution, op. cit., p.151. 
92 See, for example, the folio concerning the ‘dénonciation et délibération du directoire du département au sujet 
d'une lettre reçue au Mêle-sur-Sarthe et communiquée par lui à l'Assemblée nationale, contenant les détails sur 
les agissements du comte d'Artois et des émigrés à Ath (Horinant).’ AN D/XXIII/1 dossier 34, pièces 14-19, 
dated 21 September 1791. 
93 On 23 June 1791 the Comité des Recherches de la municipalité de Paris sent a procès-verbal from the section 




example, the Constituent Assembly’s Comité des Recherches received a voluminous report 
from a ‘prétendu avocat au Parlement, named Goisset who, along with two spies, passed 
themselves as counter-revolutionaries in Switzerland and Savoy.94 The Comité des 
Recherches also curated intelligence from the bundles of letters originating from Jersey and 
Germany on the propaganda and recruitment attempts made by the Prince de Condé’s army, 
as well as the living conditions of the émigrés installed there.95 Likewise, the archives of the 
Comité des Rapports, though less rich than the Comité des Recherches, contain several 
reports on the menées of the émigrés and counter revolutionaries at Bâle as well on the 
frontier of the Rhine.96 Otherwise, one of the most noteworthy intelligence reports was the 
Comte de Montmorin’s secret communiqué of 5 May 1791 on ‘des intérêts et dispositions 
des princes étrangers et de leurs liaisons avec les Français émigrés’ found scattered among 
the papers of the Comité Diplomatique and bearing the title ‘Mémoire sur la situation, les 
forces et les projets des princes possessionnés en Alsace, des Français rassemblés le long 
des frontières helvétiques et germaniques depuis Lausanne jusqu’à Trêves et sur les 
dispositions de la Franche-Comté de l’Alsace et de la Lorraine.’97  
Despite the presence of harmless refugees among the émigrés, the revolutionaries 
nevertheless possessed sufficient, workable intelligence to prepare for a military incursion. 
The real challenge for them, on the other hand, lay in uncovering and thwarting the designs 
of the ‘rebelles cachés’, ie their subaltern agents who, having remained in France, were 
surreptitiously engaged in the auxiliary operations, whether in terms of suborning and 
 
different towns throughout the kingdom and abroad, hidden in several issues of the Journal de Prudhomme. 
ibid, dossier 382, pièces n°25 et 26. 
94 Emmanuel Vingtrinier, op. cit., II, pp. 52 et 53. 
95 See, for example, the letter dated 18 May 1790 from a ‘princesse très bonne patriote’ sent to the National 
Assembly’s Comité des Recherches by Alexandre-César Perron, a member of the Comité des Recherches de 
la municipalité de Paris, denouncing the intrigues of Louis de Lorraine, Prince de Lambesc at Metz, the 
activities of émigré troops in the German region of Lorraine, their collusion with the German princes and the 
‘menées’ of the clergy. AN D/XXIXbis/6 dossier 79, pièces n°12 et 13. Otherwise, for folios on the despatch 
of agents to Switzerland to spy on the sieurs d'Autichamp, de Bonneville, d'Algrain and the vicomte de 
Mirabeau, see AN DXXIXbis/32 dossier 329, pièces 7-44.  
96 For dossiers on the ‘menées’ of the émigrés and counter-revolutionaries at Bâle and on the Rhine frontier 
see, for example, AN D/XXIX/12 dossier 96.  




recruiting volunteers, spying on defenses, procuring arms and other material or inciting 
domestic insurrection through propaganda and bribery.98 As Carra declared during his 
discourse, even if :  
 
La nation française se trouverait forcée d'entrer elle-même à main armée sur les terres 
desdits électeurs pour détruire ce repaire de conspirateurs et de traîtres’, it would still 
be confronted with the problem of identifying the ‘trop grand nombre’ of 
‘administrateurs dévoués à l'ancien régime… sur lesquels les conspirateurs du dedans 
et du dehors n'ont cessé de compter, non-seulement pour favoriser une guerre civile 
et une invasion au moment donné.99  
 
This connection between the buildup of the émigré army and the clandestine, auxiliary 
operations within the interior was most clearly drawn by Jean Antoine d’Averhoult who, on 
27 November 1791, explained how:  
 
On sait que le nombre de ceux en état de porter les armes peut aller à vingt mille 
hommes, dont environ quatre à cinq mille officiers et soldats déserteurs ou anciens 
militaires : le recrutement continuel, les achats d’armes, de chevaux, d’équipages, de 
munitions et de vivres, tout prouve qu’ils… comptent sur les troubles intérieurs qu’ils 
excitent et entretiennent par toutes sortes de moyens, ainsi que sur les relations 
secrètes qu’ils peuvent avoir conservées dans quelques-uns des places frontières.100 
 
98 Brissot actually distinguished between three categories of émigrés, the princes, the officials and the rank and 
file, each of which posed their own set of problems. See Étienne Lehodey de Saultchevreuil (ed.), Journal de 
l'Assemblée nationale, ou Journal logographique (Paris: chez Le Hodey, 1791), I, 450-451. 
99 Carra, Discours, op. cit., pp.28-29. 
100 Guillaume N Lallement (ed.), 1791-1792: Choix de Rapports, Opinions et Discours prononcés à la Tribune 
Nationale (Paris: A Eymery, 1819), VIII, p.250. A good example of these auxiliary operations at this juncture 
involved the agents of the Cardinal de Rohan. In December 1791 the juge de paix at Strasbourg, the sieur 
Roederer, issued an arrest warrant for a group of them that included François-Michel de Loyauté, a chevalier 
de Louis, Hyacinthe Joseph de Silly and Louis-Joseph Mayer, dit Saint-Louis. According to the acte 
d’accusation dated 16 December 1791, they were accused ‘comme prévenus de complots & attentas contre la 






Yet, despite the mounting evidence, and the calls for greater vigilance, the Comité de 
Surveillance that was subsequently formed on 25 November 1791, almost two months 
following the suppression of the Constituent Assembly’s Comité des Recherches was largely 
ill-equipped to avert the high crimes designated lesé-nation.101 Unlike the Comités des 
Recherches, the committee possessed neither the authority to track or interrogate suspects, 
make domiciliary visits, or issue arrest warrants. Nor did it dispose of its own agents 
d’éxecution or discretionary funds.102 Instead, following pressure from the feuillants, its 
functions were reduced to receiving, collating and analyzing intelligence, mostly in the form 
of written denunciations, before sending their reports and recommendations to the 
assembly.103 This restriction of the comité’s remit reflects not just the fundamental mistrust 
of concentrated power that subsisted throughout the early period of the Revolution but to the 
manner of which power can also be arrogated, especially when bureaucratic structures and 
practices are still malleable. As the feuillants made clear, the National Assembly’s Comité 
des Recherches had repeatedly overstepped its prescribed authority by appropriating 
investigative and prosecutorial powers for itself.104 It was for this reason that, to prevent the 
 
deliver the fortress at Strasbourg to an armed force composed of six hundred émigrés. L Prudhomme (ed.), 
Révolutions de Paris, dediée à la Nation (Paris: 1791), p.550. 
101 In reality, as Martucci makes clear, the Constituents did not provide a legal definition of the crime of lèse-
nation itself, preferring, instead, to employ the notion of crimes against the security of the state. Roberto 
Martucci, ‘Qu'est-ce que la lèse-nation? À propos du problème de l'infraction politique sous la constituante 
(1789-1791)’, Déviance et société, 24.4 (1990), 377-393. Roberto Martucci, ‘L'enjeu pénal à l'Assemblée 
constituante: Un chantier prometteur (1789-1791)’, Dix-huitième Siècle, 37.1 (2005), 283-303. G. A. Kelly, 
‘From Lèse-majeste to Lèse-nation: Treason in 18th century France’, Journal of the History of Ideas, 42 (1981), 
269-86. 
102 Michel Eude, ‘Le Comité de Surveillance de l’Assemblée Législative (1791-1792)’, Annales historiques de 
la Révolution Française, 36. 176 (1964), 129–148 (p.130). As Brissot complained to the Legislative Assembly, 
‘votre comité de surveillance ne peut suppléer à cette impuissance du corps législatif. Il n'a aucun pouvoir ni 
d'amener, ni d'arrêter, ni d'interroger’. August Amic, Étienne Mouttet, (eds.), Choix des discours et des rapports 
les plus remarquables prononcés dans nos Assemblées Parlementaires depuis 1789 jusqu’en 1840 (Paris: Aux 
Tribune de la Tribune Française, 1840), I, p.595. 
103 ibid, p.142. In proposing its creation, Claude Basire stated, ‘nous somme environnés de conspirateurs, 
partout des trames se préparent et sans cesse on vous dénonce des faits particuliers qui se lient à la grande 
conspiration sur l’existence de laquelle aucun de nous ne peut avoir de doutes. Ces faits sont tous isolés, et s’ils 
étaient réunis, ils formeraient un corps de délit qui jetteraient enfin un grand jour sur les intentions de nos 
ennemis…. ' AP, XXXV, op.cit,, p.361.  




committee from becoming a national instrument for any one political faction, the proposed 
solution was to limit its functions and rotate its members. Unfortunately, as Michel Eude 
had discovered, and which this author can more or less verify, most of the papers pertaining 
to the Comité de Surveillance no longer exists and the remaining dossiers are mainly undated 
and scattered amongst the papers of the various committees of the period.105 Consequently, 
the inner workings, ambitions and even the activities of the comité remain largely unknown. 
However, what can be reasonably determined is as follows.  
The purpose of the Comité de Surveillance was not just to gather intelligence on 
counter-revolutionary activity in France but to collect information on all forms of domestic 
opposition, potential, conflated or otherwise. As one of its foremost members, Claude Basire, 
made clear, it should be ‘chargé de recueillir toutes les pièces qui ont rapport aux faits qui 
pourraient troubler la sécurité publique’.106 In other words, whilst the comité was formed in 
response to claims that state employees were being incited to emigrate, it was ultimately 
charged with reporting on civil disturbance in all its ‘myriad forms’, whether in terms of 
counter-revolution, radical agitation, or popular resistance.107 To discharge this function, the 
comité solicited- like the Comité de Recherches before it- the cooperation of the various state 
and governmental institutions both within the capital, where it sat, and throughout the 
country. In Paris, for example, the principal sources of intelligence were the commissaires 
de police elected in each section and the city mayor, Jérôme Pétion de Villeneuve.108 On 27 
 
demanded that the committee account for itself. As he rhetorically asked, ‘Oserais-je demander au comité quel 
est le but de son institution? Sans doute il agit en vertu d'un pouvoir: quel est-il? Trouve-t-il ce pouvoir dans 
un de vos décrets?’, AP, XVIII, op. cit., pp.667-668.  
105 Michel Eude, ‘Le Comité de Surveillance’, op. cit., p.130. There are no dossiers in series D (Comité 
d’Assemblées) at the Archives Nationales, nor do the registres of the procès-verbaux in either original or 
digitized format exist. On the other hand, folio F7 81, titled ‘1791 et Années Suivantes. Déclarations et 
dénonciations faites au Comité de Surveillance’ do contain a few dossiers of limited interest.  
106 Quoted in Michel Eude, ‘Le Comité de Surveillance’, op. cit., p.134. Eude does not cite the original source 
nor was the author able to trace this quote in the debates printed in the Archives Parlementaires. A section of 
the debates regarding the Comité’s formation can, however, be found in Étienne Lehodey de Saultchevreuil 
(ed.), Journal de l'Assemblée nationale, ou Journal logographique (Paris: Chez Baudouin, 1791), IV, p.248. 
107 Howard G Brown, Ending the French Revolution: Violence, Justice, and Repression from the Terror to 
Napoleon (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2006), p.1. 
108 On 29 December 1791, for example, the commissaire de police de la section de l'Arsenal, M Virvau, wrote 
to the president of the Comité de Surveillance informing him of a ‘complot’ which was supposedly brewing in 




April 1792, Pétion sent the Comité de Surveillance a copy of a letter accusing M. de 
Lambelle, the Chevalier de Saint-Louis of maintaining ‘intelligences secrètes avec le comte 
d'Artois’ adding that ‘il doit rejoindre sous peu afin de prendre, de concert avec le 
Département de Police, les mesures nécessaires pour découvrir et suivre le fil de cette 
intrigue.’109 As mayor, Pétion was officially responsible for maintaining order within the 
capital by, as he acknowledges, investigating and suppressing counter-revolutionary activity. 
In other words, it was the mayor’s office that, during this critical phase of the French 
Revolution, was in charge of counter-espionage operations in Paris, essentially filling the 
vacuum created by the suppression of the Lieutenance de Police in 1789. Indeed, until the 
end of the constitutional period, Pétion would continually reassure his superior, Terrier de 
Monciel, the Ministre de l'Intérieur, ‘qu'il ne cesse de prendre des mesures pour le maintien 
de l'ordre et pour déjouer les manoeuvres des conspirateurs’, measures that were also 
executed in conjunction with paid companies of National Guardsmen and financed through 
the allocation of discretionary funds.110 As one deputy claimed, Pétion thus possessed ‘ tous 
les moyens nécessaires pour ‘y maintenir l’ordre et la sûreté, pour éclater la conduite des 
gens suspects.’ 111  
Beyond the capital, the Comité de Surveillance depended on the intelligence reports 
of its envois extraordinaires such as Charles Barbaroux, the deputy for the department of 
the Bouches-du-Rhône or M Rutteau who was deployed to the northern frontier in 1792 in 
 
declared that the conspirators were meeting every day at the residence of M. de Vienne, an architect and former 
inspector of public works and possessing ‘des espions très adroits pour ne pas se laisser surprendre’. Alexandre 
Tuetey (ed.), Répertoire général des sources manuscrites de l'histoire de Paris pendant la Révolution français: 
Assemblée legislative, 11 vols (Paris Imprimerie Nouvelle, 1902), VI, p.25. 
109 Alexandre Tuetey (ed.), Répertoire général, op. cit., VI, p.27. Bulletin 207. 
110 ibid, IV, p. ‘Lettre de M. Pétion, Maire de Paris, à M. Terrier de Monciel, Ministre de l'Intérieur, 22 juin 
1792 (4 h. 3/4 du matin)’ Original signé, AN F7 3688 (doss ?); For evidence of these funds, see the note in the 
archives of the Comité des Recherches, ‘États des dépenses secrètes du maire de Paris et du commandant 
général de la garde nationale pour la surveillance tant des individus suspectés de tramer des complots contre-
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ibid, X,p.319. bulletin 2933,  AN DXXIX/34 dossier 357, pièce 1. 
111 Étienne Lehodey de Saultchevreuil, (ed.), Journal de l'Assemblée nationale, ou Journal logographique, 




the capacity of ‘secrétaire-commis du Comité de surveillance de l'Assemblée nationale.’112 
Rutteau, a former regimental officer, had acted unofficially as a double agent for the Comité 
des Recherches and was involved in a sting operation which led to the arrest of two suspected 
royalist agents, les sieurs Lacombe et Thévenot, both of whom were accused of attempting 
to suborn national guardsmen for the Prince de Condé.113 Otherwise, like its nominal 
predecessor, the Comité de Surveillance relied heavily on the strict vigilance of the corps 
municipaux, tribunaux de districts, administrations départementales, and of course, the 
proliferation of patriotic societies and clubs, all of which transmitted their reports either 
directly or indirectly via the mayor or administrateurs du Département de Police.114  
Significantly, in the very few cases during the constitutional period where 
proceedings for the crime of espionage had actually been raised, the comité played no 
contributory role at all in either the investigative or judicial stages. Attesting to its limited 
role, the comité was only made aware of these individual cases either indirectly via the 
directoire du département or, in one known instance, by the Assembly itself.115 Although it 
 
112 For Barbaroux’s exchanges with the Comité de Surveillance see Alfred Chabaud (ed.), Correspondance et 
Mémoires de Barbaroux: Édition critique augmentée de lettres inédites (Paris: Société de l'histoire de la 
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1792.’ Reproduced in Tuetey (ed.), Répertoire, VI, op. cit., p.27. Tuetey only provides the incomplete 
reference, AN D III 235. Lettres des administrateurs au Département de Police au Comité de surveillance de 
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Département de Police, par des municipalités ou citoyens de divers départements, touchant des individus 
suspects se rendant à Paris et qu'il est bon de surveiller. 6-18 June 1792. Originaux et extraits signés (19 p.), 
AN/F7/4590. 
115 During the séance of 29 April 1792, the Assembly received a report from the Directoire du Rhin containing 
the records of a trial instigated by the Tribunal of the District de Belfort ‘contre un particulier prévenu 
d’espionnage’. Anonymous, Procès-verbal des séances de l’Assemblée nationale législative (Paris: 
L’Imprimerie Nationale, 1792) XIV, pp.47-48. Equally, on 24 July 1792, the Assembly sent the Comité de 
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is impossible to determine just how many reports were transmitted to, and filtered by, the 
Comité de Surveillance, it is reasonable to assume that they were not inconsiderable. In May 
1792, for example, Claude Basire announced how ‘le Comité de Surveillance a reçu cent-
cinquante lettres, qui lui ont été adressées par les officiers municipaux des diverses 
municipalités de l’empire’ declaring alone that the refractory priests ‘se rendent actuellement 
en foule à Paris.’116 Indeed, such was the perceived effect of the comité’s omnipresence that 
it was accused of having established ‘un vaste système d’espionnage dans toutes les parties 
du royaume’.117 Leaving aside the validity of this supposition, that such a ‘système’ 
succeeded in being ‘vaste’ in scope, Ternaux unintentionally raises a key point which 
requires qualification. Although an important mission, state organized espionage is 
essentially a limited, focused activity both in peace and wartime that principally targets 
foreign powers as well as their accredited embassies, institutions and installations, civil and 
military. Above all, it is an activity which is performed clandestinely. Yet, in so far as it was 
directed at the kingdom of France, this ‘système’ did not conform to this traditional model 
of renseignement. It would be more accurate to say, on the other hand, that the 
revolutionaries sought to conduct surveillance en masse, both covertly and overtly, with the 
purpose of monitoring as many people in France as possible. This is not to say that their 
surveillance was not occasionally targeted- which this thesis will continue to demonstrate 
throughout- but that this surveillance inescapably overlapped with its broader, indiscriminate 
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Semantics aside, the difficulty of identifying the enemy within helps explain why the 
revolutionaries continued the ancien régime’s practice of attempting to surveil the general 
population.119 As anyone could potentially be a counter-revolutionary, it followed that 
everyone should be observed. The problem, so the revolutionaries conceived, was that 
masked patriots seldom leave evidence of their real intentions and that, without the existence 
of forensic evidence, or the structural capabilities to perform mass surveillance itself, the 
easiest, although obviously not the sole method of revealing the real face of a conspirator 
was for everyone to watch and denounce each-other.120 As Tackett explains:  
 
The pervasiveness of fear and rumour, undergirded with the emerging accusatory 
culture of denunciations, had the potential for creating a kind of “everyday terror” 
where everyone spied on everyone else: a vicious circle of grassroots suspicion that, 
in some respects, preceded and prefigured the institutional Terror of 1793–1794.121   
 
In propagating this cycle of suspicion, the comité’s efforts do not appear to be negligible. 
Despite possessing no immediate power to erect or dismantle the structures of control and 
surveillance, the comité made good use of the popular pressure for dévoilement by 
encouraging the vigilant self-policing of communities and the proliferation of written 
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denunciations on a local level.122 To this end, it relied on both the code of criminal procedure 
and the 1791 penal code which made denunciations a civic requirement. As article 1, Title 
VI, part I of the latter prescribes: 
Tout homme qui aura été témoin d’un attentat, soit contre la liberté et la vie d’un 
autre homme, soit contre la sûreté publique ou individuelle, sera tenu d’en donner 
aussitôt avis à l’officier de police du lieu du délit.123 
 
To be sure, it is impossible to know whether this law had actually compelled people to 
denounce or betray a conspiracy, or whether they would have done so in any event. Since 
the fall of the Bastille, the revolutionaries had repeatedly instructed the French population 
that denunciation was a virtuous act and to preserve one’s silence, despite knowledge of a 
political crime, was to render them complicit too. In this, the revolutionary dénonciateur 
citoyen, as characterized by Jean Paul Marat, was distinguished from the denigrated 
‘mouchard’ of the ancien régime.124 Jean Dusaulx, in his Dix Commandements des Français, 
instructed his readers to ‘surveille les ennemis de la liberté, ne crains pas de dénoncer leurs 
conspirations, ton silence te rendrait aussi coupable qu'eux.’125 Other hommes de lettres had 
also offered techniques in identifying so-called ‘charlatans du patriotism’. The pamphleteer 
 
122 On 28 July 1792, for example, the departmental authorities on the Lower Rhine sent a circular inviting its 
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contre la liberté’. Archives départementales du Bas Rhin, sous-série 1L 143 N°89. 
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and future deputy of Puy-de-Dôme, Jacques-Antoine Dulaure, distinguished them from loyal 
patriots, not by any conventional, suspicious disposition, but by their ‘pétulance marquée, 
par des exagérations affectées, par une audace à offrir sans cesse des mesures qui 
peuvent compromettre la liberté publique, par des déclamations, des clameurs, des élans 
continuels’.126 On the other hand, the Jacobin Leader, Georges Couthon, famously declared  
that:  
 
Dans les révolutions tous les bons citoyens doivent être physionomistes; tous ceux 
qui ont aujourd'hui la mine patibulaire, les yeux hagards, un costume évidemment 
déguisé, sont de mauvais citoyens que tout vrai républicain a le droit d'arrêter sur le 
champ.127 
 
He was essentially elaborating on the 18th century theory propounded by Johann Casper 
Lavater whose treatise ‘L'art de connaître les hommes d'après les traits de leur physionomie’ 
became police practice under the ancien régime.128 As the title of his study indicates, he 
claimed that the real personality- and thus latent motives- of an individual can be deciphered 
not only by the way a person dressed, spoke and comported themselves but by their facial 
features too.129 It would appear that such primers were genuinely welcomed by members of 
the public who concurred with the political authorities that denunciations were necessary for 
the greater good.130 Gensonné nevertheless pointed out that the declarations sent to the 
comité did not constitute ‘preuves légales’ and therefore could not be legitimately used to 
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level an acte d’accusation against a suspected conspirator.131 Citing the loi de Septembre, he 
made clear that a denunciation was essentially the ‘premier indice’, or clue, that marked the 
point of origin for police and judicial enquiries but that it could, in no case, serve as proof 
or substitution of proof, not least because the author chose to remain anonymous.132 In this, 
he drew the legal distinction between denunciations and depositions which, by contrast, 
carried the weight of law and could be obtained, if necessary, by a bench warrant.133  In other 
words, to keep a suspect in custody, the judicial authorities required incriminating evidence, 
such as correspondence written in cipher or suspicious signs of criminal intent, otherwise 
they would have to abandon prosecution.134 This requirement was made plain by the 
municipal authorities at Metz, who during the séance of 10 May 1792, observed how they 
had arrested ‘facilement les gens, accusés de complot contre la sûreté de l'État’ but that they 
were released 'aussi facilement parce que les preuves manquent pour un emprisonnement 
prolongé’.135 In any event, recognizing their importance in unmasking plots etc, the comité 
continued the practice of welcoming and spreading denunciations, including in the popular 
press, such as Jean Marat’s L’Ami du Peuple or Carra’s Annales Patriotiques, not least 
because of its perceived deterrent effect.136 His was just one of many radical publications 
which specialized in relaying denunciations, and levelling its own accusations, against 
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perceived plots, injustices and other political improprieties. Despite the fact that many, if not 
most, denunciations carried more noise than éclat, and that many were dismissed as the mere 
fancies of a suspect or overzealous functionary, men of ‘bonne foi’ (or good faith), both 
literate and credulous, were not only expected to believe in the existence of these 
conspiracies, as well as the complicity of royalist officials, but also to fear the repercussions 




The importance of the patriotic press in denouncing and deterring counter-
revolutionary activities, irrespective of the danger they posed, is well exemplified in the 
history of the Breton Association.138 Traditionally, the failure of this famous conspiracy has 
been explained by the perfidious actions of two double agents, Pierre Bénigne Laligant 
Morillon and Dr Valentin-Marie-Magloire Chévetel, an old family friend of the Marquis de 
la Rouërie.139 In February 1793, after having been informed of the association’s secret 
blueprints, the Comité de Sûreté Générale vested the two men with plenary powers to arrest 
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De l’Imprimerie Nationale, 1793); Gustave Bord, ‘Notice sur la conspiration de la Royrie’, Revue de la 
Révolution, (1886), pp.21-28. Goodwin supposes that Chévetel’s betrayal had been the ‘worst of all’, p.344. 
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La Rouërie and his chief co-conspirators.140 By the first week of March 1793, they had 
succeeded in apprehending twenty-six of La Rouërie’s chief associates, twelve of whom 
were executed the following month for conspiring ‘contre la sûreté générale’. La Rouërie 
was already dead, having succumbed to both nervous and physical exhaustion. Yet, as DMG 
Sutherland demonstrates, the Breton Association had suffered a series of crippling blows 
even before the deposition of the Bourbon monarchy and the establishment of the Comité de 
Sûreté Générale.141 Although the planting of double agents is a key practice in counter-
espionage operations, the roles of Laligant-Morillon and Chévetel have nevertheless been 
largely exaggerated. Indeed, in his report, Basire went so far as to credit Laligant-Morillon 
with being ‘l’un des hommes dont les travaux, comme militaire & comme observateur 
citoyen, ont le plus concouru à déjouer les manoeuvres de l’aristocratie dans le cours de la 
Révolution.’142 The reality was that the dismantlement of the Breton Association was 
precipitated by the local authorities which, as the trail of reports indicate, began investigating 
La Rouërie before notifying the Legislative Assembly of their activities.143  
On 10 May 1792, an anonymous article appeared in the Journal de Rennes accusing 
Armand Tuffin, the Marquis de La Rouërie of sheltering refractory priests in his château as 
well as of having participated in the insurrection at Caen six months earlier. Although the 
provenance of this denunciation has never been uncovered, at least with any certitude, the 
most likely explanation is that La Rouërie was exposed by one of the groups or individuals 
whom the Breton Association had tried to suborn and recruit from the populace.144 In May 
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1792, about the time that the article appeared, the association’s comité at La Roche-Bernard 
and Guérande, two communes on the Breton coast, began to recruit local peasants, promising 
them money on behalf of the émigré princes. But, as was so often the case during these 
dangerous times ‘un secret pareil ne pouvait pas être gardé très longtemps’ and within days, 
the authorities launched an official inquiry.145 The subsequent events are worth examining 
as they shed light on how the suppression of espionage was conducted during this period. 
As this thesis will continually demonstrate, these operations largely depended on regional 
circumstance. So, whereas in one locality these activities might relate to infiltrating 
clandestine cells, in another it could be linked to the surveillance of foreign enemy suspects, 
notably in the ports and fortress towns. Depending as they did on local conditions, the 
prosecution of these measures was thus a matter for the corresponding authorities.146 In the 
Jura, for example, the contiguity with the Swiss frontiers naturally increased the presence 
and passage of the émigrés and their agents. Therefore, the policing of the borders as well as 
the monitoring of their movements and correspondence were, despite local sympathies, one 
such security concern.147  
In Paris, on the other hand, the very presence of a number of government institutions, 
such as the Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, meant that the protection of state secrets, or 
the subornment of officials from infiltration, posed a different but not isolated challenge. 
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Controlling the movement of foreigners, intercepting suspect correspondence, disrupting 
lines of communications in and out of the capital etc also presented a related security 
concern. In other words, counter-espionage was not necessarily limited to a single operation 
but could be performed simultaneously with other, sometimes interrelated, sometimes 
unrelated, security operations. Whilst the revolutionaries attempted to impose some measure 
of central control and oversight, as the following chapter will discuss, the obvious tempo-
spatial obstacles nevertheless rendered it logical that the investigative and enforcement 
duties were performed ‘on the ground’.148 Indeed, with the division of France into eighty-
three departments, the revolutionaries not only supposed that the bureaucracy could be 
rationalized but that it would also facilitate localized surveillance. As Ozouf argued, the 
departmentalization was recommended by different writers and administrators who argued 
that the creation of smaller, autonomous units would enable local officials to better monitor 
and police the inhabitants in their jurisdiction (as well as receive denunciations quickly).149 
It was for this reason that one of the key objectives of the National Assembly in 1789 was 
to construct a police edifice that was closely wedded to the communities with responsibility 
for the maintenance of order conferred to the new municipalities.150 
The investigation and subsequent pursuit of La Rouërie and his co-conspirators 
reveal three key aspects about counter-espionage at this juncture. First, the individuals 
primarily responsible for these activities were not professional intelligence agents, at least 
as we conceive them nowadays, but functionaries- in this instance the juges de paix- who 
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were probably not schooled in cloak and dagger tradecraft. In other words, there is no 
evidence- at least which this author has found- to suggest that they were trained in the use 
of traditional espionage and counterespionage techniques, not least because this branch of 
renseignements as an institutionalized profession did not exist until the end of 19th century, 
not only in France but across the continent. On 19 July 1791, two days after the ‘massacre’ 
perpetrated on the Champ de Mars, the Constituent Assembly endowed these local 
magistrates with the police de sûreté effectively rendering them ‘agents of political 
repression’.151 With the ‘Code of Municipal and Correctional police’ they were now vested 
with investigative and prosecutorial powers to combat high crimes of the state including 
provocation to insurrections or ‘tumults and illegal gatherings.’ Assuming a quasi-police 
function, these juges de paix were therewith authorised to issue warrants, conduct searches 
of premises, seize evidence and interrogate both suspects and witnesses.152 In other words, 
they were expected to discharge the functions that were traditionally the remit of the 
commissaires de police, themselves now reduced to passive auxiliaries.153 Of course, this is 
not to suggest that the juges de paix were necessarily incompetent, or even unsuited to their 
hybrid role.154 In fact, the official investigation into the Breton Association that was initially 
prompted by the anonymous denunciation in the gazette suggests a degree of competency 
that could only have been acquired and inherited over time.155   
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The second observation to make about counter-espionage operations is that they 
invariably required a measure of cooperation not just in terms of intelligence sharing 
between the rivalrous municipal corps and departmental administrations but also in terms of 
tactical coordination between the commissaires de police and the paramilitary forces, the 
National Guard and Gendarmerie.156 On the initial raid of La Rouërie’s château, for example, 
the juge de paix of Dol was accompanied by the commissaires de la Bigue and Fougères and 
supported by detachments of the army and National Guard from Rennes, together with 
brigades of the gendarmerie, totaling more than a thousand men. Under the loi municipale 
of 14 December 1789, the municipalities had the power to call upon these armed formations 
to support the commissaires de police elected under their authority, a prerogative that did 
not go unchallenged.157 As studies show, the relations between the national guardsmen and 
the municipalities were often strained with the former often refusing to submit to the 
authority of the latter, a jurisdictional rivalry that also subsisted between the gendarmerie 
and the commissaires de police.158 Another complaint made by the national guardsmen was 
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that the municipalities, to which they were subordinated, were ‘too moderate’ in suppressing 
counter-revolutionary activity, an accusation that they made on a national level too. In 
Provence, for example, a detachment of National Guardsmen complained ‘de la lenteur de 
l’Assemblée nationale et de toutes les administrations de n’avoir pas agi contre les 
conspirateurs avec des forces et des sévérités…’159 Jurisdictional jostling aside, the 
deployment of these armed formations show how counter-espionage operations often 
assumed a quasi-military character, especially where there was a threat of insurrection. Of 
course, we need to be cautious here. A number of incidents can be found where, during the 
summer and autumn of 1792 (and indeed earlier) the hunt for refractory priests and 
aristocrats provoked the self-mobilisation of the gendarmerie and radical units of the 
National Guard. In July 1792, for example, more than twenty national guardsmen of 
Langogne invested the village of Pradelles in the Haute Loire, laying waste a family of 
Benedictines reputedly hostile to the Revolution as well as several members of the 
municipality that they accused of having participated in the troubles of Jalès.160 Similarly, 
one month later, national guardsmen pillaged several homes in Génolhac on the pretext that 
they belonged to royalist agents.161 However, a key difference is this. These were essentially 
punitive expeditions organised by radicalised volunteers, often originating from different 
parishes but belonging to popular societies and clubs, who attacked these properties on the 
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(sometimes spurious) grounds that they harboured counter-revolutionaries.162 They were, in 
other words, a manifestation of anarchic violence, mostly unsanctioned and without central 
oversight, unlike the case of the raid on La Rouërie’s château, an official investigation 
instigated by the juge de paix.163  
The third observation about counter-espionage is that its success often owed as much 
to the zeal and competence of the revolutionary authorities as to the imprudence and 
indiscretion of the conspirators. One of the reasons that the Breton Association ultimately 
failed was that it proved incapable of recruiting enough members to its cause. In fact, the 
attempts to suborn line regiments, National Guardsmen and departmental administrators etc 
only led to the arrest and subsequent dispersal of other members of the local cells. On 1 
August 1792, for example, one of the members of the association’s regional commitee in 
Rennes, Charles Elliot, was arrested at Lorient whilst attempting to recruit a lieutenant-
colonel of the artillerie des colonies. The interrogation and ensuing investigation led to the 
arrests of other commitee members, the majority of whom quickly revealed what they knew 
about the association and its conspiratorial plans.164 Whether these failed attempts at 
subornment and infiltration can be attributed to the revolutionary fervour of the targeted 
individuals or to their fear of repercussion- or a combination of the two- cannot be 
determined with any certitude. However, what can be reasonably argued is that the ‘wider 
the conspiracy, the greater the certainty of detection’.165 In his exposition on the United 
Irishmen, William Fitzpatrick made plain the ‘impossibility of treasonable associations 
being secure’ from the double agent, or false friend, as invariably, there would always be 
found someone who was disposed to ‘purchase their safety or make a profit for 
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themselves.’166 Indeed, the history of espionage during the revolutionary and Napoleonic 
periods reveals time and again how the royalist cause was harmed by the indiscretion and 
perfidy of its recruits. As William Wickham, Britain’s spymaster on the continent, 
complained just four years later:  
 
I cannot say that I could ever bring myself to approve of any attempt of the kind of 
which was projected, because I always thought it will necessarily be discovered as 
well from the number of persons to whom the secret must be intrusted as from the 




In abstract terms, the formation of increasingly complex civil and military structures, 
together with the rise in the number of persons occupying posts within them, meant that the 
opportunities to compromise national security, as well as the susceptibility to fear 
subversion, were genuinely increased. As Cubitt puts it, conspiracies were not solely 
‘imagined against the security of the state but in defence of that security, and in subversion 
of that defence from within’.168 For the revolutionaries, the reconstruction of a state based 
upon fundamentally new abstract notions of popular sovereignty would always stand under 
threat as long as it was staffed and administered by functionaries of continuing, doubtful 
allegiance. The French diplomatic corps, overseen by the Comte de Montmorin at the 
Ministère des Affaires Etrangéres was especially perceived to be vulnerable to security 
leaks, not least because it was almost exclusively comprised of members from the noblesse 
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who were largely attached to the ancien régime.169 As General Charles-François Dumouriez 
complained to the king, ‘presque tout votre corps diplomatique est contre-révolutionnaire 
ouvertement’.170 To be sure, some of these individuals did rally to the new order whilst others 
voluntarily ceased their functions or were subsequently divested of them.171 François 
Barthélémy, who served as the king’s ambassador to the Helvetic Body, was especially 
assiduous in discharging his important functions, as will be seen in the following chapter. 
Yet, the underlying fear that France’s ministers were colluding with the same foreign courts 
which were threatening invasion did not, of course, dissipate in any way. Indeed, it was this 
fear of ministerial collusion with the Revolution’s external enemies that prompted the 
national assembly to exert a stricter measure of legislative surveillance in the area of foreign 
affairs.172 With the prospect of war looming, and perceived signs of complacency, if not 
downright negligence, it was perhaps unsurprising that the revolutionaries would doubt the 
fealty of a ministry which possessed all the means to compromise the security of the state. 
Referring to the baleful influence of foreign diplomats accredited to the French court, for 
example, one complained how the ministry had not even taken ‘les mesures nécessaires pour 
écarter de la France les ministres étrangers qui travaillent sans cesse contre notre 
Révolution’.173 Of course, the deputies in the assembly had good reason to distrust the king’s 
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171 Upon assuming the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs on 15 March 1792 General Dumouriez began to 
purge the diplomatic corps of the ‘creatures’ of the ancien régime in the interests of ‘la sûreté politique’. Those 
who displayed ‘hautement des intentions contre-révolutionnaires’ were recalled immediately whilst those who 
conducted themselves ‘prudemment’ were ordered to change diplomatic residence. Jean Bailou, Charles Lucet, 
Jacques Vimont, Les Affaires étrangères et le Corps diplomatique français (Paris: CNRS, 1984), p.306; 
Frédéric Masson, Le Département des Affaires Étrangères,op. cit., pp.154-155. Dumouriez also left a plan for 
the organisation of the diplomatic corps, Mémoire sur le ministère des Affaires étrangères, par Dumouriez, 
maréchal de camp de la 12e division de l’armée (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1791), in-8.  
172 Jeremy J Whiteman, Reform, Revolution and French Global Policy, 1787-1791 (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003), 
p.224.   
173 AN D/XXIXbis/33, Dossier 367 pièce n°9. Of course, even before the Revolution, foreign diplomatic agents 
had been the first object of vigilance for the obvious reason that the line between diplomatic functions and 
espionage was naturally blurred. In referring to ‘des agents, des espions, des ambassadeurs’ Louis Noailles 
confessed how ‘je confonds assez facilement ces mots-là’, Frédéric Masson, Le Département des Affaires 
Étrangères, op. cit., p.91. Consequently, states found themselves in the contradictory position between trying 




ministers. Without needing to recount the secret diplomacy of Comte de Montmorin, or the 
surreptitious activities of the amis du roi, a number of instances can be cited when France’s 
diplomats either willfully furnished bogus intelligence, refused to provide any or simply 
aroused suspicion by their associations.174 On 4 January 1791, for example, Colbert de 
Maulévrier, the French Minister Plenipotentiary in Cologne, was instructed to uncover the 
designs and activities of the émigrés in that city. As the instructions stipulated, he was to be 
‘attentif à tout ce qui pouvait concerner le royaume de France et se tramer contre lui’. 
Maulévrier, however, refused, professing him-self indignant at the prospect of spying on 
what he characterized to be refugees in distress. Further suspicions were cast on the Comte 
Vergennes, son of the former minister. On 16 December 1791, the very same day Louis XVI 
issued an ultimatum to the elector of Trèves demanding the dispersion of the army of 
Coblence, Vergennes sent a communiqué from his diplomatic post there, claiming that the 
émigrés were not even mobilizing and that he had not seen any “force armée”.175  
It was this failure, or refusal, of some of France’s diplomatic corps to furnish reliable 
intelligence on counter-revolutionary activities that led the Assembly to adopt measures 
designed to safeguard the state’s institutions from infiltration and other breaches of security. 
On 2 January 1792, in a move to seize full control of international renseignement, the 
assembly ordered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to transfer to the Comité Diplomatique all 
‘les notes et éclaircissements relatifs auxdits complots’ fomented by the foreign courts and 
their principal agents whilst, at the same time, demanding the denunciation of all ‘agents de 
 
Bély, Dictionnaire de l’Ancien régime, op.cit., p.360. The simplest solution to limit the risk of military 
espionage practiced by foreign emissaries was thus to rupture all diplomatic relations, which generally 
speaking, was the first act of war between between two belligerent states. Stéphane Genêt, Les Espions des 
Lumières, op. cit., p.381. 
174 For information on Montmorin and the ‘amis du roi’ see Olivier Blanc, Les Hommes de Londres: Histoire 
Secrète de la Terreur (Paris: Albin Michel, 1989), Oliver Blanc, Les Espions de la Révolution et de l’Empire 
(Paris: Éditions Perrin, 1995). Jules Flammermont (ed.), Négociations secrètes de Louis XVI et du baron de 
Breteuil avec la cour de Berlin (décembre 1791-juillet 1792) (Paris: Picard, 1885) in-8°, p.9, Munro Price, 'The 
Comte de Vergennes and the Baron de Breteuil', unpublished doctoral thesis, Cambridge University, 1988), 
Gary Savage, ‘Favier’s Heirs: The French Revolution and the Secret du Roi’, The Historical Journal, 41.I 
(1998), 225-258. 
175 Quoted in Alain Montarras, Le Général Bonaparte et le Renseignement: La période révolutionnaire et la 




la nation’ who had either connived with them, neglected to transmitted intelligence on their 
‘dispositions hostiles’ or were suspected of ‘mensonges par omission’.176 In other words, the 
purpose of the decree was not only to vest the committee with jurisdictional control of the 
ministry’s diplomatic secrets but also to uncover and proscribe disloyal ministers and other 
‘hommes corrompus’.177 Indeed, this protection of secrecy, as the Cardinal Richelieu 
affirmed, is fundamental to the security of the state.178 In relation to counter-espionage, 
Colonel Walther Nicolai, the Head of the German General Staff’s military intelligence 
department (Sektion IIIb) during WWI went so far as to claim that ‘the number of spy arrests 
is no proof of the efficiency of the defense service; that is only proved if state interests are 
successfully kept secret’.179 So, if the principal objective of state sponsored espionage is to 
collect sensitive information from an adversary then a function of counter-espionage, or 
‘counter-intelligence’ according to specific Anglo-American terminology, is to protect or 
conceal such information against infiltration and subversion.180 The problem, of course, is 
that the prevention of the loss of sensitive information remains very difficult to assess, not 
least because a nation’s constituent authorities are naturally unexcited by the prospect of 
disclosing to the public the embarrassing truth that such information has been stolen.181 Nor 
would they especially be open to revealing the measures taken to guard their secrets, 
 
176 AP, XXXVII, op. cit., p.9. As the decree read: ‘comme aussi de dénoncer à l’Assemblée nationale ceux 
d’entre les dits agents qui peuvent s’être rendus coupables de connivence avec les révoltés, soit en favorisant 
ouvertement leurs projets, soit en négligeant d’instruire le gouvernement des dispositions hostiles qu’ils ont 
manifestées et des négociations qu’ils ont préparées et suivies sous leurs yeux dans les cours étrangères’. 
177 Anonymous, Tables Générales des Lois, Arrêtés, Décrets, Ordonnances du Roi, Arrêts et Avis du Conseil 
d’État (Paris: Ménard et Desenne, 1826), III, p.8. 
178 Or in his words, ‘Secrecy is the first essential in affairs of state’, Richelieu, ‘Maxims,’ Testament Politique 
(1641). 
179 Quoted in Chris Northcott, MI5, op. cit., p.228.  
180 It should be noted that the French language only recognizes the one term, ‘counter-espionage’, whilst the 
Anglo-Saxon model makes a subtle, conceptual distinction between it and counter-intelligence. The latter is 
essentially a more passive activity, focusing on the dissimulation and protection of sensitive state secrets and 
information rather than the prevention of a threat. For an authority on American terminologies, see Paul W 
Blackstock, Frank L Schaf, Intelligence, Espionage, Counter-espionage and Covert Operations, a Guide to 
Information Source (California: Gale Research Company, 1978), p.59. 
181 An example can be recently found in France. On 24 May 2018, the Ministère des Armées announced that 
judicial enquiries had been launched against two retired agents of DGSE for the suspected disclosure of national 




whatever the latter are considered to be.182 The 1791 Penal Code only identifies the 
disclosure of a ‘secret d'une négociation, d'une expédition ou d'une opération militaire’ as a 
punishable offense.183 Kaitlyn Carter, on the other hand, argues that much of this secrecy, 
which required protection, revolved around the procedures to uncover counter-revolutionary 
plots.184 Highlighting the ‘paradoxical interplay of surveillance, publicity and secrecy’, she 
shows in her recent article how the revolutionary committees, beginning with the Comité des 
Recherches, came to work à huis clos despite public calls for greater transparency.185 Later 
echoed by Jean Paul Marat, this recourse to procedural secrecy was justified by Brissot who 
argued that the existence of foreign and domestic enemies demanded such extraordinary 
precautions: 
 
Si donc nous avions tout à craindre, et des ennemis de la révolution, et du dehors, 
devions-nous confier notre sûreté à des précautions ordinaires? Le salut de la patrie 
n’exigeait-il pas que l’on créât dans le sein de la capitale, des comités extraordinaires 
peu nombreux, plus actifs, plus secrets que des assemblées générales, qui eussent le 
pouvoir de veiller sur les conspirations, et d’en arrêter les effets, par de promptes et 
vigoureuses mesures?186 
 
182 Articles R. 2311-2 and R. 2311-3 of today’s Code de la Défense, for example, has three levels of 
classifications; ‘Très Secret Défense’, ‘Secret Défense’ and ‘Confidentiel Défense’ with each representing 
information of varying sensitivity to national security, http://www.sgdsn.gouv.fr/missions/proteger-le-secret-
de-la-defense-et-de-la-securite-nationale/ 
183 AP, XXXI, op. cit., pp.326-339; It was not until 1810 that the ‘révélation de secrets’ were extended beyond 
the diplomatic and military sphere. Under Articles 378 & 418 in Section VII of the Napoleonic Penal Code, 
medical professionals such doctors and surgeons, as well as commercial directors, were prohibited from 
disclosing the ‘secrets’ of their activities or their manufactured goods to foreigns or French people residing 
abroad., A D Chauveau, F Hélie, (eds.), Théorie du Code Pénal, 2 Vols (Brussels: M Eline, Cans et Cie, 1844-
1845). The law of April 18, 1886 against espionage made official the concept of state secrets, and punished 
anyone who attempted to expose particular information. The law itself did not clearly define these secrets, 
however, and therefore the specifics of what kind of knowledge was deemed to be property of the French state 
was left to be determined by the courts. 
184 Kaitlyn Carter, ‘The Comités des Recherches’, op. cit., 45-65.  
185 ibid, p.48. The elimination of secrecy from state proceedings was a purported, if unrealised, ideal of the 
French Revolution. For studies on this topic, see Antoine de Baecque, Le Corps de l’histoire.  Métaphores et 
politique (1770-1800) (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1993), pp. 257-302, P Serna, ‘Pistes de recherches: du secret de 
la monarchie à la république des secrets’, in Secret et République (1795-1840), B Gainot, P Serna (eds.) 
(Clermont-Ferrand: Presses Universitaires Blaise-Pascal, 2004), pp. 13-37.  
186 Jacques Pierre Brissot, J. P. Brissot, Membre du Comité des Recherches de la Municipalité (Paris: chez 





In essence, Brissot argued that to preserve the secrets of the state, it was necessary that they 
were confided to as few people as possible. Even today, as France’s Secrétariat Général de 
la Défense et de la Sécurité Nationale affirms, this principle of ‘need to know’ – or 
cloisonnement - is a central tenet of national security policy.187 The Legislative Assembly’s 
Comité de Surveillance, for example, only employed three secretaries for its twelve 
members. Moreover, the séances were convened in strict secrecy in order to preserve the 
integrity of the denunciations.188 Unfortunately, in the absence of procedural records, it is 
seemingly impossible to identify the full range of precautions taken at this particular stage. 
Not wanting to air in public all its activities, the National Assembly mostly remained silent 
about certain proceedings or prerogatives of the comité, whether in terms of the employment 
of spies, or of the remuneration of its agents and informers etc. It is known that the Comité 
des Recherches took the elementary precaution of keeping records of its proceedings in a 
locked armoire.189 Furthermore, conforming to a decree rendered by the National Assembly 
in October 1790, the comité’s missives were confidentially signed, sealed and hand-
delivered to the newly established Bureau de Contre-seing & d'Expédition where they were 
accordingly classified. Under the supervision of four inspecteurs des secrétariats-bureaux, 
this office was staffed with two or three functionaries who were responsible for affixing a 
‘griffe numérotée’ to committee documents, each of which contained a unique ‘point secret’ 
only known to the administration des postes.190 This affixation of a unique mark, identifiable 
 
à huis clos, jusqu'à l'arrestation des traîtres qui sont à l'intérieur, des agents des puissances ennemies et de tous 
les gens suspects.’ AP, LXI, op. cit., p.128. 
187 The SGDSN stipulates that two criteria need to be satisfied for access to classified information to be gained: 
‘le besoin d’en connaitre soit la nécessité impérieuse, évaluée par l’autorité hiérachique, d’accéder à cette 
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soitl’autorisation d’accéder à des informations classifiées au niveau requis et précisé dans la décision.’ 
http://www.sgdsn.gouv.fr/missions/proteger-le-secret-de-la-defense-et-de-la-securite-nationale/ 
188 Michel Eude, ‘Le Comité de Surveillance’, op. cit., 137, 141. Adresse au Comité de constitution sur la 
question de savoir si les délibérations des commissaires doivent rester secrètes ou si le lieu de leurs séances 
doit être ouvert à tous les citoyens, avec lettre d'envoi de M. Bailly. 7, 11 décembre 1790. AN/D/IV 3 doss.21. 
189 AN D/XXIXbis/*/1.  
190 Décret qui admet une nouvelle rédaction de celui qui établit un seul bureau de contre-seing & d'expédition 
près l'assemblée nationale oct 12, 1790 in Anonymous, Collection générale des décrets rendus par 




only to a few individuals, remains one of the fundamental elements in the protection of 
classified documents.191 Another measure, less secretive but no less important, was to 
reinforce the security of the installations where the documents themselves were kept. 
Following the flight to Varennes, for example, the National Assembly issued the following 
decree:   
 
Il est ordonné au ministère de l’Intérieur de faire établir à l’instant même une forte 
garde aux dépôts des Affaires étrangères à Paris et aux dépôts des Affaires étrangères, 
de la Guerre, de la Marine et autres qui sont à Versailles, avec défense de laisser sortir 
aucuns papiers ou paquets des lieux où ils se trouvent. Pareils ordres seront exécutés 
à l’égard du logement qu’habite à Paris le ministre des Affaires étrangères.192  
 
The establishment of static defences, such as the militarised protection of an installation, are 
generally designed to obstruct all aggressive acts, regardless of who performs them.193 Such 
control of an area is essentially a physical security measure that includes checkpoints, the 
screening and clearance of personnel, the possession of ‘locking containers’ etc (ie the 
armoire). It is, by its nature, a passive measure, which is not limited to deterring spies, and 
can be distinguished from the more proactive activities that require the identification of 
enemy agents, knowledge of their operations, and the capability to reverse them. Following 
the outbreak of hostilities, this function turned ever more urgent as espionage became 
increasingly associated to the war effort.194 As far as the revolutionaries were concerned, the 
 
191 Hughes Moutouh, Jérome Poirot (eds.), Dictionnaire du Renseignement (Paris: Perrin, 2018), p.34. 
192 Assemblée Nationale Constituante, Collection Générale des Décrets rendus par l’Assemblée Nationale: 
Mois de Juin 1791 (Paris: Chez Baudouin, 1791), p.29. 
193 Loch K Johnson (ed.), Strategic Intelligence: Understanding the Hidden Side of Government (Connecticut: 
Praeger Security International, 2007), p.186.  
194 A distinction needs to be drawn between French spies working for the revolutionary armies and those 
working against them. Obviously, the revolutionaries deployed spies on reconnaisance missions to monitor the 
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war was not simply conceived as a series of pitched battles between rival dynasties in which 
the role of espionage was primarily limited to reconnaissance and other auxiliary operations 
such as subornment or sabotage. With reason, they also saw it as a manifestation of the 
counter-revolution.195 This meant, of course, that domestic subversion was directly linked to  
the conduct of the war and that, as Robespierre demanded, ‘pour faire la guerre utilement 
aux ennemis du dehors, il est une mesure absolument indispensable, c’est de faire la guerre 
aux ennemis du dedans.’196 The war, in other words, created an added dimension as far as 
counter-espionage was concerned: the revolutionaries were now on the hunt for both military 




As with other counter-espionage operations during this period, the hunt for military 
spies was characterized by three interrelated factors- localization, identification and control. 
At the outbreak of the war in April 1792, these operations were invariably confined to the 
fortress towns such as Douai, where, following the Austrian occupation of Orchies and 
Valenciennes, the municipal authorities were confronted with the twofold problem: the 
prospect of a protracted siege and the spectre of a grande inondation of foreigners, refugees 
and soldiers straggling from the front.197 To control the influx, and root out the ‘suspects’ 
thought to be among them, the municipal police stopped all new arrivals, whether found in 
the streets or at the city gates and arrested anyone who did not possess valid identity 
 
195 During one séance, the counter-revolution was equated to ‘des armées étrangères dans l’intérieur de l’État’. 
AP XXXVI, op. cit., p.48. Or as Robespierre put it, ‘la guerre n’est que le fruit des intrigues de nos ennemis 
intérieurs, ligues avec nos ennemis de dehors.’ Maximillien Robespierre, Recueil des Oeuvrès de Max. J. 
Robespierre, et de pièces pour servir à son Histoire (Paris: Recueillis, 1819), IV, p.5. 
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depuis 1789 jusqu’en 1815 (Paris: Paulin Librairie, 1835), XIV, p.361. 
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885-901 (p.885), Bernard Lefebvre, ‘La Terreur et ses victimes dans une ville de la frontière nord. L'exemple 




documents, officially in the form of a certificat de résidence and/or a passport.198 According 
to Monique Mestayer’s interpretation, the interrogations of these detainees at Douai were 
more or less divided into three distinct periods with the revolutionaries’ characterisation of 
a ‘suspect’ dependent on the circumstances and exigencies of the moment.199 Between May 
and mid-August 1792, where this chapter terminates, Douai’s municipal authorities were 
principally looking for deserters or soldiers that had either been recruited into Austrian 
regiments or those groups or individuals- confusingly deemed to be spies- who were inciting 
sedition.200 Naturally, with the country now at war, it was logical that the revolutionaries 
would be primarily concerned with the fighting capacity and loyalty of the army. Indeed, it 
was for this reason that, on 13 May 1792, just days following the dispersal of two French 
regiments at Le Mons, the Assemblée Nationale instructed the royal government to report, 
seemingly for the very first time, on the efforts that it would take to track spies. As the decree 
read, ‘le pouvoir exécutif rendra compte, de huitaine en huitaine, des poursuites qu’il doit 
faire contre les espions et traîtres qui ont excité les soldats à l’insubordination’.201 Whilst no 
trace of the discussion surrounding these ‘poursuites’ can be found, probably due to the royal 
government’s disincentive to investigate the matter, we do know that nine men accused of 
sowing disorder among the troops were incarcerated in Lille whilst at Valenciennes a 
suspected spy disguised as a dragoon was arrested for crying out ‘sauve qui peut’ during that 
 
198 During the years 1760-1770, the absence of papers was cited as the most frequent motive of arrest. Vincent 
Denis, Une Histoire de l’Identité: France 1715-1815 (Seyssel: Champ Vallon, 2008), p.220. The ordinance of 
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suspects, n’ayant ni passeports ni certificats pour se faire connaître’. Initially issued by military chiefs to 
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identification dans la France des Lumières’, op. cit., pp.11-18.  
199 A discussion of the other two periods, April- September 1793 and July-September 1794 will be covered in 
chapters 2 and 3 respectively. 
200 Mestayer cites A. M. Douai, H 4 4, Interrogatoires de Mathieu Agaçant, Antoine Savary, de plusieurs autres 
soldats et enfin de Séraphin Rollin, ex-religieux (7 septembre 1792); One exception relates to the interrogation 
of d'Urbain Joseph Richer (9 septembre 1792). Richer, a former writer, was arrested as a suspected spy in 
Douai after having made a long trek on foot from Boulogne where he claimed to have sought succour from his 
father. His interrogation, however, yielded no evidence against him and the twin accusations of espionage and 
treason were dropped. A. M. Douai, H4 4, (9 septembre 1792).  




journée.202 Moreover, upon orders from the Assembly, a provisional military tribunal was 
convened in order to judge the ‘coupables qui, dans le 5e et 6e régiments de dragons, ont 
crié la trahison, et ont excité à la défection’.203  
Similarly, in Metz, the fear of a ‘fifth column’ undermining the war effort led the 
municipality to adopt a series of corresponding security measures.204 Like their counterparts 
in Douai, the local authorities were concerned about the presence of ‘ennemis à la fois 
intérieurs et extérieurs’, not least because the émigré army under the command of the Prince 
of Condé’s army was gathering in the forest around Coblenz, approximately one month’s 
marching distance away.205 With the nation mobilising for war, the municipal authorities 
carried out a census of all its inhabitants, focusing especial attention on the identity of 
étrangers as well as 'personnes notées suspectes, mal intentionnées ou sans aveu’- in other 
words, royalist officers, refractory priests and nobles. As the Journal des départements (de 
la Moselle et de la Meurthe etc) reported, a ‘grande nombre’ of étrangers were able to slip 
into the town and ‘échapper aux regards et à l'action de la police’.206 Given the impracticality 
of keeping a registre of all inhabitants, the police resorted to targeting specific groups 
thought to be potential sources of disorder, a strategy that also predated the Revolution.207 
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204 These measures appear to have been prompted by the Marquis de la Fayette who was instructed by Louis 
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soient en état de guerre’. Two days later, on 25 April, La Fayette went in person to Metz to inform the municipal 
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under série D n°1DB.   
205 A month’s march was estimated by the German general Adolf von Horsetzky, A Short History of the Chief 
Campaigns in Europe since 1792 (London: John Murray, 1909), p.21. 
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Focusing their search on ‘des munitions de guerre destinées à l’étranger’, the municipal 
police intercepted carriages and riverboats, arresting, among others, for ‘complot contre la 
sûreté de l'État’ Jean-Baptiste Chappe, former lieutenant of Louis XVI who was accused of 
being a porter of ‘nombreuses lettres et de pièces pour les apporter à Coblentz’.208 As the 
Conseil général de la Commune complained, recruitment for the émigré army was gathering 
apace with ‘autant de force que de facilité’ and that regiments loyal to the monarchy were 
passing ‘en corps à l'étranger sans obstacle’, a complaint equally made by the city’s 
Commissaire de Police, Nicolas-Gaspard Bricard in his report of 15 May 1792:  
 
Depuis la Révolution, les ennemis de la Constitution se permettent non seulement 
d'exciter du trouble en cette ville et d'y répandre l'alarme, mais encore d'embaucher 
des militaires et autres pour les faire passer chez l'étranger, à l'effet de tourner leurs 
armes contre leur patrie; que ces traces odieuses et ces menées sourdes ont été jusqu'à 
présent très difficiles à découvrir malgré les soins que la police et les citoyens y 
apportent. 209  
 
Of course, even before war was declared, the municipal authorities at Douai, Metz and 
elsewhere had imposed a range of security controls which led to the arrest of suspects for 
either espionage or its related crime, ‘embauchage’. On 2 January 1792, for example, the 
assembly were informed of the arrest at Douai of one François Auguste ‘comme suspect 
d’espionnage’.210 In fact, only months after the fall of the Bastille, after having received a 
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208 Zoltan-Etienne Harsany, Metz Pendant la Révolution, op. cit., pp.62, 77. Many of the suspects arrested were 
released for lack of evidence including, Jean Duteil, former colonel-général of the National Guard who was 
imprisoned for five days. 
209 Arch. mun. de Metz série D, n° 1 D 7, délibérations du 10 mai 1792. Conseil général de la Commune: 
Délibérations du 20 novembre 1791 au 14 août 1792, p.72. Arch. mun. de Metz, série I, n° 2 I 42. 




denunciation of a ‘complot découvert à Douai’, the authorities there announced ‘des mesures 
prises, tant dans la ville que sur les remparts, pour arrêter les suspects et visiter les étrangers,’ 
measures which included ‘visites domiciliaires’, a rather innocuous term that would gain 
disrepute following the storming of the Tuileries on 10 August 1792.211 Likewise, in Lille, 
the municipality issued an ordonnance on 17 April 1790, subsequently republished and 
redistributed fourteen months later, ‘relatifs au séjour et à la surveillance des étrangers 
à Lille’.212 With increasing numbers defecting to the émigré army, the authorities appear to 
have kept careful vigilance of local ‘embauchers’, exchanging reports to that effect with, 
among others, the patriotic Société des Amis de la Constitution.213 The journals of the day 
also report on various incidents in which the constant rumours of an impending attack had 
not only created a permanent state of public alarm but also had incited mob violence.214 In 
Lille, a peasant from Croix, who had been caught with ‘preuves’ of his spying in the coëffe 
of his hat, was lynched, his head decapitated and paraded through the town on the tip of a 
sword. The fact that he had concealed the ‘preuves’ in his hat was reasonable cause for his 
original arrest.215 Boulanger, on the other hand, recounts an episode which occurred in July 
1791, over a year before the city fell under siege, in which two Dutch officers from the 
garrison at Breda had walked onto the ramparts of the citadel without authority where they 
were spotted tampering, supposedly, with the pieces of cannon. The locals cried foul and 
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accused them of espionage.216 The two officers were promptly arrested, their belongings 
deposited at l'Hôtel Villeroy searched and it was not until eight days later, following a 
succession of inconclusive interrogations- denunciations alone not being proof of guilt- that 
they were safely released upon orders of the département.217 Whilst no recorded arrests were 
made, a similar situation arose in Metz where the ability to spy on the city’s fortifications 
led the municipality in October 1791, following a request from the military authorities, to 
prohibit any unauthorised individual from frequenting the parapets and ramparts of the town 
in order to prevent them from making ‘observations sur les différents moyens de défense 
préparés pour la sûreté de la place, soit sur la quantité de munitions de guerre qui y sont 
destinées.’218 At the same time, the commissaires paid unannounced visits to the city’s hôtels 
and auberges in order to inspect the guest registers whilst detachments of the National 





These incidents would suggest that the rampant spy-mania, which would eventually 
grip the French population during the Terror, began to feel its first, real rumblings during 
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the prewar period. In any event, with the military reverses on the front, and the nation 
plunged further into chaos, demands for ‘promptes mesures’ were repeatedly demanded in 
the Assembly to deal with the growing security threat from within.220 During the séance of 
12 May 1792, the Ministre de l’Intérieur, Jean Marie Roland, warned how counter-
revolutionaries and étrangers (ie Austrians arrayed in French dress) were swelling the capital 
and transforming it into ‘un foyer d'intrigues où affluent des inconnus et où se font des 
rassemblements nocturnes.’221 Professing not to be scaremongering with ‘des craintes et de 
fausses alarmes’ Roland also complained of ‘le manque de moyens d'action de la police 
municipale’ to combat ‘les trames dangereuses et les intelligences secrètes qui agitent la 
capitale’, a complaint that was greeted with incredulity by some deputies and agreement by 
others.222 Of course, similar rhetoric had been employed just ten months earlier during the 
occupation of the Champs de Mars when demands were raised for ‘les précautions 
nécessaires pour expulser les brigands, les assassins, les scélérats et les conspirateurs dont 
Paris regorge’.223 But with the country now facing the possibility of a calamitous defeat and 
occupation, the Legislative Assembly were compelled to act with increased rigour, and over 
the following weeks, passed a set of decrees, the first on 27 May, calling for the deportation 
of refractory priests, the second, abolishing the king’s constitutional guard on the basis that 
it was a counterrevolutionary force and the third, demanding the deployment of twenty 
thousand federés in Paris to replace the regular troops dispatched to the front.224 
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In retrospect, these ‘defence decrees’ would mark the first in a series of emergency 
measures that formed part of a broader process to securitize the revolutionary state.225 Whilst 
this process was not preplanned or predesigned, as the next chapter will make clear, a related 
discussion was raised in the Assembly that is commonly overlooked by historians. On 30 
May 1792, whilst the ‘defence decrees’ were debated, Armand Gensonné, the future deputy 
for the department of the Gironde, tabled a motion, proposing the creation of a new ‘national-
security’ system completely detached from the royal government. In his discourse, Gensonné 
lamented the fact that the legislative Assembly’s Comité de Surveillance, like the Constituent 
Assembly’s Comité des Rapports and Comités des Recherches before it, had not been 
invested with sufficient police powers to investigate or suppress counter-revolutionary 
activity. As he complained, the Comité possessed ‘aucun des moyens qui pourraient le rendre 
utile. Il n’a pas le pouvoir de rechercher les crimes et d’assurer des prévenus.’ Instead, 
highlighting its absence, he suggested the formation of an ‘organisation de la police de sûretê 
générale pour la recherche des délits de haute trahison, car dans l’état actuel des choses, cette 
police n’existe pas…’226 Brissot supported his plan but expressed concern that it would be 
quickly reduced to prosecuting minor offences if not careful. As he declared, there was ‘rien 
de plus ridicule, par exemple, que d’organiser une grande institution de sûreté générale, pour 
punir quelques propos de café, ou les atrocités de quelques feuilles ignorés.’227 Like 
Gensonné, Brissot raised the urgent need to circumvent the royal government, arguing that 
the juges de paix and the local courts, whose authority emanated from the monarchy, could 
not be relied upon to keep the Assembly informed on the existence of the conspiracies nor 
were they adequately equipped to.228 As he claimed, albeit with exaggeration, it was only 
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due to the ‘zèle et du patriotisme des municipalités ou les corps administatifs that the 
Assembly were made aware of the conspiracies at all.229 The crux of the problem, so Brissot 
supposed, was the lack of jurisdictional clarity surrounding France’s policing institutions. 
Mirroring Roland’s earlier complaint, he argued that the lack of authority invested in the 
police had ultimately impeded the state’s capacity to quash these plots, the number of which 
had been multiplying as a result of the war. In other words, whilst the municipal police had 
the powers to search for the authors of criminal acts and issue arrest warrants, the ability to 
anticipate and prevent the commissioning of a crime was, however, hindered if they 
possessed no intrusive powers to intercept and decrypt correspondence, raid homes or 
premises unannounced or, in terms of manpower, conduct round the clock surveillance, 
especially in a city as ‘immense’ as Paris.230 For all the loud noises of a city populated by 
mouchards, there is very little evidence to suggest that this was the case or that they made 
any notable contribution to rooting out traitors or foreign spies.231 In his discourse ‘sur les 
mesures de sûreté générale’, which he delivered on 25 July 1792, Brissot summarized the 
situation as follows:  
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Il est donc démontré qu'il existe des conspirations contre la sûreté générale de l'état; 
que la guerre où nous sommes engagés va les multiplier. Il faut donc, ou songer à les 
prévenir, ou se résoudre à périr. Mais comment les prévenir, s'il n'existe pas un 
pouvoir qui, à l'origine même, ou dans quelque état que soit la conjuration, puisse 
mander, arrêter les coupables et saisir leurs papiers? Cette lacune existe dans 
l'organisation des pouvoirs qui doivent poursuivre et juger les crimes contre la sûreté 
générale. La constitution, à la vérité, délègue au pouvoir législatif exclusivement le 
droit de connaître des crimes contre la sûreté nationale. Cet article le constitue bien 
jury d'accusation à cet égard; mais quant aux formes nécessaires pour les rechercher, 
elles ne sont pas fixées, elles n'existent même pas. Des rebelles peuvent conspirer 
impunément sous nos yeux, et il n'existe aucun pouvoir bien défini qui puisse 
décerner contre eux le mandat d'amener ou d'arrêt.232 
 
To address the problem- at least how he perceived it- Brissot proposed that the juges de paix 
be stripped of their functions and that the power to combat the crimes against la sûreté de 
l’État should be officially and without ambiguity, delegated to the municipalities, districts 
and départements.233 The reasoning behind this delegation of policing powers was simple. 
Since the principal function of the municipalities was to ‘maintenir la tranquilité et la sûreté 
de la commune’, and since they were already best placed to police their own jurisdiction, it 
thus made logical sense that they should be uniformly charged with investigating high crimes 
as well, a function which many of them were, of course, discharging already.234 As the late 
Gérard Sautel put it, the municipality’s role as the de facto police de sûreté générale was 
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‘loin d’être chose nouvelle.’235 At the same time, as Gensonné’ recommended, the Comité 
de Surveillance would be renamed and invested with plenary powers to oversee their 
activities. In other words, whilst the municipalities would still enjoy some independence of 
action, as the theoretical devolution of powers permitted, they would nevertheless be 
required by fiat to correspond with the committee within a prescribed timeframe, thus 







Gensonné’s proposal exposes the difficulty that the revolutionaries faced in pursuing, 
and executing, a coherent national security policy at the time. Despite the promises of the 
1791 constitution, France remained a highly fractured state, torn between loyalties, and with 
neither a strong executive nor legislative to assume direction of the security agenda. Indeed, 
by the end of July 1792, the royal ministry resembled nothing more than a ‘straw 
government’ with the Legislative Assembly itself reduced in numbers and divested of any 
power to enforce its own decrees.237 Gensonné’s proposal, seconded by Brissot, was thus 
designed to impose a measure of central oversight, at least in security matters, not by 
frustrating local initiative but by ensuring that there was a more consistent demonstration of 
vigilance.238 In relation to counter-espionage activities, it would be hard to disagree with 
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their reasoning. Despite the revolutionaries’ efforts to establish a uniform, legal framework 
to indict individuals for high crimes, no systematic attempt appears to have been made to 
hunt for spies ‘on the ground’ - whether in the fortress towns, the capital or provinces - a 
problem, unhelpfully compounded by the conceptual confusion between espionage, 
subversion and sedition. Of course, in hindsight, the revolutionaries would have been better 
served with forming a single body charged with coordinating efforts between the country’s 
civil, military, naval and diplomatic authorities. Neither the Comité de Surveillance, nor the 
National Assembly’s Comité des Recherches before it, came close to fulfilling this function. 
Instead, over-relying on denunciations and the cooperation of otherwise rivalrous 
institutions, the revolutionaries scoured the country for spies, traitors and counter-
revolutionaries- the enemies within - employing methods of control that, for the moment, 
were usually untargeted, sometimes unsanctioned, but mostly deterrent in nature and 
departing little from the practices of their predecessors. But with the patrie en danger, and 
the fall of the monarchy, the conditions were created for the revolutionary state to undergo 














State of Emergency: August 1792- September 1793 
 
With the monarchy deposed, but the threat of counter-revolution still alive, the task now 
facing the revolutionaries was to consolidate their power and forge a national state based on 
staunch, republican principles.239 In the ensuing days and weeks, dozens of delegations and 
commissioners were sent into the provinces to instill discipline, prepare the nation’s defenses 
and purge the body politic of all royalists.240 At the same time, on walls throughout the 
country, proclamations were placarded exhorting France’s citizens to surveil their 
neighbours and root out the traîtres hidden among them.241 From the great urban centers to 
the remotest corners of the country, the enemies of the Revolution were peceived to be 
growing in number and advanced in their plans to reinstate the ancien régime. On 23 August 
1792, less than two weeks following the storming of the Tuileries, the fortress of Longwy 
surrendered in suspicious haste, prompting Vergniaud to claim that it had been ‘vendus aux 
ennemis’.242 As military catastrophe loomed and the country descended into fratricidal civil 
war, rampant spy-mania began to take hold. To combat this perceived surge in espionage 
activity and ‘se délivrer de l'ennemi intérieur’, the revolutionaries adopted a series of 
emergency measures that, though not necessarily predetermined, nevertheless formed part 
of a broader process of securitization.243 This chapter will examine this dual development 
and its relation to counter-espionage operations during the thirteen months prior to the 
Terror. It will not only explore the methods and structures employed to suppress espionage 
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and related subversive threats but explain how they overlapped with both domestic 
surveillance programs and the parallel efforts to expand the security apparatus of the 




On 18 August 1792, just over a week following the storming of the Tuileries, the 
National Assembly sanctioned the formation of the first state organ officially charged with 
government propaganda.244 Under the direction of Jean-Marie Roland, the Ministre de 
l’Intérieur, the bureau was awarded one hundred thousand livres to print and distribute 
throughout the departements writings that ‘éclairer les esprits sur les trames criminelles des 
ennemis de l’État, et sur les vrai causes des maux qui ont trop longtemps déchiré la patrie.’245 
With these allocated funds, Roland launched a nationwide propaganda offensive, pasting the 
walls with proclamations, subsidizing patriotic publications and dispatching agents or 
missionaires patriotes to all corners of the country.246 The purpose of this campaign was 
twofold: First, to discredit the spread of royalist ‘disinformation’ and second, to legitimize 
the series of emergency measures that the National Assembly, and its competing center of 
power, the Paris commune, enacted in the hours, days and weeks following the insurgency. 
As the great wave of anti-royalist purges swept the country, in chaotic scenes so vividly 
depicted by Baroness d’Orczy in The Scarlet Pimpernel, over a thousand suspects were 
detained with hundreds brought before the newly established Tribunal Criminel in Paris and 
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judged for espionage-related crimes. Among them were Jean Jacques Chambon and Joseph 
Douligny, two royalists who were executed for plotting to steal the crown jewels ‘pour les 
faire servir à l'entretien et au secours des ennemis intérieurs et extérieurs’. Also arrested was 
the Sieur Jean Baptiste Dossonville who was accused, but acquitted, of facilitating ‘les 
enrôlements et soldes d’espions contre-révolutionnaires’ in collusion with Louis Collenot 
d’Angremont, the secrétaire de l’administration de la garde nationale.247 In Lille, 
meanwhile, dozens of customs officials were removed from office for their purported 
incivisme, a recent revolutionary construct that counted among its criminal acts, acting as 
spies for the invading Austro-Prussian armies. As the Gazette du département du Nord made 
clear to its readers: 
 
Un certain nombre des préposés aux douanes nationales seront cassés de leurs 
fonctions. Une partie de ces scélérats servoient d’espions à l’ennemi au lieu de nous 
informer de ses invasions sur notre territoire.  
 
And just as promised, five days later, the journal announced how ‘plusieurs  particuliers 
suspectés d’incivisme et convaincus, ou peu s’en faut, d’entretenir correspondance avec nos 
ennemis extérieurs, ont été arrêtés et incarcérés.’248  
In their dogged pursuit of these ‘conspirators’, the revolutionaries imposed a range 
of overlapping security controls - some temporary, others already or formerly employed - 
that included the staging of military road blocks, the suspended allocation of passports and 
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the conduct of large-scale, visites domicilaires.249 Moreover, upon further pressure exerted 
by the Commune, the revolutionaries ordered the deportation to Guyana of all refractory 
priests under the age of sixty (by the loi 26 août 1792) and the de-facto proscription of 
parents whose offspring had emigrated for unjustifiable (ie non-commercial) reasons. As 
Philippe Jacques Rühl made clear to the Assembly on 12 August, the latter were complicit 
in the emigration by providing ‘secours’ to the very same sons who now ‘attaquent leur 
patrie et servent aux ennemis d’indicateurs & d’espions’.250 In many respects, the enactment 
of these emergency measures formed and conformed to a wider process hitherto referred to 
as ‘securitization’. According to the original, constructivist formulation posited by The 
Copenhagen School, ‘securitization’ occurs when a state uses a perceived threat- in this 
instance an existential one- to justify and deploy a series of illiberal measures in order to 
protect itself.251 As Buzan argues:  
 
The question of when a threat becomes a national security issue depends not just on 
what type of threat it is, and how much the recipient state perceives it, but also on the 
intensity with which the threat operates.252  
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During the summer of 1792, with the patrie declared en danger, these conditions were 
certainly met. As the revolutionaries correctly perceived, the war, with its attendant 
disorders, not only exposed the weaknesses and vulnerabilities of the revolutionary state but 
also rendered securitization an imperative.253 Yet, it is a mistake to believe that this process 
is necessarily smooth or certain. In reality, the securitization of a state does not occur quickly 
or instantaneously, nor is it limited to a set of temporary measures, but rather evolves over 
the course of time in accordance with the vicissitudes and exigencies of the moment. As 
Thierry Balzacq explains, ‘securitization is not necessarily the result of a rational design 
wherein goals are set beforehand, following a predetermined agenda.’254 This appeared to 
be the case during the early revolutionary period where the structures of surveillance and 
control were more or less taking a tentative shape. As this chapter will argue, the events of 
10 August 1792 marked a critical moment in how the state protected itself against foreign 
and domestic enemies. At the same time that these repressive measures were being justified 
and deployed, the revolutionary state entered a new phase of restructure and expansion, a 
process facilitated by securitization that evolved imperfectly but nevertheless had important 
implications for the practice of French counter-espionage.  
In the month before the convocation of the National Convention, the revolutionaries 
took a major step forward in implementing the ‘national-security’ administration that 
Gensonné and Brissot had proposed less than three months earlier.255 On 11 August 1792, 
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despite the opposition from Emmanuel de Pastroret and other deputies, the National 
Assembly issued a decree stripping the incumbent juges de paix of their quasi-police powers 
and formally vesting the départements, districts and municipalities with the ‘fonctions de 
sûreté générale pour la recherche des crimes contre la sûreté extérieure ou intérieure de 
l’État.’256 Comprised of eighteen articles, and constituting a semi-blueprint for action, the 
decree rendered the municipalities responsible for all aspects of security within their 
jurisdiction, from the compilation of criminal files to the arrest, dispersal and disarmament 
of all suspect individuals and groups. It also made it a civic requirement for every citizen to 
denounce to the municipality anyone ‘fort soupçonné’ of committing a crime against the 
sûreté générale, a decree which contained the ‘germs’ of the future legislation against 
‘suspects’ in September 1793.257 Just as importantly, it prescribed a strict seventy-two hour 
time-frame for which all information relating to a high crime (ie the corresponding pièces, 
procès-verbaux or interrogatoires) was to be transmitted from the municipalities and 
directoires du departement to the National Assembly.258 As Gensonné anticipated, this 
decree was designed to tighten communications with the centre without impeding initiative 
on a local level.  
This decree, which was intended to impose a measure of uniformity on matters of 
state security, was to be reinforced with the formation of strong central organs. Just hours 
following the storming of the Tuileries, the Legislative Assembly awarded its Comité de 
surveillance new powers to summon and interrogate individuals, raid premises, lift the seals 
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of private correspondence and ‘faire arrêter toutes les personnes suspectes, soit pour leur 
propre sûreté dans les circomstances actuelles, soit pour découvrir les ennemis de la patrie 
et leurs trames criminelles.’259 With these new powers, the comité ordered the Paris 
Commune to transmit the names and addresses of all the persons that were suspected of 
‘malveillance’, an analogous term for the twin crimes of subversion and espionage.260 
Although little is otherwise known about its activities during this intervening period, the 
Legislative Assembly’s decision to toughen its Comité with an expanded role in security 
matters would nevertheless prove a significant move, no less in creating a model for the 
famous Comité de sûreté générale.261 Formed on 2 October 1792, and surviving the duration 
of the National Convention itself, the comité’s successor was charged with four principal 
objectives, as publicized in the National Almanach. It was to:  
 
1. Surveiller à Paris les ennemis de la chose publique et les interroger, lorsqu’ils sont 
arrêtés, pour découvrir les complots.  
2. Rechercher et poursuivre les fabricateurs de faux assignats.  
3. Faire arrêter ceux qui lui sont dénoncés comme agents des cours étrangères et tous 
ceux qui troublent l’ordre public. 
4. Surveiller ceux qui se trouvent compris dans la liste civile, c’est-à-dire, dans la 
liste des hommes vendus au ci-devant roi.262 
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Although the Comité de sûreté générale’s counter-espionage role is implicitly understood, 
at least in reference to the arrest of ‘agents des cours étrangères’, it is incorrect to assume 
that it possessed supreme authority for it, as some historians have erroneously claimed. In 
his study of the Jacobin Republic, for example, Marc Bouloiseau stated that:  
 
The security of the state rested with the Committee whose discretionary power 
extended to all of France and beyond, since it was also in charge of Counter 
Espionage. Civilian authorities and generals were also subject to its control.263  
 
Equally, Françoise Brunel argued how, as Organe de Haute Police, the comité was 
responsible for the ‘sûreté de la republique et des personnes, du contre-espionnage, de la 
recherche et surveillance des suspects, de l’exécution des lois révolutionnaires.’264 Strictly 
speaking, neither was entirely the case, as will shortly be demonstrated. Indeed, just how far 
the Convention’s comité played an active role in counter-espionage in the first eleven months 
of its existence, is difficult to determine. Except for the dispatch of double agents to infiltrate 
and arrest the members of the Marquis de Rouërie’s cells, as mentioned in the preceding 
chapter, there are few instances- at least found in the surviving archival sources and existing 
historiography- of its direct intervention in localized operations for the period up to 
September 1793, particularly in cases relating to military espionage.265 It is known, however, 
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that the comité conducted the arrest, interrogations and investigations into the theft of the 
Garde-Meuble and that it played an, albeit ambiguous, role in the hunt for the ‘Grand 
Corrupteur’, the Duc du Châtelet and his network of royalist agents.266 Yet, in the latter case, 
there exists evidence to show how the comité instructions were called into question and 
ultimately ignored.267 In all probability, the comité seldomly intervened in localized 
operations but progressively acquired the importance of its fonctions, ‘en devenant un organe 
de plus en plus centralisateur’.268 In other words, it was only following its reorganisation and 
the passage of the Loi des Suspects, as the next chapter will argue, that its interventions and 
activities in counter-espionage became more pronounced and decisive. 
A second observation to make about the Comité de sûreté générale at this stage 
relates to its methods. On 2 October 1792, the same day that it was officially formed, Joseph 
Delaunay d’Angers expounded on the revolutionaries’ preferred strategy of containment in 
its combat against espionage and related counter-revolutionary acts:   
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Quant aux personnes arrêtées comme suspectes d’incivisme, et comme prévenues de 
délits contre-révolutionnaires, nous pensons qu’il serait extrêmement dangereux de 
les mettre provisoirement en liberté, sans avoir préalablement scruté leur conduite 
dans ses rapports avec les conspirateurs du dedans et du dehors. Les scellés ont été 
apposés sur leurs papiers. Il est très important d’examiner leurs correspondances. 
Nous croyons avec d’autant plus de raison à la possibilité de trouver dans cet examen 
des lumières utiles, que les opinions de la plupart des détenus ne sont pas équivoques. 
Ce sont des écrivains marqués dans la révolution par un incivisme scandaleux; ce 
sont des agents de la liste civile; ce sont des femmes attachées aux émigrés, et 
chargées de leur correspondance. Il ne faut pas se le dissimuler, la surveillance la 
plus active est encore nécessaire… Il importe de suivre les ramifications de cette 
vaste conjuration, et de ne négliger aucun moyen d’en connaître et les plans et les 
complices.269  
 
De Launay’s preference for preventative arrest, detainment and investigation was a favoured 
method that predates the Revolution. As Genêt has well documented, it was equally practiced 
by the police, military and civil authorities during the ancien régime in order to uncover 
spies. Once suspicion was roused, usually prompted by a denunciation, a dossier was 
compiled and the suspect imprisoned, often in the Bastille for a month or so, during which 
time, he or she was interrogated, the object of which was to extract a morsel of facts, whether 
real or invented, to expose them. During their incarceration, attempts were also made to 
‘turn’ the suspect into a ‘double agent’. The purpose of this ploy was not just to return to the 
service of their king but to spread disinformation and spy, in turn, on their paid masters.270 
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Yet, as the following pages of this thesis will reveal, de Launay’s proposed strategy of 
containment was not uniformally adoped by the revolutionaries, at least in relation to the 
treatment of suspected spies. Spies were not always rounded up immediately and cast into 
prison to await trial. Some were the object of prolonged investigations and/or entrapment 
first, as occurred with the Marquis de Rouerie’s accomplices, whilst others were offered 
immunity in exchange for testimony. Many were executed immediately without any process. 
Ultimately, just how the civil and military authorities pursued and punished spies which fell 
under their jurisdiction or zone largely depended not just on local and individual initiative 
but how espionage itself was perceived, ie as a conspirational crime with its attendant 
‘ramifications’ or a military operation with limited objectives such as reconnaissance.    
The third and final observation that will be made at this stage relates to the 
composition of the comité. On 7 January 1793, in a striking example of how the combat 
against espionage directly impinged on the deliberations of the comité, the Convention 
issued a decree, requiring that the former cannot issue arrest warrants without a twofold 
majority vote from at least eighteen of its sitting members. The motive behind the decree 
stemmed from the arrest, and subsequent release under caution, of a young Englishman 
named Blackwood who was originally accused of being an ‘agent des émigrés’. This 
incident, along with disagreements surrounding the arrest of Antoine de Rivarol’s brother, 
was denounced by both Jean Louis Carra and François Buzot, the deputy d’Eure, with the 
second demanding ‘…que le Comité de sûreté générale soit doublé, et qu’il ne puisse arrêter 
personne qu’en vertu d’une délibération prise aux deux tiers des voix’.271 Thus, although the 
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majority of the Girondins was assured, every case had to be settled by a vote of half of the 
members present, some of whom would later excuse themselves for having turned into 
‘signature machines’.272 Yet, just how far these committee rules made an impact on anti-spy 
activity is- it is reasonable to say - impossible to judge. So much, after all, remains unknown 
at this junction. Without making a statement of fact, it could perhaps be argued that it had 
little effect on espionage as long as the comité’s supremacy or control over domestic security 




Despite the leniency afforded to Blackwood it was clear, from March 1793, that the 
French nation was witnessing a resurgence of l’état d’esprit that Hugues Marquis otherwise 
referred to as ‘l’espionnite’ or ‘la psychose de l’espionnage.’273 In the feuilles des rapports 
et déclarations faites au Bureau de Surveillance, a special branch of the Parisian police, one 
can find several instances where foreigners were increasingly identified as dangerous, 
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On n’est pas surprise de voir arriver dans cette ville une grande quantité d’étrangers 
de tous états au moment ou les citoyens se preparent à partir pour le département de 
la Vendée…afin d’allumer la guerre civile dans Paris…on soupçonne ces gens-là, 
quoi qu’ils affectent un patriotisme exalte, d’être des agitateurs payés par des 
ennemis du bien public, pour allumer la guerre civile dans Paris.275  
 
This surge of xenophobia, which was fuelled by the nationalisation of the war, was most 
vehemently directed against the subjects of France’s ancient rival, the British.276 On 10 
March 1793, the Bureau de Surveillance characterized the popular mood in the capital as 
follows:      
 
Le bruit court qu’il y a dans Paris quantité d’agents de Pitt, chargés d’espionner tout 
ce qui se passe dans la République: Ils logent dans des grands hôtels qu’ils louent 
dans le faubourg Saint-Germain, ou dans des maisons de campagne des environs de 
Paris, afin d’être moins découverte.277   
 
Just whether the commissaires de police genuinely believed in the omnipresence of Pitt’s 
agents or spuriously claimed so to curry favour with the Convention, remains open to debate. 
Either way, their reports are loaded with allegations levelled against ‘les Anglais suspects’ 
whose frequent ballads in different quartiers of Paris was sufficiently disconcerting for them 
to report that ‘la Cour de Londres a du répandre dans Paris un grand nombre d’émissaires et 
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d’espions.’278 Indeed, in his diary, the surgeon and temporary resident, John Moore, writes 
how such tales of British agents purportedly distributing guineas to promote confusion, and 
‘excite that spirirt of jealously and sedition’ throughout France was ‘generally believed’ by 
widespread sections of the population, a perception which he himself dismissed as 
‘ridiculous fiction’.279 To be sure, foreign spies were present in France, just as there were 
French agents operating abroad, not least in Britain.280 However, despite the mounting body 
of research, there is little evidence to suggest that these types of foreign spies (as opposed to 
military ones on strict reconnaissance missions) were fort nombreux or collectively engaged 
in sponsoring counter-revolution, whether in collaboration with the emigrés, and their 
correspondents, or not.281 Certainly, the British government did attempt to establish lines of 
communication between London and Paris, especially following the recall of its ambassador, 
Lord Gower, in August 1792, but their probable aim was to procure intelligence principally 
on the political and military state of France rather than to subvert the newly proclaimed 
Republic.282 And even if the government’s designs were more insidious at this stage, as the 
revolutionaries did not fail to propagate, there is good reason to concur with Hugues Marquis 
that the establishment of a network- already a ‘complex and delicate task’ in peacetime- was 
quite a formidable challenge following the outbreak of the Anglo-French war.283 If the 
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revolutionaries had not altogether rendered France an impenetrable target for foreign 
espionage, they nevertheless made it an increasingly unattractive one.    
One of the principle methods of deterrence - at least in relation to combatting 
espionage - is through the threat, and delivery, of capital punishment. Whilst the enactment 
of legislation to punish spies took (undue) time, the first serious advances were made in 
1793, beginning with the déclaration sur les étrangers. On 18 March, Bertrand Barère 
appeared before the National Convention, now under the presidency of Gensonné, and 
proposed that the Republic banish ‘ces hommes sans aveu qui ne vivent que de l’or étranger, 
qui ont des relations avec nos ennemis, qui alimentent les troubles et les conjurations, alors 
Paris sera tranquille.’284 Barère’s call was echoed the following day, when, during an intense 
debate on the supposedly counter-revolutionary nature of foreigners, Joseph Cambon argued 
that chasing them ‘des terres de la République’ - as Barère’s proposed decree expressed it- 
was the best means of disrupting the lines of communications between them and the enemy 
powers now at war with France.285 As he explained: 
 
En faisant la guerre Aux Anglois, aux Allemands, et à tous les despotis, vous épuisez 
vos ressources, vous leur en laissez une toujours active et beaucoup plus dangereuse 
que leurs armées et leurs vaisseaux; c’est la correspondance qu’ils peuvent entretenir 
ici avec des mal-intentionnés qu’ils y sont vivre; je demande que toute 
communication soit romper avec les puissances en guerre avec nous; que tous les 
étrangers soient tenus de sortir du territoire de la République’.286  
 
The disruption of enemy communications is, of course, a key counter-intelligence measure. 
Yet, whilst few revolutionaries were disposed to authorize mass deportation, at least at this 
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stage, the decree of 21 March 1793, which legally recognized the famed comités de 
surveillance, did nevertheless contain a clause that was especially draconian. Given the way 
revolutionary thought was leaning, it had no other likely object than to to deter all étrangers, 
either residing in or planning to enter France, from committing the slightest infraction, not 
least given the revolutionaries’ known tendency to inflate even a minor civil disturbance into 
a full blown conspiracy. 287 As it read, ‘tout étranger saisis dans une émeute, ou qui serait 
convaincu de l’avoir provoquée ou entretenue, par voie d’argent ou de conseil, sera puni de 
mort.’288  
Of course, in terms of surveillance, it was not so much that foreigners were being 
singled out but that were being added to the groups of state enemies to be monitored on a 
nationwide basis.289 On 21 March 1793, the same day that the National Convention issued 
its déclaration sur l’étrangers, the directoire de département de Loir-et-cher announced its 
intention to form a comité de surveillance vested with broad powers to uncover all counter-
revolutionary plots threatening the security of the state. Emphasizing how only through strict 
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…qu’il est à craindre que des insurrections n’éclatent dans l’arrondissement de Loir-
et-cher’ forme une comité de surveillance…de faire toutes les recherches et 
perquisitions nécessaires, de prendre des renseignements pour découvrir les complots 
qui pourraient menacer la liberté, découvrir les émigrés et les prêtres réfractaires et 
prendre toutes les mesures provisoires qu’exige la « sûreté générale » (sic) de l’Etat 
à charge de faire part au Directoire du résultant de ces démarches. Le Directoire 
rendra définitives ces mesures et dans les 24 heures les arrestations effectuées, après 
déliberation.290 
 
Strikingly, the directoire makes no mention of targeting étrangers, despite the ostensible 
mission of the comités de surveillance to receive and examine the déclarations of all 
foreigners in their commune, especially those who were native to the countries with which 
the Republic found itself at war.291 Indeed, it would appear that up to September 1793, these 
committees were mostly inclined to investigate, interrogate and release foreign suspects after 
a few days internment once their political loyalty was amply demonstrated.292 One form of 
documentary evidence was, of course, the colour-coded carte de sûreté (alternatively called 
a certificate de civisme) or a validated certificat d’autorisation de residence whose 
possession would demonstrate assimilation into a community as well as exculpation from 
crimes such as espionage.293 In fact, despite the mounting fears that, following the outbreak 
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of hostilities with Great Britain, the peuple anglais would inundate them with spies, a 
prospect that an agent in London had forewarned the Ministre des Affaires Étrangères a 
month earlier, the revolutionaries accorded the British residents in France a measure of 
protection if, in the words of one report, they ‘justifieront des affaires qui les y retiennent.’294 
Famously among them were the eighty plus members of the British Club of Jacobins who 
convened their meetings at the White’s Hotel in Paris.295 In fact, in an example of how certain 
residents attempted to demonstrate their revolutionary zeal, Nicholas Madgett, the Irish Head 
of the Bureau de Traducion attached to the Comité du Salut Public proposed to his employers 
on 22 March 1793 to establish a ‘comité révolutionnaire anglaise’ dedicated to rooting out 
British spies among them. As he suggested, it should be composed of: 
 
Citoyens britanniques d’un civisme éprouvé pour purger la ville autant qu’il sera 
possible de tous les espions envoyés par le ministre anglais. (…) J’ai déjà proposé, 
ajoute t’il non sans arrière-pensées, d’établir des commissaires anglais ou irlandais 
dans les principaux ports de la République pour y accueillir les matelots 
prisonniers.296 
 
Although Madgett’s proposal seems to have come to nothing, the revolutionaries were 
naturally content to draw on the divisions within the British expat community to uncover the 
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false brethren among them. Even before Madgett had suggested the formation of its own 
comité, the authorities were made aware of the existence of possible British spies thanks to 
the rumours that were circulating Paris’ fashionable sociétés and cafés. In January of that 
year, for example, the famous Captain George Monro was forced to flee France after having 
been denounced by a certain publisher named Thomas. Thomas had recognized Monro by 
chance and began to talk publicly of him as a spy working in the service of William Pitt’s 
cabinet. His name was thus added to a list of proscribed persons and placarded against the 
city walls, prompting his swift but safe departure.297  
In any event, the ‘mesures provisoires’ which the constituent authorities at the Loir-
et cher pronounced expedient, seem to have conformed to a general pattern of police action. 
In co-ordinated sweeps, conducted by the officiers municipaux, juges de paix and supported 
by detachments of the gardes nationales and/or brigades of the gendarmerie, hundreds of 
‘suspects’ were arrested following early morning raids and interrogated by the comités de 
surveillance. An inventory of the papers - discovered or seized- purportedly concerning la 
sûreté générale was also kept.298 Often the members of the comités accompanied the 
municipal police during these visites domiciliaires. In Carcassonne, where the advancing 
Spanish army was sowing panic among the local populace, the Conseil général du 
département de l’Aude ordered the closure of the city gates on 29 April 1793 ‘pour aucun 
des citoyens présents ne pût sortir et aller prévenir les personnes suspectes.’299 According to 
that study, of the seventy three individuals arrested in the first sweep, the motives of arrests 
 
297 Hughes Marquis, ‘Espionnage Britannique’, op. cit., p.266.  
298 Henri Calvet, ‘Les rapports du comité de surveillance’, op. cit., 432-434. Similar examples of mass sweeps 
occurred in Paris during the riots that took place on 25 February 1792 with the commissaires de police arresting 
dozens of domestics accused of being in the pay of secret agents. As one report recorded, ‘En face du Marché 
des Innocents, rue Saint-Denis, on en a saisi d’un seul coup de filet, quarante à cinquante; on a des preuves que 
plusieurs personnes qui excitaient au pillage et au meutre étaient des déserteurs, des émigrés ou leurs 
agents…Parmi les femmes il y en avait qu’on peut soupçonner d’avoir été payées par quelques agents secrets 
de troubles et de confusion…’ Georges Rude, ‘Les Émeutes des 25, 26 Fevrier 1793 à Paris: D'après Les 
Procès-Verbaux Des Commissaires de Police des Sections parisiennes.’ Annales Historiques de la Révolution 
Française, 25.130, 1953, 33–57 (p.54), Archives Prefecture de Police, AA/148 fol 128 and AA/248 fol 71-73.  
299 Marcel Rufas, ‘Le comité de surveillance et les suspects de Carcassonne (17 Avril 1793-21 Mars 




were vague at best - attachement à l’ancien régime, aristocratie, propos inciviques. Most 
significantly, given the ostensible mission of the comités, not a single person was arrested 
for specifically committing espionage related acts as a foreigner. Indeed, the study concludes 
that the cause of arrests were ‘peu grave’ and ‘ne denotent pas l’existence d’un complot 
contre-révolutionnaire.’300 Anyhow, in response to the exigency of the moment, they were 
questioned by the local comité de surveillance before their dossiers, which included the 
procès-verbaux and transcripts of the interrogations, were sent to the administration du 
departément and thereon to the Comité de sûreté générale de la Convention.301 Similarly, in 
Lyon, where the arrests of suspects were conceived as ‘preventitives’, sentries were posted 
at the city gates to not let anyone pass after ten o’clock. Also, the rivers were monitored for 
crossings and, in assuring ‘toute mesure extraordinaire de sûreté’, as their domestic security 
role entailed, armed forces were stationed at the door steps of each residence to bar the entry 
and exit of individuals during the visites domicilaires.302 As the report of one such raid read: 
 
Que la visite commencerait dans toute l'étendue de la cité à cinq heures du matin ; 
que les commissaires de section conduiraient à l'hôtel-commun les personnes 
suspectes; que les commissaires de police se rendraient dans leurs cantons respectifs, 
pour instruire, au besoin, le Conseil général; que le comité de police tiendrait ouvert 
son bureau pour reçevoir les procès-verbaux des personne suspectes 
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arrêtées….L'exécution de cet arrêté déjoua les complots des contre-révolutionnaires, 
et répandit l'alarme dans leurs rangs.303  
 
The closure of city gates and surveillance patrols was standard security procedure to contain 
and ensnare suspect individuals and groups. Again in August 1793, following a petition from 
the section du change in Lyon, no boatman or individual was permitted to ford the Saône 
between six o’clock in the evening and seven o’clock in the morning under risk of being 
treated as a suspect. Equally, during the day, noone was authorised to stop near the arches 
of bridges. Sentinels were also to be posted on the quays and ports in order to ‘surveiller les 
malveillants qui s'évertuent en malveillance’.304 According to the Comité particulier De 
Police, Surveillance et sûreté publique du Département de Rhone et Loire, the enemies 
within had been planning to facilitate the entry of the allied forces, identifying the old 
stonebridge, La Guillotière, on the Rhône as a strategic target. Moreover, according to their 
assessment, counter-revolutionaries were employing all manner of ruses and subtefuge for 
these auxiliary operations, such as donning republican uniforms and forming false patrols, 
stashing munitions, staging assassinations of local officials.305 Thus, to thwart these 
‘manœuvres perfides’ the comité enjoined the divers clubs, municipalities, section 
committees to ramp up survellance, raid all premises, arrest all suspects ‘indistinctement’ 
and body-check them especially in their shoes and other hidden areas since it was there 
where they would expect to discover clandestine correspondance.306 
Of course, not all police operations were sweeping in nature. The comités 
révolutionnaires did also conduct focused investigations of suspected spies. The case of the 
Marquis du Roveray is one notable example.307 At midnight, on 4 May 1793, the 
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commissaires de police arrested the Swiss born lawyer at his residence in the Faubourg 
Honoré, Paris.308 As the procès-verbal d'arrestation states, he had been denounced to the 
Comité de Surveillance de la Section de la Halle au Blé for supposedly possessing papers 
that indicated he was an ‘agent de l’Angleterre’.309 In fact, a month before the storming of 
the Bastille, du Roveray was already the object of denunciation. On 12 June 1789, during 
the séance of the National Assembly, the deputy Noël-Joseph Madier de Montjau declared. 
‘Je demande à la chambre qu'elle ordonne l'expulsion hors de son sein des individus non 
députés qui se trouvent assis parmi nous’. Alluding to du Roveray, he continued ‘j'en 
aperçois un, étranger, pensionnaire du roi d'Angleterre, que nous voyons depuis quelques 
jours, écrire et faire circuler des billets dans la salle’310. Du Roveray had been assigned to 
the French embassy in London by Brissot, despite the objections of the diplomat Guillaume 
de Bonne-Carrère who had ‘bonnes raisons’ to suspect that he was actually one of William 
Pitt’s spies.311 During his preliminary interrogation, the investigators instructed du Roverary 
to provide them with his correspondence, confidential or otherwise, with ‘Angleterre’. Du 
Roveray accordingly complied with the request and presented them with several bundles 
which, he declared, contained the aforesaid correspondance ‘laquelle paraît être depuis 
l’année 1789 jusqu’à la présente.’312 The pieces were transported in a box under lock and 
key and transported to the Comité de Surveillance de la Section for examination. At the same 
time, du Roveray was summoned to appear before its members that same morning to account 
for himself. In a striking example of their limited expertise in decryption or stenography, the 
comité forwarded the pièces to the Comité de salut public – after a two month delay no less- 
after having concluded that ‘dans lesdits papiers, il y en a de caractères sténographiques et 
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d’anglais a-t-on dit) et que le Comité n'a aucune connaissance en ces sortes de caractères et 
langues.313 Indeed, in a rare find, a pamphlet appeared in circulation that May instructing 
investigators and laymen on how to decrypt correspondence. Titled Le contr’Espion ou 
les cléfs de toutes les correspondances secrètes, and authored by an individual identified by 
the Moniteur as Dlandol, it represents the only printed publication of the period that not only 
provides lessons on decryption but employs the term ‘contr’Espion’.314 Recognising the 
important contribution that it represents, the Gazette nationale wrote the following editorial 
piece upon its appearance in circulation: 
 
un des moyens les plus efficaces de déjouer les trames & les complots, c’est de 
connaître toutes les recettes (?) dont on peut le servir pour les correspondances 
secrètes. Après de longues & laborieuses recherches, M Dlandol est enfin parvenu à 
se mettre en état d’en offrir à ses concitoyens le receuil parfaitement complèt & il 
ose dire que ce n’etoit pas un des moindres services à rendre à la patrie dans les 
circomstances actuelles, que d’anéantir ainsi, par la publicité, l’arme la plus 
dangereuse des ennemis secrets de la République.315  
Notwithstanding this publication, the case-file of du Roveray reveals just how much 
importance the revolutionaries attached to written proof to substantiate their criminal case at 
this stage. As one historian rightly points out, documentary evidence was far more valuable 
than a potentially false witness.316 Yet, conversely, the sole fact that an individual was the 
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recipient of counter-revolutionary correspondance, despite the possibility of error, 
nevertheless constituted a crime. It was for this reason that, during her interrogation by the 
Comité de sûreté générale on 28 floréal an II a certain Madame Pichard, the wife of the 
former président of the Parlement de Bordeaux admitted to not signing her letters in order 
to not compromise herself or her correspondants.317 
As these episodes nevertheless demonstrate, the formation of the comités 
révolutionnaires during the spring of 1793 thus marked a significant step in the securitization 
of the state. In the first place, as Jeanne Grall, a former curator at the municipal archives at 
Caen, explains in her article on the Comité de sûreté sénérale du Calvados, the comités 
played ‘un rôle eminent de liaison’ not just with the central organs constituting the 
revolutionary government but also with the divers comités in the different départements of 
France.318 Not just on ground operations, but also on everything that transpired in their 
commune, they thus represented an essential source of information for the revolutionary 
authorities in Paris. To emphasize the importance of these inter-communications, and how 
they strengthened ties within the Republic, Grall cites one letter in which the comité 
members write: 
Nous acceptons avec reconnaissance la correspondance que vous nous proposez; 
nous vous informerons des trames contre la sûreté générale qui nous seront dévoilées. 
Par cette correspondance les départements resserront les liens qui les rattachent la 
République.319 
Second, the proliferation of these local surveillance structures throughout France generated 
an increase ‘sans précédent de la dénonciation’, a tool in the service of the revolutionary 
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government and, as the following chapter will demonstrate, one of the ‘rouages de la 
Terreur.’320 Equally, the proliferation of denunciations during this period, many of which 
continued to be actuated by motives less than sincere, engendered the need to constitute 
organs specifically to receive them. As the Representatives to Mont Blanc informed the 
Comité de salut public on 27 April 1793, not only were many of these denunication plain 
absurd but that they also supposedly played into the hands of the spies and counter-
revolutionaries operating within the region, just how is not so clear:    
De la méfiance sans fin, les dénonciations absurdes, les plus fausses et plus ridicules 
nouvelles, presque à chaque quart d’heure. Les prêtres, les ci-devant, les aristocrates, 
les espions suisses, piémontais, genevois etc profitent merveilleusement de cette 
disposition d’éspirit. Chambery est le foyer principe d’où circule, dans le 
département, cette contre-révolution en détail. Nous avons pris le parti de former un 
comité de surveillance générale que tient chez nous, et qui, pour plus de sûreté et 
d’activité, n’est composé que de trois personnes. 321  
Thirdly, the comités de surveillance were often the drivers of the securitization process. 
Whilst many did limit their activities to processing the déclarations des étrangers- according 
to their interpretation of the national decree - others dispensed their mission with far greater 
zeal.322 In one striking example of local initiative, certain comités révolutionnaires 
demanded an extension of their powers by claiming the right to intercept and open all 
correspondance exchanged between the émigrés and their correspondants in France.323 On 
 
320 Virginie Martin, ‘La Révolution française ou « l'ère du soupçon ». Diplomatie et dénonciation’, Hypothèses, 
12.1 (2009), 131-140, (p.134.) 
321 François Alphonse Aulard (ed.), Recueil des Actes, op. cit., III, p.499. 
322 In a local debate surrounding their powers the comité de Saint-Dié, for example, argued that their remit was 
‘uniquement destiné à recevoir les déclarations des étrangers’ whereas the overall surveillance of ennemis 
intérieurs ultimately fell under the legal jurisdiction of the municipal authorities. As they maintained, their 
‘fonctions ne s'étendront pas plus loin, la surveillance des ennemis intérieurs relevant des municipalités’. Cited 
in Jean-Paul Rothiot, ‘Comités de surveillance et Terreur dans le département des Vosges de 1793 à l'an III’, 
Annales historiques de la Révolution française, 314 (1998), 621-668 (at pp.625-626).  
323 See ‘Renvoi au Comité central de surveillance d’un arrêté du Conseil général des Vosges tendant à 




28 April 1793, to impose a measure of uniform control throughout the departements, 
the newly instituted Comité de salut public decreed that postal correspondance should be 
superintended in each commune by special commissions composed of agents municipaux. 
Specifically, any letter coming from abroad, or from persons inscribed on the list of emigrés, 
was to be examined before being forwarded, if necessary, to the Comité de salut public.324 
As the decree of 6 April 1793 permitted, the comité had the power to take ‘dans les 
circonstances urgentes les mesures de défense générale extérieure et intérieure.’325 To justify 
this breach of privacy, it cited how: 
le secret de la correspondance est un moyen funeste de perdre la patrie, le Salut public 
exige que l’on découvre cette source des maux de la France et qu’aucun citoyen, dans 
un danger aussi imminent, ne peut réclamer le secret de ses lettres et de sa 
correspondance, lorsque le Salut de la patrie en exige impérieusement l’ouverture et 
la communication. À arrêté que toutes les lettres venant de l’étranger seront ouvertes. 
Qu’il sera écrit à tous les corps administratifs, pour leur recommander de déléguer à 
des citoyens d’un civisme reconnu et bien épuré la fonction d’ouvrir les lettres venant 
 
31 août 1792, après-midi, Arch Dept 1L 492 (p.297) Délibérations et arrêtés du Conseil général du 
Département du Bas-Rhin. And letter to the Conseil général des Vosges  relating to the illict correspondence 
between the émigrés and ‘invitation au Comité de surveillance’ to examine the measures taken by the 
municipalité de Strasbourg to intercept the correspondence sent between the two banks of the Rhine by another 
‘voie’ than by post. – 1L 492, Séance du 31 août, après-midi 1792 (p. 313). 
324 Décret relatif aux lettres chargées ou non chargées dans les bureaux de poste, à l’adresse des personnes 
portées dans la liste des émigrés. Les 9 = 11 mai 1793, Jean Baptiste Duvergier (ed.), Collection complète des 
lois, op. cit., V, p.278. 
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de l’étranger dans les divers bureaux de la république, et de rendre compte au Comité 
de Salut public de toutes les lettres et correspondances suspectes326 […]  
For the Comité de sûreté générale de Calvados, however, the proposed measure did not go 
far enough. Arrogating extra powers to itself, it reserved the right to intercept not only letters 
coming from abroad but all suspect correspondance belonging to the emigrés, refractory 
priests and ‘ennemis de la République’.327 On 27 May 1793, upon its own volition, the comité 
decreed that all letters sent to l'étranger and to the rebellous departments under arms, will 
be opened and examined by it without fail. Similar rights to intercept suspect correspondance 
were claimed by several other comités de surveillance. In Nancy, the local comié stipulated 
that such intrusive powers were defined by decree issued by a commissaire of the National 
Convention. As they argued, the prime methods of surveillance had to include the 
examinination of all correspondence that is sent by post and messengers as well as receive 
denouncations from ‘bons citoyens’ on the incivisime of suspect individuals. In other words, 
to gather all the ‘renseignements propres’ that permit the discovery of the ‘ennemis plus ou 
moins dangereux de la chose publique’.328 At the same time, the comité claimed that the 
powers conferred to them included issuing arrest warrants against suspect persons and 
placing under the surveillance of the corps administratifs and ‘bons citoyens’, all individuals 
who ‘sans mériter d'être mis en état d'arrestation’ but should be surveilled immediately 
anyway.329 
 
326 Auguste Théodore baron de Girardot, Des administrations départementales électives et collectives, 1790- 
an VIII (Paris: Guillaumin, 1857), p.172. This copy of the letter written by the ministre de l’Intérieur to the 
Administrateurs du Département de la Marne on 28 Avril 1793 is stored in the Archives municipales 
d’Epernay, under 1B1 and conveniently reproduced online.  
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2010.pdf; 
Le comité, recalling the similar argument made by Muguet de Nanthou before the Natonal Assembly in 
September 1791, declared ‘…Aucun citoyen dans un danger aussi imminent ne peut réclamer le secret de ses 
lettres et de sa correspondance, lorsque le salut de sa patrie en exige impérieusement l’ouverture et la 
communication.’ Alphonse Aulard, Recueil des Actes, op. cit., III, p.506. 
327 Jeanne Grall, ‘Le Comité de Sûreté Générale du Calvados’, op. cit., p.199. 
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Indeed, the enthusiasm with which certain comités embraced their mission is exuded 
in a letter from the comité de surveillance for the Section de la Cité, demanding the re-arrest 
of a suspect who had been released without charge following interrogation by the 
commissaires de police. In it, the comité denounced the administration de police themselves 
for not detaining the suspect, in accordance with the containment strategy, whilst 
simultaneously underlying the importance of continued surveillance: 
Nous dénonçons l’administration de police pour avoir mis en liberté le citoyen 
Maillard....Citoyens, que deviendra la liberté, que deviendra la révolution, si de pareil 
les infractions sont commises par les autorités....A quoi sert la surveillance exercée 
envers les gens suspects par les comités révolutionnaires, si les mesures qu’ils 
prennent en conséquence sont ainsi paralysées par ceux mêmes qui doivent non 
seulement les soutenir, mais même les stimuler en cas de besoin?330 
III 
At the same time that thousands of these comités révolutionnaires were 
spontaneously forming throughout France, the central authorities in Paris took fresh steps to 
compartmentalise responsibilities in their quest for securitization. On 23 April 1793, five 
days before the Comité de Salut Public issued its decree on the violability of correspondance 
emanating from abroad, the National Convention authorized the creation of a special bureau 
dedicated to tracking the manufacture of fabricated assignats both within France or abroad 
with, as their agents detected, Zaehringen in Switzerland being the centre of distribution.331 
In clause VI, it prescribed how: 
 
330 Archives Prefecture de Police, Section Divers Section de la Cité, 29 août 1793. The subject of this complaint 
should not be confused with Stanislas Maillard, the agent provocateur and one of the principle subjects of the 
work by Ernest d’Hauterive, Mouchards et Policiers (Paris: Librairie Gallimard, 1936).   
331 Décret relatif à la découverte et à la poursuite des fabricateurs et distributeurs de faux assignats, soit dans 
l’intérieur de la France, soit à l’étranger. Jean Baptiste Duvergier (ed.), Collection complète des lois, op. cit., 




Les agens du bureau de vérification, porteurs des ordres nécessaires, sont autorisés à 
se faire assister, sur leurs réquisitions, par tous officiers de police, juges de paix et 
autres dépositaires de l’autorité, et par la force publique, pour faire les recherches et 
perquisitions nécessaires, et pour obtenir et mettre à exécution tout mandat d’amener 
ou d’arrêt.332 
With reason, the revolutionaries saw the trafficking of assignats as an espionage-related 
crime employed by the counter-revolutionaries to wreck economic disruption on the 
country.333 Furthermore, the massive scale in which assignats were fabricated abroad, 
required the response to be both transnational and decisive with agents on the ground vested 
with the authority to surveil, arrest and repatriate to France the culprits for trial and 
judgement:  
Le tort incalculable qui résulte pour la patrie de la fabrication de faux assignats, ou 
de fausse monnoie, doit exciter particulièrement la surveillance des agents de la 
République en pays étranger. Ils feront en conséquence tout ce qui dépendra d'eux 
pour découvrir les coupables, les faire arrêter et livrer aux tribunaux de leur nation.334 
 
332 ibid, p.317. Significantly, clause 11 set out the standard procedure of separating indicted criminals in order 
to avoid collusion. As it read: les prévenus ou accusés du crime de distribution ou fabrication de faux assignats, 
seront détenus séparément les uns des l’autres, sans pouvoir communiquer entre eux pendant l’instruction de 
leur procès, soit qu’ils soient complices ou non, et ils ne pourront communiquer avec personne de dehors de la 
prison, sans l’autorisation du directeur du jury.’ The bureau de vérification of Paris was subsequently 
dismantled on the 3 nivôse an VI with responsibility for its operations transferred to the commissaires de la 
Trésorerie nationale. Georges Depeyrot, Monnaie et papier-monnaie pendant la Revolution, 1789-1803 (Paris: 
Maison Florange, 1996)  
333 Whilst the extent of the economic damage caused by the fabrication of the faux assignats remains open to 
historical debate, it is hard to credit seriously some of the claims made by the revolutionaries. On 13 July 1793, 
in a report that he presented in the name of the Comité de Salut public, Pierre Joseph Cambon made the 
following wild allegation. ‘Certains administateurs de département le secondent. Comment détruire la 
République, ont-ils dit ? « Depuis que Je vois Pitt, dit-il, toucher 5 millions sterling pour dépenses secrètes, je 
m’étonne plus qu’on sème avec cet argent des troubles dans toute l’étendue de la République. On est parvenu 
avec un fonds de 120 millions en assignats à faire baisser nos changes. Et Pitt avec 5 millions sterling s’est 
procuré 500 millions en assignats avec lesquels il nous fait une guerre terrible.’ A Ray, Réimpression de 
l’ancien Moniteur, op. cit., XVII, p.101.  
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It would appear that the revolutionaries felt compelled to violate Swiss territory and extract 
the manufacturers of the assignats themselves as, during the deliberations of the Conseil 
general du department du Doubs, it was revealed that the Fribourg senate had refused to 
comply with what can only be described as an ‘extradition’ request.335 Local agents thus had 
a dual role. They were not only charged with verifying whether assignats were fabricated or 
not- the discovery of which was often prompted by denunciations- but they also possessed 
powers of enforcement.336 In other words, whilst the revolutionaries had attempted to impose 
a measure of centralised control, principally with the formation of a head bureau in Paris, it 
nevertheless recognised that, due to tempo-spatial constraints- operations had to be 
coordinated on a local level. Indeed, as Georges Hubrecht has revealed, it was ultimately the 
French soldiers in the occupied territories who were deployed in search of clandestine 
printing shops.337 
Simultaneously, but on a far larger scale, the revolutionaries set about expanding the 
‘system’ of mass surveillance within France. This service de renseignement was not, 
however, organized from one single epicenter but consisted of parallel operations, of varying 
extensiveness, attached to the ministries composed of the Conseil Exécutif.338 Foremost 
among these services was the one instituted by the Ministre des Affaires étrangères, Pierre-
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Henri-Hélène-Marie Tondu, otherwise known as Lebrun. That spring, having purged the 
ministry of Dumouriez’s appointees, he began to reorganize the secret service of the interior, 
drawing on the pecuniary and manpower resources disposed to him. For his surveillance 
activities, he formed the Central Bureau, a kind of special branch that controlled a domestic 
spy network of approximately one hundred and eighty agents dispersed throughout France 
including the counter-revolutionary hotspots, La Vendée, Brittany, Lyon and Toulon. 
According to their broad remit, they were charged with keeping the Central Bureau informed 
every day ‘de tout ce qui se passe dans la capitale et dans les départements’.339 Significantly 
for this discussion, the system that Lebrun put in place was also conceived to neutralize 
enemy spies, another example of how the lines between surveillance en masse and counter-
espionage operations were often blurred. The blue-print for this system are detailed in three 
anonymous documents that Alphonse Aulard claimed to have discovered and which 
fortunately survive today.340 Given the pertinence to the discussion, the most relevant 
instructions, contained in three subsections, have been transcribed below.  
As the instructions plainly state, the purpose of Lebrun’s surveillance system was ultimately 
to ‘prévenir les crimes pour n'avoir point à les punir.’341 For it, the author of the document 
identifies three groups deemed to be the key perpetrators of espionage- or at least the three 
groups which fall under the Central Bureau’s jurisdiction- diplomatic agents, false patriots 
and émigrés. As the instructions read:  
Le peu d'agents diplomatique restes en espionnage; Notamment Gouverneur Morris, 
des États-Unis. Le plus grand ennemi de la liberté. Il a été manqué dans les visites 
domiciliaires, mais il faut absolument connaitre ses allures;  
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Les hommes qui circulent dans nos saintes sociétés patriotiques avec un excès peu 
naturel et très suspect. Il faut savoir s'ils n'ont pas des coteries ou s'ils se de 
dommagent de leur hypocrisie civique.  
 
….Je n'ai pas besoin de dire qu'ils tacheront de dépister les projets des émigrés qui 
résideront dans les pays où ils se trouveront, et qu'ils feront ce qu'ils pourront pour 
avoir à tout prix leur correspondance avec la France, car, à coup sûr. Ils en ont une.342  
 
The instructions also set out on how the agents extérieurs, who were charged with the 
surveillance of the frontiers, should discharge their functions. Essentially, the author of the 
document states that the activities of these agents would be ‘médiocrement utile si elle ne 
pouvait se communiquer de proche en proche et d'agent à agent.’ As he explains:  
En effet, je suppose qu’un agent à Dunkerque ait connaissance d'un projet qui 
concerne la sûreté de Lille, et que ce projet doive avoir son exécution sous peu de 
jours; il en instruira le ministre: mais le retard que la bureaucratie fait éprouver aux 
réponses, quelque activité que le ministre ait personnellement, rendra inutile cette 
communication, et le projet aura lieu. Si, au contraire, il écrit de suite à l'agent à Lille, 
celui-ci s'occupera, sans perdre de temps, de déjouer le projet.  
 
Thus, in order to eliminate the loss of time expended in notifying the Minister ie Lebrun of 
a purported plot, the agents were first to coordinate a response directly with one another. In 
other words, whilst the Bureau Central existed to provide central oversight, the conduct of 
local operations was not to be impeded by bureaucratic intervention. The agents were, of 
course, required to maintain a daily correspondence but that priority was always to be 
 




accorded to operations on the ground. Also, for reasons of expediency and security, these 
agents were not to rely on the usual postal routes to transmit their confidential 
communications but were to entrust their despatches to a genuine patriot:  
 
Comme il est des circonstances ou la voie des postes est encore trop lente et souvent 
peu sure, chacun des agents est autorisé à s'attacher un vrai sans-culotte, courageux, 
qui aura pour principal objet de porter, lorsque le cas l'exigera, des communications 
importantes, soit à  l'agent, soit au général, soit enfin au représentant le plus proche 
de l'agent principal.  
 
At the same time that Lebrun was developing the procedures around his surveillance system 
Dominique-Joseph Garat was also laying down his own ‘véritable service d’information’.343 
As Ministre de l'Intérieur from 14 March 1793 to 15 August 1793, he had attempted to install 
an ‘État général d’observation et de correspondance pour tous les départements de la 
République’ through the deployment of eighty commissaires.344 The role of commissaires, 
especially those of the Convention, is of importance for furthering our understanding of 
security for this period, not least as their activities, from October 1792, demonstrate that the 
Comité de Sûreté Générale did not possess overall responsibility for counter-espionage as 
formerly argued. As the deputy Charles-Nicolas Osselin made plain during the séance of 5 
May 1793, the overcrowding in the prisons could just as equally be attributed to the orders 
issued by the Commissaires of the National Convention as those by the Comité de sûreté 
générale, of which he himself was a member:  
 
 
343 As he was told, ‘J'estimais qu'un véritable service d'information était la contrepartie essentielle des 
responsabilités du pouvoir. Oui, je pense que vous avez été le premier homme d'État à organiser 
un service complet de renseignements.’ Cited in Michel Duhart, Dominique–Joseph Garat: 1749-1833 
(Atlantica: 2009), p.139. 




Les prisons, dit-il, sont en ce moment engorgées par un nombre prodigieux de 
détenus, arrêtés tant à Paris que dans les départements, les uns en vertu de mandats 
d'arrêt du Comité de sûreté générale, les autres en vertu des ordres des commissaires 
de la Convention nationale dans les départements. Votre comité vous propose de 
l'autoriser à examiner les causes pour lesquelles ces citoyens sont détenus, renvoyer 
les uns devant les tribunaux pour être jugés sur les faits articulés contre eux, et mettre 
en liberté ceux qui ont été arrêtés sans preuve de crimes.345  
 
These powers to arrest, as they pertained to counter-espionage, were vaguely defined by the 
decree of 26 January 1793 which credited the commissaires de la Convention (not to be 
confused with those appointed by the Conseil Exécutif) with the mission to preserve state 
security.346  
 
La Convention nationale autorise tous ses commissaires à prendre toutes les mesures, 
même celles de sûreté générale, que les circonstances rendront nécessaires. Elle 
décrète que leurs arrêtés ou délibérations, pris ou à prendre, seront exécutés 
provisoirement, à la charge par lesdits commissaires d'envoyer, dans les vingt-quatre 
heures, copie des arrêtés ou délibérations, pour être infirmés ou confirmés par la 
Convention.347 
 
345 Cited in Henri Alexandre Wallon, Le Tribunal Révolutionnaire (Paris: E Plon, Nourrit et cie, 1899), I, p.37. 
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Convention nationale à ...' Anonymous, Débats de la Convention nationale: ou analyse complète des séances 
(Paris: Baudouin Frères, 1828), III, p.446.  
347 Anonymous, Collection générale des Lois, Proclamations, Instructions et autres Actes du Pouvoir exécutif 
(Paris: Imprimerie Nationale du Louvre, 1793), XIII, p.163. In his discourse on the dangers facing the patrie, 
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of every government and military institution. ‘Messieurs; vous compléterez le système de recherches contre 
les conspirateurs. Commissaires aux armees; Commissaires aux municipalités; Commissaires dans le sein de 
l’Assemblée nationale; activité dans la cour d’Orléans. C’est en combinant toutes ces mesures sous les auspices 
de notre réunion, que nous écarterons tous les dangers.’ Discours de M. Brissot sur les causes de danger de la 
patrie, et sur les mesures à prendre, etc (Séance du 9 juillet 1792, an 4 de la liberté), Guillaume N Lallement 
(ed.), Choix de Rapports, op. cit., IX, p.222. A year before, on  22 June 1791, at the moment of Louis XVI’s 





Indeed, the counter-espionage role that the commissaires de la Convention played is well 
demonstrated in the case of the royalist suspect, Geneviève de Vielfort.348 In a letter to the 
National Convention dated 5 October 1792, the commissaires attached to l’armée du Nord, 
the Pas de Calais and adjacent zones reported how: 
 
Le Pas de Calais est, comme le nord, farci d’aristocrates de toutes les espèces, dont 
les intelligences avec les Autrichiens sont aussi dangereuses pour la partie que 
préjudiciables au maintien de l’ordre. Les espions et les agitateurs sont dans ce 
moment les hommes les plus nuisibles. Leur ôter les moyens de nuire, c’est servir 
essentielement la République.349 
 
Whilst possibly overestimating the dangers posed by such spies and agitators- at least 
compared to the destructive impact of regular army formations- the commissaires clearly 
recognised the imperative need to neutralise acts of espionage. Then, having established the 
contribution that this would render to security of the state, the commissaires proceeded to 
inform the Convention of the circumstances surrounding the arrest of Vielfort:   
 
et c’est dans cet éspirit que nous nous sommes conduits en faisant arreter 
l’aristocratie Geneviève Vielfort, dont ci-devant château nous a été denoncé comme 
un asile de conspirateurs et un rendez-vous d’espions. Il a resté à la force armée, et 
s’est donné le temps, par cette résistance, de brûler les preuves de ses intelligences 
avec nos enemis du dehors et du dedans. On vient de le ramener ici. On l’a sauvé de 
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la fureur des citoyens qui voulaient immoler à leur vengeance, et nous le ferons partir 
pour Douai, sous un escorte.350 
 
Just with the case of the Marquis de la Rouërie, the activities taking place at Vielfort’s 
château had attracted unwanted attention. With his person in custody, the accusateur public 
d'Arras ordered the authorities of the district de Béthune to question the aristocrat’s wife and 
servants. According to the transcripts of the interrogation, they were each asked the 
following pedestrian questions. ‘Avez vous connaissance… 
 
1. que de Vielfort ait eu aucune correspondance avec les émigrés?  
2. qu'il ait recruté ou conspiré à aucun recrutement pour les ennemis?  
3. d'aucun complot de contre-révolution dans lequel leditde Vielfort aurait bu n'aurait 
pas trempé?  
4. quelles étaient les personnes qu'il voyait le plus fréquemment?  
5. quelles étaient les matières ordinaires de leur conversation?’351 
 
At this juncture, the commissaires de la Convention, Duquesnoy, d'Aoust and Doulcet 
charged the juge de paix d'Houdain, Charles François Puchois with assessing the casefile. 
On 22 December 1792, the magistrate cleared the Marquis de Vielfort of the crime imputed 
to him, arguing that, in resisting the individuals who were sent to arrest him, he was only 
defending himself against an armed attack. Moreover, Puchois concluded that no treasonous 
correspondence existed between Vielfort and the enemies of the state. The protection 
accorded to Vielfort was, however, shortlived. On 12 March 1793, the mayor of Arras, 
Joseph Le Bon, instigated new proceedings against him. Moreover, just one week later, on 
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29 March, in yet another example how the investigators themselves became the target of 
investigation, the juge de paix Puchois and his purported accomplices, notably Philippe-
Martin Lagache, Vielfort’s postmaster, were seized along with their suspect papers and 
epistolary correspondence. They were subsequently conveyed to the Prison de Baudets under 
armed escort where, on 2 floréal (21 April 1793), the two defendants were accused by 
members of the Jacobin club d’Arras of high crimes against the state and subsequently 
condemned to death.352 
IV 
 
The extensive powers that the commissaires possessed, at least in relation to pursuing 
spies and traitors, is also evidenced in the case of General Dumouriez and his purported ‘plan 
de contre-révolution’.353 By virtue of the decree of 30 March ‘rélatif à l’état actuel de l’armée 
de la Belgique’, they were awarded powers to arrest Dumouriez, who was suspected of high 
treason, as well as his General staff. As article 3 of the text read, they were accorded the:  
 
pouvoir de suspendre et faire arrêter tous généraux, officiers militaires, quels qu'ils 
soient, fonctionnaires publics et autres citoyens, qui leur paraîtront suspects de les 
faire traduire à la barre et d’apposer les scelles sur les papiers[...]354  
 
 
352 ibid, p.354. According to the acte d’accusation, the two men were ‘des traîtres à leur patrie, des ennemis 
résistant au gouvernement républicain, d'avoir pris une part très-active dans toutes les conspiration sourdies et 
continuées depuis la Révolution contre le peuple français et sa liberté: de Vielfort, en n'ayant cessé d'entretenir 
les correspondances les plus criminelles tant avec les ennemis intérieurs qu'avec ceux de l'extérieur, comme 
aussi en conservant des papiers qui ne tendaient qu'à exciter la guerre civile, en armant les citoyens les uns 
contre les autres et à ébranler leur fidélité envers la Nation française, ainsi qu'il l'a déjà manifesté hautement 
lors du désarmement qu'on a été obligé de faire chez lui, et étant, en outre, le protecteur des aristocrates et des 
prêtres insermentés; — Lagache, en n'ayant cessé de correspondre avec ledit Gennevièrës de Vielfort, de la 
manière la plus aristocratique et la plus royaliste, ainsi qu'il conste des lettres annexées au présent acte.’  
353 AN AF/IV/1470, doc 80, 16 avril 1793, ‘On dit partout qu’il n’est pas possible que Dumouriez ait formé 
son plan de contre-révolution sans qu’une partie de la Convention Nationale en ait été instruite.’   
354 Anonymous, Débats de la Convention nationale, op. cit., III, p.396.;  Despite augmenting their powers, the 
Convention still desired to control the commissaires with article IV of the decree specifying that they ‘... ne 




Although the article did not identify Dumouriez and his General Staff directly, they were 
clearly the intended target. Originally, the commissaires were only authorised to suspend 
suspects of their functions but as the military situation deteriorated, and ever more numbers 
of the officer corps deserted their posts, the National Convention resorted to extraordinary 
measures.355 As the Comité de sûreté générale Calvados communicated to the districts in 
the departément, never, in the face of ‘de plus grands dangers’ were they ‘environnés d'un 
plus grand nombre de traîtres’.356 Indeed, the reaction to Dumouriez having crossed enemy 
lines was swift and robust. At Douai, the directoire du département reinforced measures to 
control all persons arriving at the gates and other points of entry. Anyone who could not 
present valid papers- whether in the form of a passport or certificat de civisme, was arrested 
and interrogated. Among them included the Brigadier General, Philippe Evrard Longeville, 
who was provisionally detained on 3 April 1793, the same day that Dumouriez was declared 
an outlaw, on the grounds that he possessed a ‘faute de certificat de civisme.’357 Perhaps 
with reason, the authorities were suspicious of the streams of refugees, vagabonds and 
soldiers straggling from the shifting frontlines. In the first place, there did stand the 
possibility that the civilians who had found themselves under Austrian occupation were 
contaminé by foreign influence. After all, not all the refugees who originated from occupied 
territories were supporters of the Revolution. Some, rather, were staunch partisans of the old 
 
355 Just how many French officers either deserted or crossed enemy lines is difficult to determine with any 
exactitude.  What is known is that the French army lost the bulk of its officer corps between 1791-1793 not in 
a single bout but over an extended period. This desertion was not limited to the officer corps but also to 
recaltriant peasants and the Flemish contingents recruited in the French army, many of whom crossed enemy 
lines.  
356 Jeanne Grall, ‘Le Comite de Surete General du Calvados’, op. cit, p.199. Similarly, in August 1793, the 
Ministre de la guerre, Jean-Baptiste Bouchotte appointed several agents to monitor and assess the fealty of the 
army’s officer corps. As the instructions read, ‘Une des choses les plus importantes de la mission des agents 
de Conseil de prendre des renseignements, et surtout près des soldats, sur les officiers qui ne méritent pas la 
confiance publique et sur ceux qui ont du patriotisme et de la capacité, Ils doivent faire mention de leur âge, 
s’ils sont français ou étrangers et de leur ancienneté de leurs services.’ Auguste Philippe Herlaut, Le Colonel 
Bouchotte: Ministre de la guerre en l’an II (C Poisson, 1946), p.293. Herlaut dedicates a chapter on these 
‘agents d’information’. These agents (or commissaires du Conseil), which are not to be mistaken for the 
représentants en mission, were chosen by the Secrétaire général du ministère de la guerre, and drawn from 
the most zealous citizens of Paris sections, many of whom belonged to the Club des Jacobins and Cordeliers. 
Auguste Philippe Herlaut, ‘La Républicanisation Des États-Majors Et Des Cadres De L'armée Pendant La 
Révolution (Suite),’ Annales Historiques De La Révolution Française, 14.84 (1937), 537–551 (p.543). 
357 Monique Mestayer, ‘Suspects et Espions’, op. cit., p.888. Mestayer cites A.M. Douai, H4 4, Arrestation 




order who had made common cause with the Austrians. Interestingly, in her examination of 
the interrogations from April to September 1793, mostly drawn from the H4 series of the 
municipal archives at Douai, Monique Mestayer has identified certain individuals who even 
confessed to have acted as spies, albeit for accentuating circumstances. Following a 
denunciation made by a notable from Auchy, a commune in the Pas-de-Calais, the municipal 
authorities at Douai arrested at le Pont de Râches a servant, Pierre- Joseph Madoux for acting 
as a guide and intelligence provider for the Austrians. During his interrogation Madoux 
explained that he had never ‘espionné’ per se but nevertheless confessed to having been 
forced by the Austrians to comply supposedly ‘sous la menace de voir le village pillé et 
incendié’.358 Indeed, as Mestayer demonstrates, many of the arrests and interrogations were 
prompted by all manner of denunciations which had been sent to the tribunal de police. 
Whilst some individuals were the subject of prolonged detention, others were promptly 
released after the enquiries revealed that they had either been spuriously accused or were the 
victim of mistaken identity or simple human error. In one example, a conducteur d'artillerie, 
who had been issued an order to go to Cateau in the north Pas de Calais, was arrested for 
having asked the local peasants the route, an act that automatically rendered him suspect. 
With the signature missing from his authority pass, he was assumed to be a spy and it was 
only after a letter from his commanding officer validating his identity that he was released.359 
At the same time that these arrests were made, the revolutionary authorities were 
identifying which of the returning soldiers were attempting to desert, a punishable ‘crime’ 
that was now being associated with espionage. As the Commissaire pour le recrutement dans 
les départements des Ardennes et de l’Aisne claimed in his report on 30 April 1793, 
‘L’opinion publique soutient que tous les déserteurs sont des espions. J’ai autorisé les 
administrateurs à les arrêter.’360 To judge and punish them, the revolutionaries created a 
 
358 ibid, p.892. A.M. Douai, H 4, Interrogatoire de Pierre Joseph Madoux (15 juin 1793). 
359 ibid, p.893. A.M. Douai, H4 4, Interrogatoire de Jean-Philippe Lefebvre (17 juillet 1793). 
360 Bonnal De Ganges, Les représentants en mission près les armées (1791-1797), 4 vols (Paris: A. Savaete, 




special penal code to be applicable during the war.361 Whilst there were no specific 
provisions for the high crime of espionage, section I of the Code Pénal militaire of 12 May 
1793 contained articles that characterized desertion and sedition as a crime of conspiracy 
punishable by death. As the following articles of Title 1 of Section 1 on Desertion states:  
 
Art. I. Tout militaire, c'est-à-dire, depuis le général d'armée jusqu'au soldat ou 
volontaire inclusivement, ou tout autre employé, soit dans les armées, soit à leur 
suite, qui passera à l'ennemi ou chez les rebelles, sans y être autorisé par ses chefs, 
sera puni de mort.  
 
Art. VIII. Tout chef de complot de désertion à l'ennemi, ou chez les rebelles, quand 
même le complot ne serait pas exécuté, sera puni de mort; et si c'est à l'intérieur, de 
quinze ans de fers. 
 
Art. XI. Tout embaucheur pour l'étranger ou pour les rebelles sera puni de mort 
 
Whilst the new code’s treatment of desertion and treason was, according to Georges Michon, 
‘particulierèment rigoureux’, certain sections of the military remained dissatisfied.362 In a 
letter to the National Convention, the artillery captain and commissaire to l’armée du Midi, 
Thomas Auguste de Gasparin, complained that no actual law existed to satisfactorily punish 
espionage as it relates to the protection of military secrets.  
 
Tous vos généraux réclament une loi sévère et un jugement prompte contre les 
espions. Un des grands obstacles au succès est le défaut du secret de nos opérations. 
 
361 Contenant le Code pénal militaire pour toutes les Troupes de la République, en temps de guerre.  Du 12 
Mai 1793. M Lepec (ed.), Bulletin annoté des lois, décrets et ordonnances, Depuis le Mois de Juin 1789 
jusqu’au Mois d’août 1830 (Paris,:chez Paul Dupont, 1839), IV, pp.203-4  




À peine un general a conçu un projet que l’ennemi est en instruit et prend les mesures 
pour le déjouer, tandis que leur sévérité contre nos moyens de connaître leurs 
marches nous laisse toujours dans l'incertitude. Nos soldats s'indignent de voir 
échapper tous ceux qui sont arrêtés . . .363 
 
Indeed, the contents of Gasparin’s letter reflect just how nebulous the revolutionaries’ 
conception and treatment of espionage had hitherto been. Whilst no single, centralized 
registre exists documenting each individual case, it is reasonable to argue that the 
punishment of military ‘spies’ recalled the arbitary practices of the ancien régime, with some 
of the accused summarily executed whereas others languished in prison.364 On 3 May 1793, 
for example, more than a week before the code militaire was instituted, the répresentants en 
mission assigned to the côtes de la méditerranée, informed the Comité du Salut Public how 
a ‘porteur de lettres du camp espagnol’, otherwise designated a spy, ‘a été condamné à mort 
par le tribunal.’365 Moreover, in their bulletin, the représentant expressed the hope how this 
‘puisse cet exemple salutaire en imposer aux malveillants et aux traîtres dont nous sommes 
entourés!’366 Just what the content of these letters were is unknown but the general practice, 
if they were found concealed, and generally pertained to the dispositions of the armies etc, 
was sufficient ground for arrest.367 Similarly, months earlier, the Moniteur reported how at 
 
363 Rose Barral-Mazoyer (ed.), Thomas Augustin de Gasparin, officier de l’armée royale et conventionnel: 
d’après sa correspondence et ses papiers inédits, 1754-1793 (France: J Laffitte, 1982), p.249.   
364 One such case involved Henri Van Hamme, the prévôt général et lieutenant-colonel de l'ancienne armée 
Belgique who, since September 1792, had been languishing in prison without trial for the crime of espionage. 
AN d/XV/2 dossier 11. See also, Petition presentee à la Convention nationale par le citoyen belge Henri 
VanHamme, Prévôt- Général et Lieutenant-Colonel de cavalerie de l'ancienne Armée Belgique, detenu 
arbitrairement en état d’arrestation à la Citadelle de Cambrai (Imprimerie de Defrémery, frères & Raparlier, 
1793). Van Hamme claimed that he had deserted his post in Belgium to seek refuge in the ‘terre de la liberté’ 
but his presence in France, without fixed abode or employment, was sufficient to raise suspicion. 
365 François-Alphonse Aulard, Recueil des actes du Comité de Salut Public: avec la correspondence officielle 
des représentants en mission et le registre du Conseil exécutif provisoire (Paris: L’Imprimerie Nationale, 
1890), III, p.592.  
366 ibid, p.592.  
367 In an early example, the commissaire reported to the Convention how he, and a band of peasants, had 
arrested the valet de chambre of the Prince de Ligue for bearing pièces which pointed to his role as a spy: ‘Hier 
les paysans ont arrêté dans le bois le valet de chambre du prince de ligne, je l’ai moi même fait souiller et 
conduire au cachot; cet homme, par les pièces trouvées sur lui, paraît être un espion; le coquin est Français.’ 





Châlons, in the département de la Marne, a spy had also been made an example of. As the 
reporter unduly announced, ‘hier on a coupé la tête à un espion. Il faut rétablir la confiance 
et ramener l’ordre, ou consentir à tout perdre.’368 In other words, these two examples 
demonstrate how, in the conflict zones or around military camps, spies were punished 
according to the principles enunciated in L’Encyclopedia:‘Quand on trouve un espion dans 
un camp, on le pend aussitôt’.369 Indeed, Genêt nevertheless observes how during the 17th 
and 18th centuries the trials of spies were seldom held with judgement sometimes based on 
political rather than military calculation.370 In his book, he cites the example of a young 
Scottish officer, Alexandre Gordon de Wardhouse who was decapitated in Brest for 
espionage. Although possibly innocent of the crime imputed to him, Wardhouse’s brutal 
execution in 1769 was publicly staged to assure the population that the court at Versailles 
remained vigilant in the face of British spies.371 Where suspects were not executed, they 
were otherwise imprisoned without trial, usually through-out the course of a war and/or 
according to the decision of a superior officer or minister of state. In other words, 
imprisonment served as a preventative means to isolate a suspect, a kind of arme de 
temporarisation whilst the investigation into their guilt was conducted, an often arduous task 
given the inherently secretative nature of espionage.  
 
 
368 Réimpresson de l’Ancien Moniteur, XIII, p.742. 17 September 1792. 
369 Cited in Hugues Moutouh (ed.), Dictionnaire du Renseignement, op. cit., p.47. However, in cases where the 
individual proved less malleable, they were to be made a public example of. As Tuprin de Crissé advised, ‘Si 
au contraire cet Espion ne paroît pas intelligent, ou qu’il affecte de la stupidité, il faut le punir de mort, et le 
faire prendre à la vûe de l’Armée, pour effrayer les autres.’ Turpin de Crissé, L’Art de la Guerre, op. cit., I, 
p.237. As for the conditions surrounding a prisoner’s release, Genêt argues how it was often the consequence 
of financial pressures. In 1762, for example, the Lieutenant Générale de Police, Antoine de Sartine authorised 
the release of a prisoner named Girard, after ten years imprisonment, as it purportedly cost too much. Stephane 
Genêt, Les Espions des Lumières, op.cit., p.178. 
370 ibid, p.454. 
371 Prosper Jean Levot, Procès d’Alexandre Gordon espion anglais décapité à Brest en 1769 (Brest: Imprimerie 
E. Anner, Rampe, 1861). One notable exception involved a young soldier named Fossart who was accused of 
intelligence with the enemy. Dissatisfied by the judgment of the Prevôt of the marechaussée of Flanders, the 
Comte d’Argenson argued that it made more sense that the prisoner be contained in France than banished 
abroad. ‘(Du fait) que ce particulier n’a été condamné qu’a un bannissement hors du royaume, il vaut mieux, 
pour être a couvert de ses intrigues le reternir dans les prisons de Lille pendant le temps que la guerre durera.’ 




In any event, it was not until 16 June 1793, after such complaints were raised about the 
absence of legislation to adequately punish military spies, that the National Convention 
finally instituted the death penalty for espionage. As the first two articles decreed:  
 
I. Les Français ou étrangers convaincus d'espionnage dans les places de guerre ou 
dans les armées, seront punis de mort.  
 
II. Ils seront jugés par une commission militaire, formée comme il est décrété par la 
loi du 9 octobre dernier contre les émigrés pris les armes à la main.372 
 
This law, we shall shortly see, was often cited either alone or in conjunction with the Penal 
Code of 1791 in order to justify the execution of hundreds of individuals accused of abetting 
the allied war effort. Indeed, as the conflict intensified, it became increasingly evident to the 
revolutionaries that not only did the allied powers make prolific use of spies but that the very 
nature of warfare itself was changing. On the 12 June 1793, in a bulletin to the Comité de 
Salut Public, the répresentants en mission to the armée des côtes de la Rochelle, 
characterized the situation as follows:  
 
Cette guerre n’est point une guerre ordinaire. C’est une guerre de chicane. Il faut que 
la ruse et l’imagination dirigent l’intrépidité. Il faut à la fois tendres des pièges, 
 
372 Jean Baptiste Duvergier, Collection Complète des Lois, op. cit., I, p.525. Whilst the law of 16 June did not 
specifally target ‘embauchers’, the Directory’s law of 13 brumaire an V did add corresponding provisions. 
Following the petitions from the conseils de guerre, both espions and embaucheurs were to be brought and 
tried before them. This second law, in turn, was reinvoked by the imperial decree of 17 messidor an XII. M le 
Comte Merlin, Répertoire universel et raisonné de jurisprudence: (Paris: Chez Garnery, 1812), II, p.533. 
Indeed, the June law is invoked to this day. In the annex to the procès-verbal de la séance of 5 March 
1998, Rapport fait au nom de la commission des Affaires étrangères, de la défense et des forces armées sur le 
projet de loi, adopté par l’assemblée nationale, the author of the document, Nicholas About, shows how the 
principles governing the divulgence of secrets related to the defence of the country are not new. As he states, 
the Convention’s decree of 16 june 1793 already prescribed the death penalty to ‘tout Français ou étranger 





cacher sa marche, tourner les difficultés mêmes du pays contre l’ennemi, avoir des 
espions sûrs à quelque prix que ce soit.373 
 
This practice of deception is, of course, an ancient method of warfare but it is nevertheless 
revealing to see how it was perceived by the revolutionaries during this period. In one 
example, the Commissaire Nationale from Châlons sur Marne, citoyen Westermann, 
explained how enemy spies tricked the authorities into supplying munitions: 
 
Pour vous convaincre combien l’ennemi est bien servi en espions, je vais vous citer 
un seul fait. Il fait la formation à un village de rendre leurs armes; la municipalité lui 
donne vingt fusils; l’ennemi les reçoit & fait sommation d’en rendre encore quatre 
qu’ils avoient reellement, sinon qu’il mettroit le feu. Les quatres lui furent livrés.374 
 
Westermann’s example aside, the core of the représentants’ argument was that the deceptive 
methods employed by the Republic’s enemies should be turned against them. In this, he was 
prefiguring the war maxims developed by Napoleon who, among others, advocated the 
interception of communications in order to disrupt the enemy’s military plans as well as the 
auxiliary operations that they conducted behind the lines.375 In other words, Napoleon’s 
 
373 Cited in Charles Louis Chassin, Les Pacifications de l’Ouest, 1794-1801, 6 vols (Paris: P Dupont, 1896), 
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374 Pierre Caron, Les missions du Conseil exécutif provisoire et de la Commune de Paris dans l'Est et le Nord, 
août-novembre 1792 (France: A. Costes, 1953), p.56.  
375 According to Napoleon, it was necessary to ‘…reconnaître lestement les défilés et les gués, s’assurer des 
guides sûrs, interroger le curé et le maître de poste, avoir rapidement des intelligences avec les habitants, 
expédier des espions, saisir les lettres de la poste, les traduire, les analyser ; répondre enfin à toutes les 
questions du général en chef, lorsqu’il arrive à la tête de l’armée : telles sont les qualités que doit avoir un 
bon général d’avant-poste’. Maximes de guerre et pensées de Napoléon Ier (5e éd.) (Paris: Dumaine, 1863), 
pp.43-44. For Napoleon’s use of renseignement, see Alain Montarras, Général Bonaparte et le Renseignement: 
La période révolutionnaire et la première campagne d'Italie (Paris: Éditions SPM, 1986). The interception of 
suspect correspondance by the army did, of course, lead to the discovery of treasonous communications and 
subsequent arrests. During the séance of 24 May 1793, for example, a letter addressed to the Comité de salut 
public was read out purporting to secret communications exchanged between the republican Général Duhmel 
and the émigrés. The report from the commission nationale attached to the division of Mauberge concluded 
that this correspondance ‘ne peut convenir à un citoyen ni à un fonctionnaire militaire et caractérise une 
correspondance incivique et contre-révolutionnaire.’ Duhamel and his aide de camp were consequently arrested 




maxims essentially brought together the two principle branches of renseignement - 
espionage and counter-espionage- albeit implicitly. Indeed, just how these two operations 
overlapped or merged is further exemplified by le comité de correspondance sécret, a 
clandestine bureau that was attached to the État Major de l’armée du Rhin. On 6 October 
1793, for example, the représentants to l’armée du Rhin wrote to the Comité de salut public, 
transmitting a copy of ‘d’un nouveau plan de conspiration que le hasard et l’activité du 
bureau de correspondance secrète de l’armée du Rhin ont fait tomber entre leurs mains’. As 
they continued to explain, this plan is detailed in a letter that was intercepted from a German 
spy, the translation of which was attached to letter sent by the représentants: 
 
Citoyens Représentants, Le bureau de correspondence secrète, attaché à l’État-major 
de l’armée du Rhin, ayant reçu l’autre jour un avis sur une correspondence aussi 
criminelle que clandestine, établie entre Brunswick, general prussien, le landgrave 
de Darmstadt, ci-devant seigneur des terres d’Hanau dans le department du Bas-Rhin, 
d’un côté, et les anciens employés de celui-ci à Bouxwiller, Strasbourg et autres 
endoits.376 
 
Whilst this spy was apprehended, not all of them were arrested immediately and contained. 
On 12 August 1793, in a letter to Euloge Schneider, the future accusateur public of 
Strasbourg’s tribunal révolutionnaire, Alexandre de Beauharnais, the Commandant en chef 
de l’armée du Rhin, revealed the strategy of deliberately not arresting a suspected spy in 
order to procure further information, a strategy that departed –in this case at least- from de 
Launay’s preference for containment. As he explained to Schneider, the manner in which 
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the individual had not only solicited himself but had managed to cross the lines unmolested 
rendered him suspect:  
 
‘il faut que vous sachiez qu’un des représentants du peuple, Milhaud, m’a prévenu 
qu’il fallait m’en défier, que ses dispositions généreuses pour faire l’espion sans 
rétribution l’avaient rendu suspect d’autant qu’il parait avoir une facilite extrème 
pour traverser sans danger, et quand il veut, l’armée ennemi. Je ne vous cacherai pas 
que les informations prises sur cet homme depuis la lecture de votre journal me 
donnent à penser que c’est un double espion. Il ne me convient pas de le traiter 
comme tel, mais il est mon devoir de vous présenter mes soupçons pour vous prier 
au nom de la patrie de ne rien négliger pour obtenir des renseignements exacts sur 
son compte.’377 
 
In any event, as successors to the commissaires de la Convention, the représentants en 
mission thus continued to fulfill an important counter-espionage role, not only in terms of 
arresting suspected spies but, in acting as agents de liaison with the central authorities378. In 
bulletin after bulletin, as reproduced by Aulard, one can find numerous examples of how 
they propagated the perception that France was abound with spies and that rigorous action 
had to be taken. In one notable bulletin to the Comité de salut public on 3 May 1793, the 
répresentant attached to the armée des Ardennes highlighted the troubles in Valenciennes, 
drawing the natural corollary between the absence of order - ie those pockets where there 
was little security presence - and the surge in espionage activity: 
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Il n’y a point d’ordre ni de police dans Valenciennes. Les espions des ennemis ont la 
faculté de s’y introduire librement. Aussi dit-on qu’ils savent mieux que nos officiers 
tout ce qui se passe dans notre pays et dans cette ville.’ 379  
 
In the next chapte, a subsection will be devoted to the role of the représentants en mission 
in the overlapping counter-insurgency and counter-espionage operations against the 
Vendéans but for now, it is worth examining the revolutionaries’ efforts to counter irregular 




On 4 February 1793, the eighty-fifth département, Les Alpes-Maritimes, was 
created. To install the new administration, and impose order on a potentially explosive 
situation, the Convention dispatched the commissaire en mission, l'Abbé Grégoire and his 
colleague, Fagot, to the region. Immediately upon arrival, the two men set about crushing all 
signs of opposition, focusing particularly on the counter-revolutionary hotbeds, Nice, 
Monaco and Menton.381 Enlisting the assistance of the local comités de surveillance, 
Grégoire and Fagot began by creating a consensus of the populace, treating anyone who 
espoused or surreptitiously demonstrated allegiance to Piedmont as automatically suspect.382 
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maritimes du departement des Alpes-Maritimes ‘requierement lesdites comités de redoubler de surveillance et 




Applying the émigré laws against them, they made an inventory of their goods and 
properties, published a list of proscribed names and issued an injunction to the recalcitrant 
municipalities ordering them to make arrests immediately.383 Most significantly, for the 
purpose of discussion, Gregoire mobilized the gendarmerie formed of four brigades, two of 
which were stationed in Nice, one in Menton and one in Puget-Théniers, with the 
overlapping objective of thwarting both espionage activities and the escalating guerrilla 
attacks staged by the ‘mountain bandits’ known to history as the Barbets. As Grégoire 
contended, the presence of ‘les aristocrates et les fanaitiques’ which infest the département 
‘nécessitent une force toujours surveillante et répressive, pour contenir leurs intentions 
perverses et les arrêter dans le manifestation de leurs complots.’384  
Although it was not until 18 April 1886 that the gendarmerie was explicitly charged 
with conducting counter-espionage operations, the deployment of these ‘unités 
combattantes’ in the Alpes-Maritimes – and in other départements of France- proved a 
formative experience.385 In accordance with their prescribed role of surveilling the territory, 
 
République, soit pour leurs actions, soit par leur principes.’ L Moris (ed.), Inventaire sommaire des archives 
départementales antérieures à 1790: Alpes Maritimes (Imprimerie J. Ventre et Cie, 1924). p.88.  
383 In a communiqué to the Convention, the commissaires wrote how ‘on espérait nous apitoyer sur le sort des 
émigrés qui, après avoir fui de leur patrie par lâcheté et par trahison, tentent d'y rentrer avec les mêmes 
sentiments. Nous avons répondu par une proclamation portant injonction de les arrêter sur le champ.’ Les 
Commissaires dans le Mont Blanc et Les Alpes-Maritimes à la Convention, Nice 1er Avril 1793, an II de la 
République française. Cited in Jean Tild, L’abbé Gregoire d’après ses Mémoires Recueillis par Hyppolyte 
Carnot (Paris: Nouvelles Éditions Latines, 1946), Annexe XIV, p.172. Indeed, the recalcitrance of the 
municipalities is well evidenced by the following complaint made by Grégoire. As he lamented, ‘aucune 
mesure n’a été prise par la municipalite pour faire arreter et punir les perturbateurs et les veritables aristocrates.’ 
L Moris, Inventaire, op. cit., p.49 
384  ibid, p.49. 
385 The French historian, Antoine Boulant, characterised this period for the gendarmerie as a baptism of fire. 
Antoine Boulant, ‘Baptême du feu. Naissance des premières unités combattantes [les gendarmes combattants 
en 1792 et 1793]’, Armées d’aujourd’hui, 276 (2002), 66-68. It was not until the law of 1798 that the 
gendarmerie possessed a veritable charter. Title IX prescribed the function to ‘saisir et arreter les émigrés et 
prêtes deportés qui seront trouvés sur le territoire de la France’.Yet, it was not until 1820 that the gendarmerie’s 
role in capturing spies was first enumerated. According to article 45 of the royal ordinance, they were charged 
with ‘les arrestations d’embaucheurs, d’espions employés à lever le plan des places et du territoire, ou à se 
procurer des renseignements sur la force et le mouvement des troupes; la saisie de leur correspondance et de 
toutes les pièces pouvant donner des indices ou fournir des preuves de crimes et de complots attentatoires à la 
sûreté intérieure ou extérieure du royaume.’ M Lepec (ed.,) Recueil Général des Lois, Décrets, Ordonnances, 
etc., depuis le mois de Juin 1789 jusqu’au mois d’Aout 1830 (Paris: 1839), XV, p.233; The law of 18 April 
1886 was ratified in September that year with the creation of the carnets A and B, ‘un outil du contre-
espionnage’ in Olivier Forcade’s words. Carnet B, which the gendarmes were responsible for maintaining, 
recorded the names of foreigners suspected of espionage or anti-militarism. Olivier Forcade, ‘Le Carnet B, un 
outil du contre-espionnage français de 1886 à 1939’, Politiques du Renseignement, Sébastien Laurent (ed.), 




as formally codified in article III of the Loi du 28 germinal an VI, the gendarmes were 
charged with policing the routes, narrowly focusing on the districts between Nice and 
Menton where the roadside ambushes were mostly set.386 Yet, the efforts to fight the Barbets 
were not limited to paramilitary confrontations along these routes or mountain passes. Like 
the Vendeans and Chouans in northwestern France, the success of the Barbets’ guerrilla 
tactics relied heavily on the protection, and supply of intelligence, from the local population 
as well as ‘prétendeurs déserteurs qui espionnent les opérations de l’armée de la 
République.’387 Given that the gendarmerie could not police the routes and demilitarize the 
zones as well as conduct house to house searches of the Barbets’ informants at the same 
time, it obviously meant that the combined counter-insrugency and counter-espionage 
operations were conducted both unilaterally and in coordinated sweeps between different 
organs of the security apparatus. In the heart of the communes this fell on the comités de 
surveillance and municipal authorities whereas along the mountain and coastal routes, 
jurisdiction was claimed by the gendarmerie and units of l’armée l’italie. In both situations, 
in any case, the revolutionaries once again depended on the influx of denunciations with 
foremost investigation directed at the relatives and acquaintances of those who had taken up 
arms.388 As one directive read: 
 
Si vous vous les connaissez, arretez aussitot leurs parents qui leurs parents qui leur 
donnent surement asile, et ils doivent etre considérés et traités comme des suspects 
et vrais ennemis de la République.389  
 
386 As article VI reads, ‘Le service de la gendarmerie nationale est particulièrement destiné à la sureté des 
campagnes et des grandes routes’. Journal des Débats et Lois du Corps Législatif, Floréal, an VI (Paris: Chez 
Baudouin, 1798). For a broader discussion of the gendarmerie’s role in the maintenance of order, see Georges 
Carrot, Révolution et Maintien de l’Ordre, 1789-1799 (Paris: Veyrier, 1995), p.454. 
387 Archives Alpes-Maritimes L962 doss 12, Note sur de pretendeurs deserteurs qui espionnent les operations 
de l’armee de la Republique. 
388 As one directive read, ‘Il racommande à tous les bons citoyens…se seconder tout leur pouvoir les 
municpailies et leur founir tous les renseignements qui pourront les aider à dejouer les perfides manœuvres.’  
389 Cited in Joseph André, Nice, 1792-1814: L’Invasion révolutionnaire, les Provencaux dirgent Nice, dictature 





In order to suppress the movement known during that period as Barbetisme, the 
répresentants du peuple issued a decree sanctioning the continuous disarmament of all 
inhabitants of the mountaneous regions occupied by the armée de l’Italie as well as the 
creation of an ad hoc military commission formed by the divisional generals in command of 
each army column. As article II prescribed, any inhabitant that was taken in arms would be 
recognised as a barbet or milice, treated as a ‘rebelle et assasin’, and conveyed before the 
military commission where they would be judged and summarily executed.390 Given that the 
attacks staged by the Barbets were reportedly multiplying each day to the point that they 
compromised ‘la sureté de l’armée’, the représentants concluded that these ‘mesures 
promptes et efficaces’ had to be taken.391  The formation of these military commissions is of 
such crucial importance to our understanding of how punishment was dispensed during the 
period, especially in relation to espionage, that it will also form a significant section of the 
following chapter. In terms of the campaign against the Barbets, it just worth noting that, 
like the civil war in the west, and the repression in the east, these military commissions 
became an essential apparatus of the revolutionary state, not just in terms of counter-
insurgency and counter-espionage but, of course, in punishing indiscipline in the army, of 




In Paris, meanwhile, the revolutionaries were debating how best to handle the foreign 
perpetrators of espionage. On 12 August 1792, the same day that de Beauharnais was 
advocating caution, the deputies in the National Convention voted in favour of arresting all 
 





enemy subjects resident in France since 1789.392 The justification for the ‘mesures de sûreté’ 
was, of course, the famous ‘English letter’, a probable fabrication that Albert Mathiez had 
otherwise claimed ‘un espion anglais avait perdu sur les ramparts de Lille.’393 In essence, 
the portefeuille purportedly revealed the existence of a clandestine network of British paid 
agents who were planning to stage simultaneous attacks on various strategic points 
throughout France, notably fortress towns and ports as well as counter-revolutionary 
hotspots such as La Vendée and Lyon.394 Moreover, and by no small coincidence, the project 
was scheduled to take place on the anniversary of the fall of the monarchy. Whilst the 
provenance of the portefeuille de correspondance remains unknown, Olivier Blanc draws a 
link between its ‘discovery’, and a declaration that was made by a Parisienne to the Comité 
de Surveillance du département de Paris on 29 July 1793. In this declaration, which Blanc 
reproduces in full, the Parisienne, a teacher of the English language, was approached by two 
strangers and contracted to translate a letter into French. According to her declaration, the 
contents of the letter contained a project consisting of:  
 
1. d’incendier en même temps et à l’époque du 10 au 16 août (1793) toutes la villes- 
frontières, qu’on y recommandait de ne pas épargner l’or et l’argent pour cette 
entreprise:  
 
392 Mesures de sûreté rélatives aux étrangers qui se trouvent en France. M J H Bénard (ed.), Recueil général 
des lois, décrets, ordonnances, etc: depuis le mois de Juin 1789 jusqu’au mois d’août 1830 (Paris: 1840), 
IV, p.341. The letter reproduced in Mercure Français, Historique, Politique et Littéraire: 1793 (Paris: 1793) 
pp.265-66. Projet de décret sur le mode d'exécution du décret, du 12 août, qui ordonne l'arrestation des gens 
suspects, présenté à la Convention nationale, au nom du comité de législation, par Ph.-Ant. Merlin (de Douai). 
Séance du 31 août 1793. Imprimé par ordre de la Convention national. Décret portant que les etrangers sont 
domiciles en France avant le 14 juillet 1789 seront mis en etat d’arrestation. Jean Baptiste Duvergier (ed.), 
Collection Complèe des Lois, op.cit., VI, p.80. 
393 Carla Hesse, ‘La preuve par la lettre : pratiques juridiques au tribunal révolutionnaire de Paris (1793-1794)’, 
Annales. Histoire, Sciences Sociales. 3 (1996), 629-642 (at pp.640-641). Although the government professed 
to possess the original copy, no historian has been able to trace its existence in the Archives nationales. Albert 
Mathiez, La Révolution française: La Terreur (Paris : A Colin, 1927), III, p.306. Anonymous, Rapport fait au 
nom du Comité de Salut Public le 1er août 1793 an II de la République par Barère Imprimé par ordre de la 
Convention nationale. Texte et nouvelle traduction des lettres et notes anglaises trouvées dans un portefeuille 
anglais déposé au Comité de Salut Public et depuis aux Archives nationales par décret du dimanche août... 
(Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1793). Carla Hesse, pp.640-641. 





2. de faire hausser l’argent et de baisser (le cours) des assignats…. 
On nommait d’autres personnes à qui on défendait de communiquer le projet, de peur 
qu’ils ne le découvrent. Le Duc d’York et Pitt étaient nommés. Celui qui a porté la 
lettre avait l’air et l’accent allemands. L’autre est connu de la citoyenne Samin.    
 
On observait que l’incendie aurait lieu par l’effet de mèches phosphoriques dont cent 
ne contenaient qu’un pouce trois quarts de circonférence sur quatre pouces de 
longueur et chaque membre du parti devait être muni de 100 mèches.’395  
 
Whilst the authenticity of the declaration remains open to doubt, the French population could 
be forgiven to have believed in the existence of such a conspiracy. In the days and weeks 
that both preceded and followed Barère de Vieuzac’s spectacular coup de théâtre, the nation 
had witnessed a series of attacks, the causes of which had not been detected. On 7 August 
1793, for example, the arsenal at Huningue was set ablaze. Also, arson attacks were staged 
at Douai, Samur, Chemillé and other military and naval targets throughout the country 
including the fort du château-neuf at Bayonne. Given their naval manoeuvers, and the habit 
of believing one’s own rhetoric, it was little surprise that the British were a natural object of 
suspicion. It was in this context that Barère, in his dramatic speech before the Comité de 
Salut Public, had originally demanded the expulsion of all English subjects who were living 
in France after 14 July 1789. Although he made no mention of the fact, he was advocating a 
policy that was already being discussed within certain circles of the security apparatus. Just 
two months earlier, a report of the Bureau de Surveillance de la Police claimed how the 
people of Paris were demanding, ‘la déportation de tous les Anglais se trouvant à Paris, et 
qui, depuis leur arrivéé, n’auraient pas rempli exactement les fonctions de citoyen.’ 
 




Continuing on, the commissaires de police themselves argued how ‘cette mesure paraissant 
la seule efficace pour déconcerter la correspondance de Pitt et de ses agents’.396 As the report 
made plain, deportation was presented as a legitimate counter-espionage strategy. Georges 
Couthon, however, found the measure too exclusive and, according to the developing 
worldview that all étrangers of foreign nationality were actual or potential spies, proposed 
to target all of them without distinction, a proposal that was steadily gaining widespread 
support: As he asked rhetotically, ‘croyez-vous que les Autrichens qui sont en France ne 
sont pas, comme les Anglais, des agents de Pitt? il suffit qu’on respecte les Américains et 
les Suisses.’397  
 
Yet, to certain revolutionaries, deportation seemed a risky proposition in the face of 
étrangers regarded as spies. On 3 August 1793, during debates questioning the applicability 
of the law, Jean Jacques Bréard opposed the expulsions and argued in favour of mass 
arrests.398 As he declared: 
Je crois que les étrangers doivent être mis en état d’arrestation: car, ou ces étrangers 
sont bien intentionnés, ou bien ils ne le sont pas: dans le premier cas ils ne trouvent 
pas mauvais que vous preniez à leur égard une mesure que demande la sûreté de la 
nation.  Si ce sont des espions, quels ménagements avons-nous à garder avec eux?399 
 
 
396 Rapport du Bureau de Surveillance, 15 juin 1793, AN AFIV/1470. This report stands counter to Michael 
Rapport’s observation that ‘most revolutionaries still believed that the foreigners responsible for the disorders 
in France were a minority identifiable through the existing system of surveillance and that a general expulsion 
would be counter-productive.’ Rapport’s judgement, however, is certainly more balanced than the police report 
whose evident bias should not be accepted as a statement of fact. 
397 ibid, p.104. 
398 Among others, the expulsion of foreigners was proposed by Garnier de Saintes who, on 3 August 1793,  
read out a report on behalf of the Comité de Sûreté Générale : ‘Cependant soit que le peuple français ait des 
traîtres dans son sein à punir, ou des espions soudoyés à chasser (…) il ne confondra point l’homme égaré (…) 
avec l’intrigant.(…) Purgeons notre territoire de cette dernière classe d’hommes qui le souille et déjà nous 
aurons dejoué bien des trahisons.’398 Sophie Wahnich, L’impossible Citoyen, op. cit., p.33. 




According to Wahnich’s interpretation, Bréard estimated that all good étrangers would show 
themselves to be ‘super-patriots’ and voluntarily accept the reasons for their own 
persecution.400 This was fanciful at best. The harsh reality was that there was a practical side 
to detention. Whilst there formerly existed arguments that such pre-emptive measures were 
economically disruptive and thus counter-productive, the security of the state ultimately 
overrided these considerations as long as it (or the patrie) remained en danger.401 With 
expulsion, the possibility always existed that the person could slip back across the frontiers 
undetected. Banishment, in other words, posed greater security risks than containment. With 
detention, on the other hand, the suspects could theoretically be monitored and controlled. 
Once they escaped beyond the frontiers, there was simply no way of keeping them under 
permanent surveillance. Yet, despite widespread agreement on the necessity of the measure, 
not all authorities were willing to implement it to the letter. As Rapport has shown, the 
Observatoire section in Paris did not arrest all the foreigners registered within its 
jurisidiction and even showed leniency towards three individuals who posed no danger to 
national security.402  
Of the individuals who were arrested that summer, however, was the British spy, 
Charles Marien Somers. Somers, a former priest and acquaintance of Captain George Monro, 
had naturally fallen under the law against foreigners and was denounced to the Comité de 
Surveillance de la section of his district. Significantly, given the debate on the merits of 
detention versus deportation, the revolutionaries had (albeit unwittingly) disrupted the 
correspondence that had subsisted uninterrupted for six months between him and Britain’s 
foreign minister, Lord Grenville.403 Although his interrogation by the commissaires de police 
 
400 Sophie Wahnich, L’impossible Citoyen, op. cit., p.35. 
401 For a summary of deportation in its historical context see Michael Rapport, Nationality and Citizenship, op. 
cit. pp.43-46, J Mathorez, Les étrangers en France sous l’ancien régime, 2 vols (Paris: 1919), I, p.137. 
402 Among the three released was an Irish clergyman from Douai and two Piedmontese residents. Mike Rapport, 
Nationality and Citizenship, op. cit., p.195. AN F7/2514 (Section de l’Observatoire: Délibérations du comité 
de surveillance (30 mars 1793-12 vendémiaire an III). 
403 During their raid of his residence, the police could not find any trace of his correspondence with London. 
Procès Verbal de perquisition chez le citoyen Somers du 16 aout 1793 (Pref de Police de Paris, Aa 294, F310). 




did not yield any useful information the case of Somers nevertheless demonstrated how, in 
a state of emergency, nations are prepared to punish the many just to catch the few. In the 
Terror that followed, of course, the revolutionaries were prepared to push this maxim to its 
extremity. Yet, the question as to whether this resort to violence was driven by an irrational 
fear of spies and conspiracies seems to be misdirected at best. The history of espionage 
during the revolutionary period is not just limited to the perceived machinations of a few 
foreign agents like Somers.404 After all, for all the rhetoric that was progagated about 
conspiracies, many of which appeared half-baked anyway, the reality was that the 
revolutionaries were faced with a far greater practical challenge in simultaneously waging 
a war against the allied powers, suppressing the violent insurrections that were flaring up in 
multiple corners of the country and neutralising the espionage activity that underpinned them 
both. Indeed, it was the very recognition that the fabric of their state was under existential 
threat that propelled the revolutionaries on a path towards securitization, firstly with the 
adoption of emergency measures that immediately followed the storming of the Tuileries 
palace together with the expansion, and attempted centralisation, of the twin structures of 
surveillance and control.  Over the course of the year, the revolutionary state had undergone 
a profound transformation that, although not quite becoming the pillar of national security 
that Gensonné and Brissot had envisaged, nevertheless had a far-reaching impact on the 
development of French counter-espionage, not just legislatively speaking but in the scale in 
which it mobilised its resources for the coming ‘guerre aux espions’.405 
 
 
intermediary in Calais. To avoid the possibility of the Calais authorities intercepting the despatches, the 
intermediary hired a boat which conveyed them secretly to Dover. From there, British customs officials would 
forward the despatches to Lord Grenville at the Foreign Office. Yet, despite the apparent success of this 
operation, Somers was shot for espionage at Vincennes. Hugues Marquis, ‘L’Espionnage Britannique’, op. cit., 
p.267. 
404 Hence it is for this reason that, save for a couple of observations, the story of the Baron de Batz will inform 
so little of the discussion in the next chapter. 






‘War to the death’: 5 September 1793- 28 July 1794406 
 
By the time the Revolution entered its most ‘radical’ phase, the perceptions and precepts that 
determined counter-espionage operations were firmly established. Over the past two years, 
since the institution of the Constitutional Monarchy, the revolutionaries had formulated a 
legal framework to punish both foreign and domestic spies, erected parallel structures of 
control and surveillance, devolved initiative for ground operations to local authorities but 
with a measure of central oversight and broadly adopted a discriminatory strategy of 
containment and prevention, all in the interests of national security. Over the course of the 
Terror, these core principles did not change in any profound sense. Whilst the revolutionaries 
attempted to impose greater authority from Paris, reorganising their committees and 
interceding in local operations with increasing frequency, the general thrust of counter-
espionage otherwise followed existing patterns.407 What did change, however, was the sheer 
aggressiveness with which the revolutionaries pursued and punished their opponents, many 
of whom were characterised as spies. The reason for this onslaught was, of course, the 
expansion of the war both at home and abroad. As Olivier Blanc puts it, ‘La terreur 
s’incrivait moins dans une ‘logique révolutionnaire’ que dans une logique de guerre, guerre 
sans merci au cours de laquelle l’espionnage a joué un rôle important.’408 Without detailing 
this role itself, this chapter will examine how the revolutionaries attempted to neutralise 
enemy espionage in the dual context of the war and the Terror. It will be shown how these 
efforts overlapped not only with counter-insurgency operations in La Vendée and other 
 
406 ibid, XIII, p.465. In a communiqué to Joseph le Bon dated 23 floréal an II (12 Mai 1794) the Comité du 
Salut Public declared how ‘une guerre à mort est livrée aux espions qui pullulaient dans cette place.’ The role 
of Le Bon, the controversial, if misunderstood, représentant en mission to the Nord and Pas de Calais will be 
discussed in pages 26-29. 
407 Sutherland explained this assertion of authority by neatly citing the ‘increasing centralisation of police 
powers’, ‘the reduction of departmental authority’ and the replacement of ‘local initiatives with national 
directives’. Donald M Sutherland, The French Revolution and Empire: The Quest for a Civic Order (Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishing, 2003), p.185.  




danger zones but also in the occupied territories in the Low Countries. As the French 
Republic projected its power abroad, whether in self-defense or not, so too did it create a 
fresh set of security challenges. Just as significantly, and for the first time, this chapter will 
demonstrate how counter-espionage was effectuated not just with the violently repressive 
measures associated with the Terror but also with the sancturisation of zones and protection 




On 6 September 1793, a day after Terror was declared the ‘ordre du jour’, the 
revolutionaries issued the Décret concernant des mesures de sûreté relatives aux Étrangers 
qui se trouvent en France.409 Comprised of sixteen articles, the decree essentially amplified 
existing legislation, including the Penal Code of 1791, constituting the most punitive legal 
measure enacted against the foreign perpetration of espionage since the beginning of the 
Revolution. According to the following articles:  
 
1. Les étrangers nés dans le territoire des puissances avec lesquelles la république 
française en guerre seront detenus en état d’arrestation dans les maisons de sûreté. 
 
9.   ceux qui seront convaincus d’espionnage, ou d’avoir ménagé des intelligences, 
soit avec des puissances étrangères; soit avec des émigrés ou tous autres ennemis de 
la France, seront punis de mort, et leurs biens declarés appartenir à la république. 
 
 




11. ceux qui seront découverts sous un déguisement ou travestissement quelconque, 
ou qui seront supposés d’une nation différente sur le territoire de laquelle ils sont nés, 
sont punis de mort. 
12. les étrangers nés dans les pays avec lequels le République est en guerre, qui 
entreraient en France après la publication du present décret, seront declarés 
conspirateurs, et comme tels punis de mort.410 
 
Whilst the crime of ‘espionnage’ remained ill-defined- here confusingly distinguished with 
the act ‘d’avoir menagé des intelligences’- the decree nevertheless served as further proof of 
how the revolutionaries were leveraging the legislative powers of the state in their campaign 
against wartime spy activity. Indeed, with the enactment of the loi de Prairal or Loi des 
Suspects that followed on 17 September 1793, the definition of ‘espionnage’ probably made 
little theoretical difference as far as the state’s prosecution was concerned. Anyone who 
invited the slightest whiff of suspicion was to be hauled before the Tribunal Révolutionnaires 
without being afforded the presumption of innocence or having been accorded the right of 
defence.411 And, of course, foremost among those ‘réputés gens suspects’, according to 
article II of the law, were the émigrés. In their formulation, it was not just foreigners but the 
émigré who had now fully evolved into un espion des brigands couronnés. Although the 
 
410 ibid, p.184. 
411 In his study of the ‘suspect’, as drawn by the motives of arrests in Paris from September 1793 to thermidor 
an II, and found in the alphabetical series containing their individual files (AN/F7/4576- F7/4775), Antoine 
Boulant identifies five main types: the royalist, the violent suspect, ‘the leech of the people’, the factious 
person, the indifferent one. Moreover, the parents of émigrés were also considered royalist suspects. As he 
explains, it is from the members of his family that the émigré offspring, supported and encouraged by the 
princes, received funds or provided intelligence on the political, economic and military situation within France. 
At the same time, not only didi the parents provide pecuniary support but they also guaranteed a safe haven 
and passage in and out of France (just how is not specified). Antoine Boulant, ‘Le suspect parisien en l'an II’, 
Annales historiques de la Révolution française, 280, (1990), 187-197 (at p.187). Jean-Louis Matharan explains 
‘le véritable basculement se produit en 1793 avec « l’évolution d’une lutte contre les ennemis déclarés (par 
leur engagement) à celle des opposants supposés» Jean-Louis Matharan, article « suspects », in Dictionnaire 
historique de la Révolution française, Paris, PUF, 1989, p. 1004-1008. See also Jean-Louis Matharan, 
‘Suspects et suspicion à Paris (août 1792 - thermidor an II)’, thèse pour le doctorat nouveau régime, Paris I, 
1985. Jean Louis Matharan, ‘Les arrestations de suspects en 1793 et en l'an II. Professions et repression’, 
Annales historiques de la Révolution française, 263 (1986), pp. 74-85. Philippe Barlet, ‘Suspicion et Terreur 
dans le District de Chatillon-sur-Indre (31 Juillet 1790-13 Frimaire an IV)’, Annales Historiques De La 
Révolution Française, 275 (1989), pp. 26–51. Colin Lucas, La Structure de la Terreur: l’exemple de Javogues 




article did not equate them specifically with espions, the inference was clear. In conceptual 
terms, the émigré was no longer just a traitor to the patrie doctrinally speaking but an active 
royalist agent who often crossed the frontiers illegally into France in order to gather 
intelligence and/or install ‘des réseaux contre-révolutionnaires’.412 As Sophie Wahnich 
expressed it, ‘on est passé du domaine de la théorie politique au domaine de l'action 
circonstanciée, espionnage, contre-espionnage et subversion intérieure’.413 
In any case, with the nationalisation of the war, and rising tide of spy-mania, the 
internment or punishment of foreign subjects marked a major, but not unprecedented step, 
in the revolutionaries’ quest for securitization.414 Just a year earlier, in September 1792, the 
Austrian authorities issued an imperial ordinance in the name of the Roman Emperor Francis 
II targeting all French nationals, the terms of which were no less punitive.415 Indeed, the 
decree ordering the arrest, and seizure of property, of ‘tous les sujets du roi de la Grande-
Bretagne’ just one month later, on 9 October 1793, followed the same inherent logic.416 For 
all the overblown discourse of the ‘foreign plot’, the fact remained that with the siege of 
Toulon, and (albeit often unreliable) evidence pointing to further coastal descents, the 
revolutionaries’ determination to temporarily intern the subjects of the king, and thus contain 
the perceived threat that they posed behind the lines, was probably actuated as much, if not 
more, by military expediency than internecine political rivalries. After-all, the debates over 
 
412 Antoine Boulant, ‘Le suspect parisien en l'an II’, op. cit., p.195. 
413 Sophie Wahnich, ‘L'étranger dans la lutte des factions’, Mots, Numéro spécial. Langages. Langue de la 
Révolution française, 16 (mars 1988), 111-130 (at p.122). 
414 Of course, the revolutionaries’ internment of enemy subjects had parallels with British wartime policy in 
20th century. Between 1914 and 1919, for example, the British authorities interned over thirty two 
thousand German and Austro-Hungarian civilians before the outbreak of WWI over fears of subversion. Chris 
Northcott, MI5 at War1909-1918: How MI5 foiled the Spies of the Kaiser (East Sussex: Tattered Flag Press, 
2015). 
415 Ordonnance de l'Empereur publiée le 2 septembre 1792 dans l'Autriche antérieure. ‘1° Il est défendu à tous 
les ambassadeurs et magistrats de délivrer des passeports aux François pour passer sur terre autrichienne. 2° 
Il est défendu aux sujets de l'Empereur de commercer avec les François ou de leur envoyer des espèces.  3° Il 
est ordonné de fermer tous les passages par lesquels on pourroit communiquer avec la France. 4° Tout 
voyageur françois sera regardé dorénavant comme espion et doit être traité en conséquence.’ Jean Baptiste 
Louis Kaulek (ed.), Papiers de Barthélemy: Ambassadeur de France en Suisse 1792-1797, 4 vols (Paris: Félix 
Alcan, 1886), I, p.289.  





the merits of containment had preceded the denunciation made by Fabre Eglantine. If 
anything, it was the false rumour that the représentant en mission to Toulon, Charles Nicolas 
Beauvais de Preau, had been hanged by the British authorities that ultimately served as the 
pretext for a policy which had already been advocated if not staunchly enforced.  
Indeed, it was concerns over the lack of patriotic zeal in some communes that also 
lay behind this series of legislation. The decree of 9 October, as with the Loi des Suspects, 
had the dual intention of also spurring the comités de surveillance to action.417 In Paris, 
between 160 and 250 British subjects were arrested in a series of early morning visites 
domicilaires.418 Whilst most of them had fallen victim to an increasingly discriminatory 
policy, the revolutionary authorities did nevertheless detain both active and sleeper agents 
among them including the radical writer, John Hurford Stone, who was seized at his 
residence on La rue Helvétius with his mistress, Héléna Williams.419 Though few in number, 
and posing little, if no imminent, threat to the security of the state, it was the very fact that 
these agents did exist ‘sous le masque de patriote persécutés’ that warranted, in Barère’s 
words, ‘point d’exception’ to the rule.420 In rejecting the repeated calls for leniency, he made 
the argument that, during times of crisis, the security of the Republic justified the temporary 
 
417 In Carcassone, for example, Marcel Rufas demonstrated how ‘les mesures révolutionnaires de septembre et 
surtout la grande loi des suspects, allaient tirer le comité de sa torpeur.’ Marcel Rufas, ‘Le comité de 
surveillance et les suspects de Carcassonne’, op. cit., p.240. 
418 Paul Gerbod, 'Visiteurs et résidents britanniques dans le Paris révolutionnaire de 1789 à 1799', in Paris et 
la revolution, ed. M. Vovelle (Paris, Publications de la Sorbonne, 1989), 335-51 (at p.339). See the chapter 
‘Prisoners’ in John Goldworth Alger, Englishmen in the French Revolution (London: S. Low, Marston, Searle 
& Rivington, 1889), esp pp.149-156.  
419 Stone was detained seventeen days in the Luxembourg before being released. AN F7/4775 doss 23. This 
file includes documents relating to the arrest of John Hurford Stone. Stone’s arrest had been prompted 
following as statement to the police by Citizen Arthur who denounced him as an ‘agent de l'infâme Pitt’ on 8 
March 1794.  
420 According to Barère’s assessment, 'beaucoup d'étrangers sont venus précisément sous le masque de patriote 
persécutés, afin de mieux nous tromper et par-là s'introduire partout’, 25 vendémiaire an II, Réimpression de 
l’ancien Moniteur, XVIII, p.149. Yet, not all suspected British agents were punished as can be seen by the 
case-file concerning a naval officer known simply on record as Capitaine Wood. He had been appointed by 
British naval authorities to negotiate the exchange of 1200 prisonners in Saint Malo but, doubting the veracity 
of his mission, was arrested as a spy by the local agent national. Initially, Saint-Just and Robespierre demanded 
that he should not be accorded the right to account to defend himself. Instead, according to their instructions, 
‘il faut l’envoyer à l’échafaud sans l’entendre’. Lejeune, however, protested to the Comité de salut public and 
it was only thanks to the interception of Carnot, who had requested information on his casefile, that Wood was 
spared his life. Equipped with a passport, secours and protection from a bridade of gendarmes, Wood was 





suspension of civil liberties, a contentious point that would similarly be made in Britain at 
the time.421 Those groups or individuals who were formerly accorded a measure of state 
protection, such as the students of the English, Scots and Irish Colleges, were now formally 
stripped of it.422 Similarly, at Le Havre, where the registered English and Spanish 
commercial houses were particularly numerous, all the known étrangers were promptly 
rounded up, despite petitions on their behalf, and imprisoned in l’abbaye de Montivilliers.423 
Leaving aside this question of civil rights and liberties, the ability for the revolutionaries to 
conduct ground operations against l’étrangers that Autumn was largely dependant on the 
cooperation and coordination between the Comités de Surveillance of each section, the 
obvious reason being that the movements and activities of the individuals they were tracking 
were not confined to one fixed point. In his study of the banker Walter Boyd, for example, 
Albert Mathiez has shown how the members of the Comité de Surveillance de la Section de 
Pelletier, after having issued their arrest warrant, raided his bank to investigate purported 
financial ties with France’s enemies whilst the comité révolutionnaire de la section du Mont 
Blanc pursued his colleague, Ker.424 Simultaneously, the Comité de Surveillance de 
Boulogne, in conjunction with the municipal police, raided his country home there, lifted the 
seals of his correspondence whilst all the food and livestock found on the property was 
confiscated by the commune.425 Boyd, who had already been denounced and arrested at the 
 
421 On the proposed suspension of habeas corpus, the Earl of Carnavon wrote, ‘A conspiracy clearly proved 
need not be traced distinctly through all its branches and ramifications; its existence, and the danger to the state 
from its nature, are sufficient to justify the temporary suspension of that security for our liberty, which by law 
is our birth-right.’ 22 May 1794 (PH 31, col. 595). 
422 AN, F/7/2514 (Section de I'Observatoire: Comité de Surveillance, procés-verbaux) 19 vendémaire an II, 
among the measures taken by the comité révolutionnaire de la section de l’Observatoire against the religious 
foreigners, including the arrest of the English Benedictine, le 18 vendémiaire an II, AN F7/4753 doss Kellet.   
423 These imprisonments do not appear in the registres de délibérations but the many prisoners released at the 
beginning of year III suggest that they were not few in number. ‘Les arrestations se multipliant, il y eut à un 
moment plus de 200 détenus politiques dans les prisons du Havre.’ A. E. Borély, Histoire de la Ville de Havre: 
De 1789 à 1813, 2. Partie (Lyon: Lepelletier, 1885), p.143. Marc Bouloiseau, Les Comités de Surveillance du 
Havre-Marat, an II-an III (Rouen: Imprimerie Albert Lainé, 1936). 
424 Albert Mathiez, ‘Quelques Affaires de Commerce et d’Intelligences avec l’ennemi sous la Terreur: Le 
Banquier Boyd et ses Amis’, Annales Révolutionnaires, 12. 3 (1920), 218–231 (at pp.224-226). AN, BB/3/72, 
dossier 14 (Comité de Surveillance de la Commune de Boulogne près Paris: Procès Verbal de visite et autres 
chez le C. Boyde', 28 Vendémiaire 11, 19 October 1793). Ker’s ‘accomplices’, la Baronne de Billens, le marquis 
and la marquise de Charras and JB Emmanuel Roettiers, were subsequently brought before the Tribunal 
révolutionnaire and executed for ‘correspondances et intelligences avec l’ennemi’. ibid, p.227. 




end of June, ‘’d’être en correspondence avec Pitt et de distribuer à Paris de l’argent pour 
favoriser la Contre-Révolution’, was forewarned of the raid, supplied with a passport and 
successfully fled the country before the local authorities in Boulogne had arrived.426 As the 
flight of Boyd reveals, the success or failure of the operation was equally contingent on rapid 
response, a condition that was sometimes hindered by jurisdictional overlap and eighteenth 
century spatial-tempo constraints.  
At the same time that these actions were taken against the British residents, the 
comités de surveillance also took steps to centralise and standardize their security practices. 
On 31 October 1793, delegates of forty-three of the forty-eight sections of Paris formed a 
central comité reaching the unanimous decision that it will conduct operations against their 
lists of suspects according to the same procedure. A blueprint exists to this day and has been 
reproduced by Ernest Mellie, an abridgment of which is given below. As the preamble of 
the decree read, the commissaires of each participating section agreed in principle to conduct 
their visites domicilaires as follows: 
 
‘Que cette visite serait faite les mêmes jours, à la même heure, dans les quarante-huit 
sections à 3 heures du matin. 
7. Sur les prêtres réfractaires 
8. Sur les déserteurs, étrangers, Lyonnais, Marseillais, réfugiés depuis les 
mouvements contre-révolutionnaires qui ont lieu dans les susdites (sic) 
9. Sur les signes contre-révolutionnaires 
10. Sur le désarmement des hommes présumés suspects.   
 




15. Le Commandant de chaque section sera requis de commander une force armée 
suffisante pour qu’il y ait un piquet nombreux au quartier de chaque section, et des 
patrouilles fréquentes circuleront dans les rues.427 
In applying the powers that were reaffirmed by loi de prairial, the comités de surveillance 
seemed to have awakened from their supposed ‘torpor’ and demonstrated renewed 
commitment to securitising the revolutionary state against all its enemies, declared or 
otherwise. In the first place, the law permitted the comités de surveillance to acquire more 
purpose and importance from their former legally prescribed function. Now, with the 
passage of the law, the comités were formally awarded the expanded role which many of 
them had been clamouring for, and performing anyway, since their inception in March that 
year. On paper, it authorised them to compile lists of suspects in their section, pursue and 
issue arrest warrants against their targets, examine and validate their certificats de civisme 
and finally, lift the seals off their correspondence. These expanded powers were 
subsequently formalised in the decree of 18 nivôse an II (January 1794), modifying the 
existing original decree which had conferred the municipalities with investigating high 
crimes and preserving the security of the state.428 Now, both the municipalities and the 
comités de surveillance shared responsibility for this mission. These powers, though 
intrusive, were not altogether arbitrary, illimted or subject to non-scrutiny. If the comités 
 
427 Ernest Mellié, Les Sections de Paris pendant la révolution française (21 mai 1790-19 vendémiaire an IV: 
Organisation-Fonctionnement (Paris: Au siege de la Société, 1898), pp.214-216. Some comité révolutionaires, 
meanwhile, had already begun the process of centralisation themselves. In the administration departemental 
of Landes, a comité de police et de sureté générale run by Louis Samson Batbedat, vice president of the 
département had already existed before the comité de surveillance de Dax was created on 5 Brumaire an II, 
(26 October 1793) by virtue of the decree issued by the représentants du people, Monestier (du Puy de Dome), 
Pinet, Cavignac and Dartigoeyte. This comité had, according to one historian, already centralised its 
surveillance procedures and established a list of suspects, made arrests and conducted broader surveillance of 
the town and district in search for deserters, themselves designated spies as we saw in the previous chapter. 
Antoine Richard,. ‘Le Comité de Surveillance et les Suspects de Dax’, Annales Historiques De La Révolution 
Française, vol. 7, no. 37, 1930, pp. 24–40.  
428 As the decree states, ‘Les municipalités demeurent spécialement chargées concurrement avec les Comités 
de Surveillance et Révolutionnaire des fonctions de la police de sûreté générale, pour la recherche des crimes 
attentatoires à la liberté, à l'égalité, etc... à la sûreté intérieure et extérieure de l'État. La municipalité ou le 
Comité sont chargés d'informer, de décerner au besoin des mandats d'arrêt, mais de faire passer les pièces au 
Directoire du district chargé de faire passer le tout à l'accusateur public du Tribunal Criminel du département 





made preventative arrests, the motives for them had to be recorded in a register. As the law 
prescribed, the Comité de sûreté générale was to be informed of ‘l’état des personnes qu’ils 
auront fait arrêter, avec les motifs de leur arrestation, et les papiers qu’ils auront saisis sur 
elles’.429 This obligation became even more indispensable following the loi de ventôse which 
conferred the Comité de sûreté générale with the responsibility for collating and maintaining 
centralised files of all suspects identified in France.  
The implicit purpose of the law was not just to avoid the abuse of power but also to 
tighten communications on both a local and central level. Not only were the presidents of 
each comité révolutionnaire required to correspond regularly with the Comité de sûreté 
générale- now formally conferred supreme authority for domestic security- but also, at the 
end of each month, they were to submit their deliberations and correspondence to the organ 
which was directly responsible for monitoring their actions on a local level.430 In Paris, as 
we have seen, the sections’ comités révolutionnaires not only communicated directly with 
each-other but also with the national comités so that ‘la police n’éprouve aucune entrave’.431 
At the same time, the districts, which were immediately responsible for surveillance in the 
départements, was also required to inform the two comités of the Convention ie de sûreté 
générale and de salut public, of their operations every ten days. With the loi de Frimaire 
(passed on 4 December 1793) these comités had now become the principal centre of power, 
with the former working in close collaboration with the  Tribunal révolutionnaire but with 
the latter retaining its ascendancy on matters concerning the inspection and surveillance of 
the constitutent corps and functionaries (ie des autorités et des agents publics).  In turn, 
however, they were obliged themselves to keep the Convention regularly informed of their 
 
429 Jean Desenne (ed.), Code général français: contenant les lois et actes du Gouvernement (Paris: Ménard et 
Desenne, 1819), X, p.130. 
430 As Cadio explains, the law of 17 September was thus not just ‘le texte de base de la législation contre les 
suspects’ but also ‘par-là même des attributions’ of the Comité de sûreté sénérale. Emilio Cadio, ‘Le Comité 
de Sûreté Générale’, op. cit., p.2. The comité’s overall responsibility for the police générale de la République 
(et intérieure) was later reaffirmed by the decree of 7 fructidor an II (24 août 1794). These powers would 
remain in force until its suppression on 4 November 1795. 





own activities- something that is evidenced by the publication of their reports- thus ensuring 
that this hierarchical pyramid is fully maintained. Securitization and centralisation thus went 





The role of the comités révolutionnaires was not just limited to police actions. In a 
striking example of how their conduct of counter-espionage operations also overlapped with 
the general war effort, certain among them were, due to their geographical location, equally 
vested in surveiling coastal and fort defenses as well as thwarting the counter-revolutionary 
activities which directly impinged upon them both. From September 1793, for example, the 
local comité at Le Havre acknowledged this dual mission in the following terms: 
 
…’considérant qu'il est investi de tout pouvoir pour rechercher dans toute l'étendue 
du district la présence de tout complot contre-révolutionnaire, considérant qu'il 
devient nécessaire et indispensable qu'il soit instruit si les batteries le long des côtes 
sont en bon état, si elles sont suffisamment garnies de munitions, si le zèle et l'activité 
des commandants s'étendent sur toutes les parties qui leur sont confiées, si des 
complots n'y sont point tramés contre la sûreté générale.’432 
 
 
432 Cited in Céline Duclos, ‘Les activités et le rôle des comités de surveillance dans le district de Montivilliers’, 
Annales de Normandie, 59ᵉ année, 1 (2009), 85-108 (at p.91). Similarly, in the adjacent commune, Ingouville, 
where, from its heights, batteries were placed to ‘pour connaître la position du pays, et voir ou pourraient être 
placées les batteries, qui regardant et la rade et la ville, seraient destinées à garantir le Havre et de l’approche 
des ennemis du dehors et des mouvements contre-révolutionnaires des ennemis du dedans’. Marc Antoine 




As a strategic maritime town, Le Havre was particularly vulnerable to acts of espionage and 
sabotage.433 With foreign ships birthing in the commune, the revolutionaries were taxed with 
keeping them under constant inspection as well as having to secure the peripheral land and 
waters surrounding the port from spies gathering intelligence on both naval dispositions and 
possible breaches to its security. As one report dated 17 September 1793 claimed, 
‘Les bâteaux pêcheurs dans l'étendue de la côte sont en partie plus anglais que français, 
et servent parfois eux mêmes d'espions à nos ennemis.434 Of course, the effort to create 
securitised zones was not new in France. In his study of counter-espionage during the reign 
of Louis XV, Genêt shows how the eighteenth century progressively saw ‘l'émergence de la 
sanctuarisation des zones stratégiques notamment pour faire pièce à l'espionnage britannique 
de nos ports.’435 Yet, following the sieges of Toulon and Dunkirk, where the initial thrust of 
these allied operations depended on reconnaissance missions, the revolutionaries redoubled 
its efforts to securitize Le Havre with the local comité de surveillance assuming a prominent 
role. Keeping the Comité de salut public regularly informed of its actions, the comité 
appeared to have been especially active, working in close-knit cooperation with the 
neighbouring comités de surveillances at Montivilliers, Harfleur and Ingouville- thus 
constituting a close network- along with the two représentants en mission sent by the 
National Convention.436 As Céline Duclos concluded from examining their correspondence, 
 
433 Only three years later, the naval captain ‘Sir William Sidney Smith, was captured of the coast of Le Havre 
with ‘proofs’ that he was planning to set the port ablaze. As the Ministre de la Marine, Pléville, was informed, 
he was the same ‘firebrand and incendiary’ who had successfully destroyed the French naval forces at Toulon 
by burning ten ships of the line, two frigates and two covettes as well as setting aflame the adjacent mast-house 
and timber stocks. Carlos de la Huerta, The Great Conspiracy: Britain’s Secret War against revolutionary 
France, 1794-1805 (Gloucester: Amberely, 2016), pp.41-43. 
434 ibid, p.7. 
435 Stéphane Genêt, Les Espions des Lumières, op. cit., p. It would seem that British spies had until managed 
to evaded this ‘sancturaisation’ by a simple flaw as Hugues Marquis makes clear. With the lines of 
communication between Somers and Lord Grenville disrupted, the British government recruited a double 
agent, L’abbé Ferris, to re-establish them. According to Marquis, Duban would rent a neutral vessal using his 
name aux frais de Anglais but to avoid attracting suspicion, changed port every time he made the crossing. By 
this simple manoeuver, he made sure that the same boat did not repeatedly return to the port. This seemingly 
elementary precaution raises the question, as to why the French authorities did not cross check their records 
with other ports. Hugues Marquis, ‘Espionnage Britannique à la fin’, op. cit. pp. 268-269. 
436 In a letter dated 6 October 1793, the Comité de salut public not only espoused its approval of the comité de 
surveillance’s actions but encouraged renewed effort. As the letter instructs, ‘le comité, par cette lecture, est 
invité à redoubler d'efforts pour déjouer les complots de la malveillance’. For further see Céline Duclos, ‘Les 




these two organs, the comité d’Havre and the représentants enjoyed ‘une véritable 
collaboration’, together concerting wartime measures to fortify the ports’ defences, mobilise 
its eligible citizens into service (ie the national guard) and purge the municipalities and 
fonctionnaires publics, notably those of Saint-Romain de-Colbosc and Saint-Jean-de-la-
Neuville, for their perceived incivisme.437 Similar operations were conducted across the 
départements of north-western France where the whole region was threatened by enemy 
incursions either from land or sea. In Calvados, the local comité révolutionnaire joined to 
the bureau militaire du département took combined measures to reinforce the defence of the 
coast, including petitioning the Convention to supply it with additional munitions.438 
Meanwhile, at Ingouville, the commandant de la garde nationale was instructed by the 
comité de surveillance to mobilise fifty able-bodied men and be at its ready disposition ‘pour 
prendre des mesures de sûreté générale’.439 
Of course, the problem facing the revolutionaries was that the long stretches of 
France’s coastline were, quite simply, impossible to surveil by manpower alone. Unlike 
defending a controlled site such as a building, coastal (and littoral) surveillance signified 
constantly patrolling, observing and preventing every ‘illicit manoeuvre’. And given the 
extended coastal and littoral lines, the plentiful supply of manpower was thus essential.440 In 
maritime towns during the revolutionary and Napoleonic epoch, these resources were drawn 
from the préfecture maritime, the mayorial office, national guards, municipal police, 
gendarmerie, army, navy and above all, the customs office. The army was deployed to 
defend the littoral, the navy managed the semaphores (ie signals) and patrolled the waters, 
paying especial attention to the fishermen. The national guardsmen and gunners manned the 
 
437 ibid, p.91 & 101. In speaking of this mutual rancour, the représentant en mission reported how ‘Le comité 
de surveillance etant mal avec la municipalité, qui a des liaisons très suspectes, et souvent entravé par elle dans 
la recherche des intelligences avec des mauvais citoyens avec nos ennemis,’ Marc Antoine Julien, Une Mission 
en Vendée, op. cit., p.7. 
438 Jeanne Grall, ‘Le Comité de Sureté Générale du Calvados’, op. cit., p.199.  
439 Cited in Céline Duclos, op. cit., (at pp.91-92). Duclos quotes the archival source, 5 AD 76, L 5327, registre 
de délibérations du comité de surveillance du Havre, 14 septembre 1793. 
440 Bernard Bodinier, ‘Mesures de défense de la révolution et de la nation révolutionnée’, Annales de 




forts and batteries. The gendarmerie patrolled the routes in and out of the town whilst 
customs officers, themselves ‘quasiment militarisée’, were occupied with administering all 
entries and exits from the port.441 And invariably, with this multiplicty of state actors, petty 
conflicts over jurisdiction were generated between rivals.442  
It was perhaps among these reasons that, as Maurice Hutt points out, the inclemency 
of the weather presented such ‘a formidable weapon of national defense’.443 In his article 
‘Spies in France’, he describes how émigré agents such as the Chevalier de Tinteniac and 
Noel François Prigent,  a native of St Malo, were able to land surreptitiously on the north-
western coast of France in order to establish communications with the insurgents in the 
interior. Moreover, ‘La Correspondance’- as this ‘secret service’ would become known- 
continued to ‘function with increased regularity’ all through the late summer and autumn 
months in 1793.444 Naturally, given its geographical location, St Malo presented an ideal 
springboard for operations from the Channel Islands. From 1793, it became a kind of depot 
for the transmission of epistolary correspondence between the princes regrouped beyond the 
Rhine and the ‘thousands’ of émigrés based in Jersey. Despite the failure of La Rouërie’s 
conspiracy, the core principles of his restoration plan which had been put in place during 
March 1792 – namely to capture the principle towns of the region through the massive 
disembarkment of émigrés from Jersey and Guernsey- ultimately remained a live if but 
distant hope. Indeed, such was the climate of suspicion that, despite the political complexity 
of the region, with its oscillation between patriotism and counter-revolution, the 
revolutionaries came to know St Malo not just symbolically but strategically as an ‘autre 
Coblence’.445 Not just foreigners or nobles but merchants and tradesmen were progressively 
 
441 ibid, pp.78-79. 
442 ibidem, p.79. 
443 Maurice Hutt, ‘Spies in France, 1793-1808’, History Today, 12.3 (1962), 158-167 (at p.160). 
444 ibid, p.130. ‘Le fameux Prigent’ was captured by the republican administrators at the end of 1794. Jean 
Julien Michel Savary, Guerre des Vendéens et Chouans contre la République française ou Annales des 
Départemens de l’ouest pendant ces guerres (Paris: Bauouin Frères, 1825), IV, p.283. The ‘fameux Prigent’ 
was captured by the republican administrators at the end of 1794. 
445 Yet, in July 1793, the municipality had demanded the departure of noble families from St Malo but the 




absorbed into this groundswell of suspicion that enveloped the country since 1792. Although 
originally protected by their commercial status, the movements of merchants also drew 
attention from the revolutionary authorities who perceived prolonged or unaccountable 
absences, especially abroad, to be a cloak for espionage.446 And quite often, the movements 
of these merchants were often the subject of denunciations as seemingly was the case with 
the ship-owner Benjamin Dubois.  
Dubois, a native of Normandy, had been arrested at his home in Montmarin on the 
morning of 15 December 1793 by the commissaires François Fénéaux and Coulonghon. Sent 
by the Comité de Sûreté Générale two months earlier, they were mandated with operating a 
series of preventative arrests in the principal towns of north-western France including St 
Malo itself.447 As with so many cases, these arrests were not the product of an undercover 
sting operation, involving the tailing of a suspect and/or the employment of some elaborate 
ruse. Instead, they tended to follow the same established, if somewhat prosaic, methods and 
procedures predating the Terror. Fénéaux and Coulognhon had arrived in their zone of 
operation – covering Rouen, Quillebeuf, Dinan, Rennes, Vitré, Laval, Bayeux- where they 
first joined together with the local Comités de Surveillance and Sociétés Populaires to 
produce lists of names and addresses, -sometimes in disagreement- of individuals who 
possessed ‘la certitude des principes contre-révolutionnaires’.448 According to his case-file, 
the papers found at his home, together with his status as a ‘noble’, automatically rendered 
 
‘L'accusation d'émigration des négociants malouins: Une justification abusive de la politique terroriste à Saint-
Malo’, Annales historiques de la Révolution française, 345 (2006), pp 31-53.  
446 In one such case, the parents of a merchant from St Malo, who was inscribed on the list of émigrés from 
year II, were detained for ‘prétendent que leur fils est en Angleterre pour y à prendre le commerce et la langue’. 
Karine Audran, L’accusation, op. cit., p.4. As the représentant at Brest declared to the Comité de salut Public  
on 9 Prairial an II (28 Mai 1794) the policy was to ‘les faire arrêté comme les autres. Point de communication 
avec des Anglais, ce sont…des espions’. Alphone Aulard, Recueil des Actes, op. cit., XIII, p.802.  
447 Barthélémy A. Pocquet du Haut Jussé, ‘Fénéaux et Coulonghon Commissaires du Comité de Sûreté 
Générale en Bretagne et en Normandie (1793)’, Annales de Bretagne, 79.2 (1972), 455-471. Barthélémy A. 
Pocquet du Haut Jussé, Terreur et terroristes à Rennes 1790-1795 (Mayenne: Joseph Floch, 1974). 
448 ibid, pp.455-456. For a compliation of letters exchanged between St Malo’s societé populaire, comité de 
surveillance and the administrateur du district on the presence of counter-revolutionaries there see La doctrine 
de Robespierre et Couthon, répandue dans la ci-devant Bretagne, par les lettres de Chaumont, Tréhouart, 
Charles Duval etc. députés par le département d'Ille et Vilaine à la Convention Nationale (Paris: Les 




Dubois suspect. Fénéaux and Coulognhon had paid Dubois two visites domicilaires 
accompanied by volunteers of the bataillon de la Somme. Conducting a search of his private 
study, they broke the seals in Dubois’ presence and finding the contents of his papers 
compromising, escorted him to a local prison where he remained for a week before being 
transported by a brigade of the gendarmerie to Paris for further interrogation. To formalise 
the procedure, the local juge de paix then compiled an official procès-verbal that was 
subsequently reviewed by the Comité de sûreté générale and the Accusateur Public who 
determined that he should be hauled before the tribunal révolutionnaire.449 The most 
incriminating piece of evidence against Dubois was the discovery of an undated anonymous 
letter attributed to one of his ‘frères’.450 For the revolutionary authorities, this letter thus 
served as further proof that a join Anglo-Royalist descent on their shores was being 
planned.451 On the front of his dossier, the Comité de sûreté générale inscribed the following 
motif d'accusation: ‘prévenu de correspondance contre révolutionnaire et d'intelligence avec 
un émigré’. If these facts ‘proved’ to be true, Benjamin Dubois risked the death penalty.452  
In any case, with multiple threats emanating from both land and sea, perhaps the best 
that the revolutionaries could do, besides mobilising more men and mounting more coastal 
defences, was to continue to intercept enemy communications and aggressively pursue all 
signs of counter-revolutionary opposition, violent or otherwise. By this means, they could, 
 
449 The procés-verbal contains a ‘dossier d’instruction’ which can be found under AN W42 doss 2873. Arrêté 
du Comité de Sûreté Générale 22ème jour du premier mois de l'an II (13 octobre 1793), Alexandre Tuetey 
(ed.), Répertoire général, op. cit., X, 1911, p. 95. Complaining against communicating the motives of arrests, 
they make the astonishing admission, ‘d’ailleurs, les Comités révolutionnaires, composés de sans-culottes, 
seraient souvent, dans la rédaction des procès-verbaux, des erreurs involontaires dont profiteraient les contre-
révolutionnaires pour se rendre la liberté’. Réimpression du Moniteur, XVIII, 174. Séance du 21 octobre 1793. 
450 According to one online study, only two people could have been the author of this letter: his half brothers, 
François Claude ou Claude Jean Alexis Dubois. Gérard Jolivet, ‘Benjamin Dubois, un armateur malouin sous 
la Terreur : une arrestation à haut risque qui finit bien – 25 frimaire-5 fructidor an II’, 2015, 
http://www.geneabretagne.org/articles/  
451Although not written in cipher, the letter supposedly speaks of ‘la guerre menée contre « les brigands » des 
armées royalistes’ and more precisely, about the siege of Granville that took place in November 1793 at the 
time that this letter is dated. More incriminatingly, it also, supposedly, makes an allusion to a planned joint 
Anglo-Royalist expedition by its otherwise unsubtle reference to ‘une descente de Jersey’. 
452 Of his companions, Magon de la Lande was put on the list of émigrés and executed 7 thermidor an II as 
‘contre-révolutionnaire’. Magon de la Blinais was executed 1 thermidor an II ‘comme contre-révolutionnaire 
et agent des conspirateurs d'Outre-Rhin’. As for Pierre Jacques Grandclos-Meslé, he staged an escape from 
his home where he was detained under house arrest under orders of the two commissaires before fleeing to 




at the very least, develop an idea of the dispositions, strategy and ground tactics of the 
insurgents as well as the nature of their communications with the foreign powers.453 For the 
revolutionaries, there was no doubt, given the mounting body of intelligence, that the 
insurgents in Brittany and La Vendée were greatly assisted by the presence of spies among 
the populace. As General Turreau explained in his memoirs, these ‘espions des brigands’, 
who appeared to be mostly women and young children, acted as scouts for the insurgents, 
keeping them informed of the republican armies’ formations and movements:454  
 
Les rebelles retiraient de tres grandes avantages des dispositions amicales des 
habitans restés dans la Vendée…ils n’en favorisaient pas moins secrètement leur 
cause; ils étaient les espions du parti; les femmes, les enfans même étaient des agens 
fidèles et intelligens qui instruisaient à la minute les chefs des rebelles des moindres 
mouvemens de l’armée républicaine.455  
 
453 In his report on the war of La Vendée dated 24 November 1793, the secret agent Venet, a resident at 
Lausanne, denounced ‘un corps de 1800 étrangers, Suisses, Allemands, Anglais et autres, qu'ils nomment les 
invincibles et qui doivent avoir fait des merveilles dans toutes les occasions.’ Cited by Pierre Le Bastard de 
Villeneuve, ‘L'écho des guerres de Vendée dans la correspondance des agents de la République en Suisse’, 
Revue du Souvenir vendéen, 129 (1979), p.19. About the same time, the représentants du people attached to 
the départements de l'Ouest reported the presence of foreign contingents among the ranks of l'armée catholique 
et royale as it marched towards Granville. From their correspondence at the time, many of these volunteer 
soldiers had wanted to join the Vendean army as much to serve the royal cause as to seek vengeance for the ‘la 
mort de leurs frères massacrés aux Tuileries’. Czouz-Tornare Alain-Jacques. ‘Les Suisses dans la guerre de 
Vendée’, Annales de Bretagne et des pays de l'Ouest, 101.4 (1994), 37-57 ; Emile Gabory, ‘Les Allemands 
dans les armées républicaines et royalistes pendant les guerres de Vendée’, Revue du Bas-Poitou (1919), p. 
247. See also the bulletin from the représentant attached to army of la Rochelle to the Comité de salut public 
dated 20 June 1793 concerning ‘une lettre saisie sur un espion annonce que les rebelles attendant des secours 
au dehors’, Alphonse Aulard, Recueil des Actes, op. cit., p.29. 
454 As Turreau recounted, ‘Dans ce pays, tout a combattu contre la Republique. Les enfants de 13 à 14 ans 
portent les armes contre nous; des enfants en plus bas âge encore sont les espions des brigands. Beaucoup de 
ces petits scélérats ont été jugés et condamnés par les commissions militaires’. Cited in Charles Louis Chassin, 
La Vendée patriote, 1793-1800 (Paris: J Floch 1973), IV, p.235. 
455 De Louis-Marie Garambouville Turreau, Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de la guerre de la Vendée. Par 
le genéral Turreau (Paris: Baudouin Frères Libraires, 1824), p.33. Otherwise, in the archives of the 
departément de la Vendée, one can find the following digitised sources that contain reports from Turreau, 
among others, concerning the perpetration of espionnage by the insurgents. See especially AN AF II 267-5 
-  Nantes, Ancenis et Angers, 4-15 juillet 1793: arrêtés et correspondance des représentants du peuple 
Cavaignac, Gillet et Merlin sur l'arrestation d'un espion présumé des insurgés (plaquette 2249, pièces 54-64). 
AN AF II 277-13 -  Angers, Saumur, Savenay et Avranches, 21 brumaire-3 pluviôse an II : correspondance et 
arrêtés du représentant du peuple Turreau sur l'espionnage de l'armée vendéenne, (plaquette 2321, pièces 92-
102).  AN AF II 278-29 - Paris et Nantes, 9-12 septembre 1793: minutes d'arrêtés et de correspondance de 
représentants du peuple sur l'arrestation du général Tuncq et l'espionnage des armées vendéennes (plaquette 
2329, pièces 24-33). Similarly, see Alphonse Aulard, Recueil des Actes, op. cit., XXVIII, p.449. ‘l’ennemi qui 





Given the undoubted existence of these civilian spies, it was small wonder that the 
revolutionaries’ counter-insurgency operations merged with their counter-espionage efforts. 
In a number of instances, we can see how these twin operations overlapped. In listing the 
advantages gained from the service of the cavalry, the republican general, Jean Baptiste 
Kléber highlights, for example, how:  
 
Les détachements de cavalerie, portés sur toutes les routes intermédiaires, servent à 
inquiéter l’ennemi sur la direction de nos forces, à empêcher les espions des Brigands 
de leur porter des renseignements, à établir et entretenir une communication 
rapide…Empêcher que des espions ou gens vendus au parti des Rebelles n’aillent 
prévenir l’ennemi de notre marche. Il nous semble que l’on put espérer le plus grands 
succès de ce concours de moyens.456  
 
Kléber staked success in the deployment of the cavalry along circuitous routes as a mean to 
intercept enemy communications and catch their couriers.457 In his writings at the time, he 
also reveals how the republican army had established ‘partout des postes de surveillance’ 
and employed their own spies – in accordance with the principles of renseignement- to not 
only pre-empt the rebels’ plans but also sow disorder among its ranks.458 Whilst they were 
not always well served by their own spies, and sometimes were betrayed by them to the 
enemy, as Turreau later lamented, their employment nevertheless demonstrates how the lines 
 
456 Jean Baptiste Kleber, Mémoires politiques et militaires, Vendée, 1793-1794 (Paris: Tallandier, 1989), 
pp.489- 494. 
457 In a report from the prince de Rohan, for example, it was reported how one of his spies had been stopped 
by ‘une patrouille de chasseurs à cheval’ and finding his passports ‘n'ayant pas paru bons’, was arrested, 
imprisoned but somehow- the details are not given- managed to escape that same night just in time to be a 
witness to ‘l'attaque d'hier matin’. Hugues Marquis, Espions et agents secrets’, op. cit., 129. 
458 As Kléber writes, ‘Ils auraient des espions qui non seulement pourraient prévenir des desseins de l’armée 
Rebelle, mais qui entretiendraient encore parmi elle l’ésprit de désertion qui commence à se manifester’, Jean 




between espionage and counter-espionage were blurred more often than not.459 The 
republicans, in other words, used spies for various missions during the Vendéen war, from 
guiding republican columns into unknown enemy territory, such as the special corps formed 
by Esprit Antoine Guillou, to intelligence gathering and infiltrating local cells and their 
hideouts.460 On 30 germinal an II (19 April 1794), for example, the revolutionary general, 
Jean-Antoine Rossignol, wrote to the Comité de Salut Public announcing how he was going 
to ‘employer, pour les découvrir, l’espionnage, les moyens les plus propres’ to discover ‘leur 
répaire.’461 Also, according to the republicans- as indeed the partisans found out for them-
selves - it was ‘les femmes qui font mieux le métier’.462 In fact, in the archives de la Vendée, 
one can find several reports either seized or provided by republican spies on the insurgents 
in the west including lists of their correspondents, the composition of their armies as well as 
interrogations of captured spies by either the army or municipal authorities.463 An 
interrogation of a nineteen year old Vendéen spy has been reproduced in full in appendix IV 
giving the reader a clear insight into how much testimony could sometimes be extracted from 
the interrogators.464 Unfortunately, what is unknown are the prime techniques that were 
employed during the course of interrogations ie in terms of coercion, seduction or a 
combination of the two. 
 
459 In his memoirs Turreau confides how the republican generals ‘ont voulu aussi avoir des espions du pays: 
ils ont toujours été trahis ou mal servis par eux: et jamais on n’a pu organiser un espionnage à l’armée de 
l’ouest De Louis-Marie Garambouville Turreau, Mémoires, op. cit., p.33. 
460 As we learn, Ésprit Antoine Guillou, a native of Cholet, was in command of a corps de Guides and served 
as a spy on behalf of republican columns to ‘guider’ the generals and soldiers into unknown territory. ibid, 
p.227-8 
461 Cited in Jean Baptiste Kléber, Mémoires, op. cit., p.535.  
462 See letter from the Representant attached to l’armee de l’ouest to the Comité de salut public dated 23 
frimaire an III. ‘Je me felicite d’avoir pu trouver quelques espions, qui nous sont déjà d’une grande utilité, 
mais qui le seront encore davantage par la suite; ce sont les femmes qui font mieux le metier.’ Alphonse Aulard, 
Recueil des Actes, op. cit., p.687. 
463 See digitised sources, AN AF II 277-18 -  16 mars 1793-10 frimaire an II (30 novembre 1793) : rapports 
saisis ou fournis par des espions sur les insurgés de l'Ouest contenant des listes de correspondants vendéens 
et de prêtres assermentés (plaquette 2322, pièces 43-58), AN AF II 277-19 -  23 mai 1793-7 frimaire an II: 
rapports et papiers d’espions contenant des réquisitions d'agents vendéens, des notes d'agents du général 
Rossignol et deux billets signés de Lescure, La Rochejaquelein et Donissan (plaquette 2322, pièces 59-73) 
464 AN AF II 277-21 - Rennes et Vitré, 8 brumaire (29 October 1793)-6 frimaire an II (26 november 1793): 




Similarly, in the northeast of France, the republican army took strict measures to 
secure the front from spies operating on behalf of the coalition forces. Despite the 
exaggerated rhetoric that the region ‘abondent les émigrés, les espions, les scélérats qui ont 
voulu faire de ce pays une nouvelle Vendée’ the revolutionaries had good cause to be worried 
about the security situation on the entire frontier contiguous with the low countries and 
(modern day) Germany and Switzerland.465 The problem was not just the concentration of 
allied forces along the entire frontier, especially in Flanders, but the existence of spies and 
informers that had been recruited particularly by the British and Dutch armies to provide 
auxiliary support. Thanks to Hugues Marquis’ article on the Flanders campaign, much is 
known about their presence and activities.466 As he explains, the Dutch army had recruited 
‘networks’ of correspondents in the principle towns of France such as Dunkirk and Bergues 
which not only gathered intelligence on republican dispositions but established their own 
units to support a planned allied disembarkment.467 Similarly, during the Flanders campaign, 
the British command solicited the assistance of the French émigrés to compensate for the 
lack of organised intelligence gathering capabilities of its expeditionary corps.468 With their 
knowledge of the adversary’s language, continued ties to their homeland and ideological 
commitment, they were thus considered to be a particularly useful source of political and 
military intelligence.469 As Marquis argues, it was thanks to the émigrés who had joined 
 
465 Letter of the Représentant à l’armée du nord to the Comité de Salut Public on 30 September 1793, Alphonse 
Aulard (ed.), Recueil des Actes, op. cit., VII, p.159.  
466 Hugues Marquis, ‘Espions et agents secrets pendant la campagne des Flandres (1793-1794)’, Revue du 
Nord, 75.299 (Janvier-mars 1993), 121-132. 
467 For examples of how spies supported Dutch regiments during their campaigns see David Gabriel Albert de 
Gross, Journal des principales opérations de la campagne de 1794 dans les sept Provinces (NA, 1795) 
468 Since the beginning of 18th century, the collection of topographical information was gathered in the English 
army under the direction of the Quarter Master General. It also was responsible for gathering intelligence on 
enemy forces from the interrogation of deserters or prisoners of war but also the despatch of spies and scouts. 
As the général Paul Thiébault states, ‘en campagne surout, l'espionnage, autrement dit la partie secrète, forme 
une tâche essentielle du travail d'un chef d 'État-Major’. For more information on these intelligence gathering 
capabilities, and how they pertained to campaigns of 1794, see H Coutanceau, La campagne de 1794 à l'armée 
du Nord, lre partie: Organisation (Paris: Chapelot, 1903), I, pp. 234-235. 
469 Following the French conquest of Holland in May 1794, for example, the British army despatched another 
spy to Amsterdam, known otherwise by the codename ‘M. de L.C’. His mission was ‘d'avoir une connaissance 
exacte du plan général de la campagne, des forces que la France peut déployer, et des vues du comité de Salut 
Public et de se procurer les «les moyens d'être informé régulièrement de ce qui se passe dans ledit Comité’. 




ranks with the coalition armies, together with the support of the royalists established in the 
rear of republican forces, that reports arrived with increasing regularity until a ‘closely knit 
and extensive network of informers’ –as he characterised it- could be constituted.470 Yet, 
there were significant limits to this espionage activity. As the comte de Cunchy, the princes’ 
emissary at Tournai, confessed, it was far easier to communicate with his province at the 
beginning of the Revolution than during the winter 1792-1793 when he was at Gand.471 
Moreover, he also regarded it as almost impossible to plant spies, or recruit traitors, in senior 
positions within the revolutionary armies that enabled them to discover directly its 
confidential operational plans. On the other hand, he judged it possible to establish spies ‘sur 
ses flancs et sur ses arrières’.472 In other words, it was easier to recruit scouts and sow dissent 
among the rank and file than to penetrate the État-Major and its innermost military secrets.473  
Despite these limitations, the revolutionaries were rightly concerned about the 
possibility of enemy spies attempting to penetrate their military camps and outposts. On 5 
April 1794, for example, Florent Guiot, the représentant en mission in the département du 
Nord and Pas-de-Calais, announced the capture and execution in Lille of one Coupeleux, a 
native of Pont-à-Tressin, ‘qui depuis longtemps servait d’espion à cette frontiere aux 
ennemis de la République’.474 As the Mercure de France reported, this ‘scélérat’ was the 
‘chef’ of the military spies operating along the frontier who ‘avait fait égorger, en different 
termes, plusieurs de nos avant-postes’.475 In response to these security breaches, the general 
staff of l'armée du Nord were issued instructions to separate their camps from large 
conurbations favourable to the recruitment of spies. At the same time, they were instructed 
 
dispatched their spies to different points of the interior of the territories occupied by the republican armies, 
risking, as Marquis makes clear, ‘doublement leur vie comme espion et comme émigré’. ibid, p.129. 
470 Cited in Marquis Hugues, ‘Espions et agents’, op. cit., p.121. 
471 For Le comte de Cunchy see Georges Sangnier, Les émigrés du Pas-de-Calais pendant la Révolution 
(Doullens: 1959), p.79. 
472 Cited in Marquis Hugues, ‘Espions et agents’, op. cit., p.131. 
473 For these subornment plans, Marquis quotes the Letter from Lord Elgin to Lord Grenville, 26 January 1794, 
BL, Add. Mss. 59129, folio 26 and ‘Projet de diminuer les forces des ennemis et d'augmenter celles de la 
Grande-Bretagne sur le Continent’ dated 23 September 1794, British Library, Londres (BL), Add. 46711. 
474 Mercure de France: 1794 (Paris: Bureau de Mercure, 1794), p.376.  




to redouble the surveillance of the camps adding that any officer who neglected their guard 
duty would be treated and judged as a spy as well. As the decree of 22 June 1794 stated: 
 
Le général en chef est instruit qu'il se glisse dans nos camps des hommes suspects à 
la solde de nos ennemis comme cela ne peut provenir que de la négligence des 
commandants des avant-postes, le général prévient tous les officiers que lorsqu'un 
espion sera arrêté dans l'intérieur du camp, le commandant du poste près lequel il 
aura passé sera arrêté et jugé comme espion...476  
 
Whilst the army enhanced its security protocols, parallel measures were put in place to clear 
France’s maritime towns and military strongholds of spies. On 27 and 28 germinal an II (16 
and 17 April 1794), the revolutionary leadership issued a national decree, prescribing the 
temporary removal of all ex-nobles and étrangers from the communes immediately impacted 
by the war. According to article IV of the Décret sur la Répression of Conspirateurs: 
 
Aucun ex-noble, aucun étranger des pays avec lesquels la République est en guerre, 
ne peut habiter Paris, ni les places fortes, ni les villes maritimes, pendant la guerre. 
Tout noble ou étranger dans le cas ci-dessus, qui y serait trouvé dans dix jours, est 
mis hors la loi.’477 
 
The germinal decree, which was was prompted by Saint-Just’s survey of the dangers facing 
the Republic, represented one of the most comprehensive legislative acts designed to purge 
the nation of its enemies.478 Within ten days of the decree being promulgated, the nobles and 
 
476 Henri Coutanceau, La campagne de 1794 à l'Armée du Nord (Paris: R Chapelot, 1903), I, p. 124. 
477 This decree also applied to the generals who were not in service. According to Article XVI, ‘Le séjour de 
Paris, des places fortes, des villes maritimes, est interdit aux généraux qui n’y sont point en activité de service’. 
Décret concernant la Répression des Conspirateurs, l'éloigneinent de Nobles, et la Police générale. 17 
Germinal an 2 (6 April 1794)] Jean Baptiste Duvergier (ed.), Collection des Lois, op. cit., VII, p.172.  
478 From Dumouriez’s treason, the insurrections in La Vendée, the Siege of Toulon, revolts in Lyon, Bordeaux, 




foreigners residing in the targeted areas were compelled to leave or suffer proscription.479 
Those who remained surreptiously behind were subject to denunciation, as the inhabitants 
of the Strasbourg had been encouraged to do by the Directoire du District.480 Just as the 
émigrés had discovered for themselves, once they were declared outside of the law, they 
were no longer afforded the protection of it. Exceptions were, however, accorded to workers 
employed in the manufacture of munitions in Paris, the étrangères who were married to 
French patriots and conversely, female nobles married to ‘non-nobles’.481 Equally, foreign 
workers who ‘vivant du travail de leurs mains’ before the decree was promulgated, children 
below the age of fifteen years old and senior citizens above the age of sixty were also 
excluded. As articles IX and X of the decree established, the Comité de salut public, as 
supreme authority over the war effort, retained the right to requisition the étrangers 
militaires and female nobles whom they deemed useful to the Republic.482 For the 
individuals who were displaced, they were required to obtain an ordre de passe from the 
local comités révolutionnaires, declare where they would be residing and present themselves 
every day at the municipalités which received them. In turn, the comités révolutionnaires 
and municipalities were required to submit their updated registres to the Convention’s 
comités for inspection and record keeping. By these measures, the revolutionaries tried to 
maintain a measure of centralised and local control.483    
 
 
had assailed the Republic since May 1793. Saint-Just, Rapport sur les personnes incarcerées présenté au nom 
du Comité de salut public et du Comité de sûreté générale à la Convention nationale à la séance du 8 ventôse 
an II (26 février 1794).  
479 Jennifer Heuer, ‘Enemies of the Nation? Nobles, foreigners and the constitution of national citizenship in 
the French Revolution’, in L. Scales, O. Zimmer (Eds.), Power and the Nation in European History, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 275-294. 
480 Euloge Schneider, op. cit., p.166. Since the year before, of course, the district of Strasbourg had keeping 
records of the British and Spanish subjects residing there according to standard surveillance procedure. See 
Arch Dpt du Rhine, 1L 147 N°25 (digitised) circulaire du 26 nivôse an II. No.66 circulaire du même et du 
même jour aux municipalités et agents nationaux de son ressort concernant la formation de listes des sujets 
anglais et espagnols et des princes étrangers en guerre avec la République ayant, dans le district, des biens 
meublés ou immeublés ou des créances, 27 Germinal an I (March 1793). 
481 Jean Baptiste Duvergier (ed.), Recueil des Actes, op. cit., p.172. 
482 ibidem, p.189. 





As so often was the case, the revolutionary leadership was ultimately responding to 
pressures from below. For months, the représentants du peuple, and other militant jacobins, 
had been either clamouring for such measures to be enacted nationwide and/or had attempted 
to enforce them unilaterally on a local level. Two months earlier, for example, Saint-Just and 
Philippe Le Bas, the représentants du peuple attached to l'armée du Nord had issued orders 
to arrest and incarcerate ‘au secret’ all nobles found in the départements du Pas-de-Calais, 
du Nord, de la Somme, de l'Aisne within forty-eight hours.484 Of course, as we have seen, 
the revolutionaries had resorted to such preventative, if draconian, measures before the 
institution of the Terror. On 8 August 1793, the représentants en mission to the département 
de l’Aisne, Joseph-Marie Lequinio and Lejeune de L’Indre issued a decree aimed at 
the ‘ennemis de l’intérieur’ who were accused of having maintained treasonous 
communications with the Austrians.485 In virtue of their extensive powers at the time- powers 
that were circumscribed following the Law of Frimaire - the two Conventionnels 
montagnards enjoined the administrators of the département ‘de mettre en arrestation sans 
délai et de faire dans toute l’étendue de leur ressort arrêter les ci-devant nobles, femmes et 
parens d’émigrés [sic] et gens suspects qui peuvent s’y trouver […]’.486 Adopting Barére’s 
rhetoric, these measures were justified by the threat of a ‘trame perfide’ by duplicitous 
royalists who ‘se cachent sous le masque du patriotisme’ in order to ‘seconder les 
 
484 Décret 16 pluviôse an II, August Joseph Paris, La Terreur dans le Pas-de-Calais, op. cit., p.189. 1L 147, 
N°29: ordre du 12 pluviôse an II (31 January 1794) du général Dieche, commandant la division de Strasbourg, 
pour la poursuite et l’arrestation des contre-révolutionnaires. 
485 Not just in Aisne but in the Midi and throughout the centre of France, cells were actively setting up émigré 
networks and engaged in espionage activity, including suborning officers, on behalf of the Austrian army. As 
the représentants dans l’armee des pyrénées orientales announced to the Comité de salut public on 1 February 
1794 (13 pluviose an II)  ‘Le système de trahison combiné entre nos ennemis exterieurs et les contre-
révolutionnaires du Midi se developpe tous les jours…Un espion de marque, qui venait offrir des sommes 
considerables au Commandant de Mont-Libre et qui a été fusillé à la tête de la division de Puycerda est une 
preuve que l’ennemi comptait encore sur les trahisons.’ Alphonse Aulard (ed.), Recueil des Actes, op. cit., X, 
p.605. Equally convinced of their existence, Joseph Duquesnoy, the représentant to l’armée de la Moselle, 
issued a decree prohibiting all communication with the enemy warning that anyone in contravention would be 
treated as spies and punished as such. ibid, V, p.507 




envahisseurs autrichiens’.487 Lejeune and Lequinio had issued these orders at the moment 
when the Austrian army was penetrating the departément’s territory. Moreover, they were 
carried out along with the purging of the fonctionnaires publics in both the civil and 
judiciaries under the surveillance of the members of the conseil général of the commune.488 
Just how many nobles were arrested is, due to the unavailability of sources, impossible to 
establish but the représentant du peuple en mission, Roux, and his colleague Lejeune, at the 
time of presenting his report to the Convention on 31 December 1793 boasted of having 
arrested ‘neuf cents et quelques personnes suspectes […] parmi lesquelles on distingue un 
certain Sainte-Foy, un chevalier Saint-Georges, un fils naturel de Capet et le ci-devant comte 
de Pardieu, ex-constituant […]’.489 According to the Laurent Brassart, they were 
‘particulièrement bien exécutées’. Significantly, they were principally conducted under the 
direction of the municipalities and units of the National Guard and not, as with the case of 
Le Havre, by the structures of militant Jacobinism. As Brassart makes clear, neither the 
comités de surveillance nor the sociétés politiques were implanted in the department de 
l’Aisne at this juncture.490 
Lejeune and Lequinio played an instrumental role in drastically reducing the threat 
of espionage from their jurisdictions. Indeed, the revolutionary zeal with which they and 
other militant Jacobins pursued spies is articulated in a bulletin to the Convention dated 16 
germinal an II in which it was claimed how: 
 
 
487 Archives Parlementaires, LXXXIII, op. cit., p.81. 
488 ibid, p.82. 
489 ibid, LXXXII, p.509. 11 nivôse an II. 
490 Laurent Brassart, ‘Je resterai passif au milieu de tous les citoyens actifs. Les stratégies politiques de la 
noblesse picarde non émigrée pendant la Révolution française’ in Philippe Bourdin (ed.,) Les Noblesses 




L’accueil fraternal que leur ont fait la société populaire et tous les patriotes, a deja 
produit un bon effet: et dans toute cette partie de la frontière, on poursuit avec un 
ardeur patriotique tous les traitres et tous les espions.491 
 
Among the most zealous of these patriots was reputedly Joseph Le Bon. In his report, in 
which he declared ‘une guerre à mort aux espions’, Le Bon had stressed the central 
importance of rupturing ‘sans pitie’ all ntelligence with the enemy before announcing how 
‘trois espions et cinq ci-devant français, devenus échevins autrichiens ont egalement disparu 
du sol de la liberté.492 Le Bon had been charged by Louis Antoine de Saint-Just with clearing 
the north-eastern frontier of spies in support of the military effort.493 As his instructions read, 
he was ‘de se transporter à Cambrai avec un section de son excellent tribunal (criminal 
d’Arras), pour délivrer la ville de tous les espions qui compromettant sa sécurité’.494 Indeed, 
the success with which his efforts were met was lauded by Saint Just who, in a public letter, 
applauded Le Bon for having ‘fait exécuter à Cambrai les espions, et guillotiner toutes les 
intelligences de l'ennemi.’495 Citing the testimonies of several prisoners interrogated by the 
représentants en mission, Barère added to the chorus of approval, claiming how Le Bon’s 
measures had the effect of disrupting the enemy’s campaign plans:   
 
La police faite à Cambrai depuis deux mois, contre laquelle les journaux étrangers et 
les émigrés vomissent les imprécations les plus horribles, a fait changer le plan de 
campagne de nos ennemis. Ce fait est attesté par les rapports de plusieurs prisonniers 
 
491 ibid, p.97. 
492 A. J. Paris, La terreur dans le Pas-de-Calais, op. cit., II, p.193. 
493 ibid, p.193. For Saint Just’s Albert Soboul, ‘Sur la mission de Saint-Just à l'armée du Rhin (Brumaire an 
II)’, Annales historiques de la Révolution française, 26e Année, 136 (Juillet-Septembre 1954), 193-231. Joseph 
Deschuytter, ‘Cambrai sous la Révolution’, Revue du Nord, 46.183 (Octobre-décembre 1964), 525-543. 
Herlaut. ‘Les missions de Saint-Just à l'armée du Nord. Seconde Mission (30 Avril 1794-28 Juin 1794)’, Revue 
du Nord, 28.109 (1946), 1-33. 
494 Cited in Louis Jacob, Joseph Le Bon, 1765-1795: La Terreur à la Frontière (Nord et Pas-de-Calais) (Paris: 
Mellottée, 1934), II, p.362. 




interrogés par Guyton Saint-Just et Le Bas ; mais il sera fait, au surplus, un rapport 
particulier sur cet objet qui tient à la police révolutionnaire et aux opérations d'un 
représentant républicain et fidèle '.496 
 
Le Bon’s imposition of Terror in Cambrai demonstrated how one of the best means of 
neutralizing espionage was through the power of deterrence.497 This conclusion was 
similarly reached by Laurent Brassart who, in his study of the nobility in Picardy, argued 
that the multiple forms of resistance to the Republic from vocal opposition to the running of 
clandestine counter-revolutionary networks uncontestably declined with the institution of 
the Terror and the repressive measures sanctioned by the ‘dispositif législatif’. As he 
concluded, with repression at its height, the best means of opposing the Revolution was not 
to stay and fight but emigrate.498 In deploying ‘une energie farouche’, as Saint-Just had 
enjoined him to do, Le Bon had applied this ‘dispositif législatif’ with the gruesome public 
display of executions, always an effectual method to cause fright and sow panic amongst the 
more sensitive ranks of the opposition.499 Having installed the tribunal révolutionaire 
d’Arras in Cambrai, both military spies and royalist conspirators were tried and judged, with 
condemned ‘aristocrates’ delivered to the guillotine whilst ‘espions’ were placed before a 
firing squad.500  
Fortunately, the register of ‘jugements rendus’, the ‘motifs des jugements’ and the 
lois ‘citées’ (albeit except for cases 173-215) survive for the period 21 Floréal - 9 messidor 
 
496 ibid, p.279 
497 As Jean Lambert Tallien made clear, the Terror was, at its core, a system based on the principle of fear, with 
a society torn between ‘those who are afraid, and those who make others afraid’. As he said, this strategy was 
adopted not so much to ‘eliminate the enemies of the Revolution but to break their will to resist’, ibid, p.617. 
In another example of how terror was used as a form of punishment and deterence, the représentant of the 
Loire wrote a long letter to the Comité de salut public on 9 March 1794 recounting the recent draconian 
measures that were taken to displace Cholet in La Vendée of its inhabitants among which were ‘thousands’ of 
spies. As he declared, ‘Les mesures que nous avons prises les chagrinent beaucoup. Comme nous avons fait 
évacuer de Cholet et de l’intérieur plus de six mille femmes et enfants qui étaient leurs espions – (nous n'y 
avons pas mis le feu, mais nous n'y avons rien laissé qui puisse servir à l'ennemi’. Alphonse Aulard, Recueil 
des Actes, op. cit., XI, p.618. 
498 Laurent Brassart, ‘Je resterai passif’, op. cit., p.267. 
499 Louis Jacob, Joseph Le Bon, op. cit., p.358. 




an II (10 May - 27 June 1794) as entered by the greffier (or court clerk) of the Tribunal 
named Galand.501 The register contains the cases of 216 individuals judged by the Tribunal, 
of which 153 (including twenty-seven females) were sentenced to death, forty five of them 
for military ‘crimes’ such as abandonment of post, desertion but above all, ‘espionnage’. In 
the civil cases, thirteen persons were guillotined for having emigrated, corresponded with 
the émigrés or for having accepted public functions during the occupation of the territory by 
the ‘Satellites des Tyrans’ with a further fourteen persons for having either ‘avili’ (ie 
debased) circulated assignats or for having fabricated false ones. The others were either 
acquitted or ‘retenu en état d’arrestation par mesure de sûreté’ as with the case of Nicholas 
Gabelle indicated in the sample table below: 
 
 














Art. 1er décret 16 juin 
1793 ; Art.4, 1re sect. tit.1, 
2e partie du code pénal Art. 







Espionnage Art. 1er décret 16 juin 
1793 ; Art.4, 1re sect. tit.1, 
2e partie du code pénal 
Art.2 du tit. 2 du décret du 







Art.1, décret du 7 septembre 
1793, Art. 2 du tit. 2 du 
décret du 10 mars 1793 
 
501 The register is AN F7/4774/6 and has been reproduced in full in volume 41 of the Annales du Comité 
Flamand de France (Lille: Librairie René Giard, 1936), pp.175-223. In his study of Joseph Le Bon’s mission, 
Louis Jacob reproduces an inexact list with names misspelt, dates and professions inaccurate. See, for example, 
‘Le lendemain, 22 floréal (11 mai), le tribunal prononça huit condamnations. Maximilien Cottaux (56 ans), 
marchand de filets à Paillencourt, est « convaincu d'espionnage; il a discrédité les assignats ».’ Louis Jacob, 
Joseph Le Bon, 1765-1795, op.cit., p.412. André Ulrich (ed.), Recueil de pièces authentiques servant à 
l’histoire de la Révolution à Strasbourg, ou les actes des représentants du peuple en mission dans le 
Département du Bas-Rhin sous le règne de la tyrannie, des Comités et Commissions révolutionnaires, de la 
Propagande et de la Société des Jacobins à Strasbourg (Strasbourg: Impr. de Dannbach et Ulrich, an III), 2 
Vols. See pages 12-19 and 69-74 for a list of arrests during prairal an II but of which not one spy was cited. 
F/7/4551-F/7/4575 Arrestations, détentions, mises en liberté (série départementale). For an analysis of similar 
judgements rendered at Douai see Bernard Lefebvre, ‘La Terreur et ses victimes dans une ville de la frontière 















d’avoir  fourni des 
vivres aux ennemis 
Art. 10, décret des 12 aout 










Art.74, section 12e, décret 
28 mars 1793. Art. 4, 1er 
sect. tit.1, 2e partie du Code 
penal, Art. 2, 2e sect. du 
meme titre. Art 2, décret du 







les émigrés et leur    
avoir servi d’espion 
Art. 4, 1sect., tit.1, 2e partie 
du Code pénal, Art.1, décret 




d’espionnage    et 
d’avoir favorisé le 
pillage commis au 
Catelet par les  
satellites des tyrans 
Art.4, 1 sect., tit.1, 2e partie 
du Code penal, Art.1, décret 
du 16 juin. 
 
The lois citées show just how far the revolutionaries applied its full legislative 
arsenal, including its 1791 Penal Code, Loi des Suspects and décret of 16 June 1793, to 
incriminate and punish its perceived enemies including spies.502 Whilst these executions 
were intended to impose both military and political order, it is possible that some were 
unjustly judged, not least out of distaste for their Catholicism. However, given that the 
‘motifs de jugement’ are condensed into a few words, and that nothing is known about their 
individual cases, nor the evidence that was collated to convict them, this must remain pure 
supposition. The fact that a number of accused were acquitted suggests that the revolutionary 
tribunal in Cambrai was not some kind of indiscriminate killing machine, as characterised at 
the time, but a legal apparatus of the state calibrated to dispense local punishment as swiftly 
and severely as possible.503 With no right of appeal or judicial review, it was undoubtedly 
 
502 Forrest who argued that, no matter its excesses, the Terror’s proceedings were legal with the passage of 
legislation designed to combat counter-revolutionary activity. Alan Forrest, ‘The Local Politics of Repression’ 
in K.M Baker (ed.), Terror in The French Revolution in Modern Political Culture, (New York: Pergamon, 
1994), IV, 81-98. 
503 In his book on the Terror, David Andress judged that Joseph Le Bon had carried his zeal ‘to hunt down 
counter-revolutionaries to grotesque length’. Just because Le Bon employed revolutionary rhetoric to instil fear 




true that these ad hoc legal procedures (and laws) against individuals accused of espionage 
were tinted in favour of the state prosecution – but that did not mean that the tribunal 
révolutionnaire possessed the power to kill wantonly, no matter the miscarriages of justice. 
Not just at Cambrai but elsewhere in France, cases arose where individuals falsely accused 
of espionage were acquitted.504  
Throughout the country, from Brest in the northwest to Nice in the southeast, both 
military commissions and tribunals révolutionnaires were instituted on a local level, 
employing divers language, to dispense punishment of spies and other perceived enemies of 
the state.505 On 27 November 1793, for example, the représentants to Brest and l’armée de 
l’ouest issued two decrees, one for establishing a Commission militaire composed of 
members taken indistinctly from differents corps to judge délits militaires committed by 
‘brigands prisonniers’ and ‘les espions’ and a second, to establish a Commission militaire et 
révolutionnaire at Saint Malo in order to judge ‘les actes attentatoirs à la liberté’.506 About 
the same time, the représentants du people, Prieur de la Marne, Bourbotte, Turreau formed 
a commission at Rennes (1 frimaire an II- 21 novembre 1793) to punish with equal celerity 
all counter-revolutionaries. As Article III declared:  
 
Ils jugeront également tous les prisonniers pris les armes à la main sur les brigands 
en faisant le métier d’espions.507  
 
 
they may strike some as unpalatable according to today’s sensibilities. David Andress, The Terror, op. cit., 
p.278.  
504 See acquittement de Michel-Victor Brige, ancien capitaine de fédérés, accusé faussement d'espionnage, 
Archives de la guerre de Vendée, AN BB3/8-3.   
505 For the establishment of the military commission in département d'Ille-et-Vilaine in Brittany, see Théodore 
Lemas, Les commissions militaires révolutionnaires dans l'Ille-et-Vilaine en 1793-1794 (Fischbacher, 1893) 
506 Alphonse Aulard, Recueil des Actes, op. cit., IX, p.13. 
507 Hippolyte de La Grimaudière, Documents sur l'histoire de la révolution en Bretagne: la Commission Brutus 
(Nantes: Société des Bibliophiles Bretons, 1879). On 15 floreal, the commission condemned to death René 
Sibille, marchand de cassis, faubourg de Nantes, for accusations ‘d’etre l’espion des chouans’. AN BB3/8-3 




Just what constituted an ‘espion’ remained, of course, a local decision. In Lyon, for example, 
the president and sécretaire-général of the sections went so far as to decree that any 
unregistered person who presented themselves at the gates, during the period of the siege, 
was to be brought immediately before the commission militaire and ‘jugés irrévocablement 
dans les heures, comme espions, ayant été et venant de l’ennemi’.508 Whilst most of the 
condemned are forgotten, some are known to history. On 20 April 1794, for example, the 
two sisters of Jean Chouan, Perrine and Renée Cottereau, were executed at Laval. At their 
sentencing, the commission ruled that they were: 
 
convaincues d'avoir servi d'espions à leurs frères, chefs des rassemblements de 
Brigands, de les avoir alimentés et approvisionnés, enfin d'avoir endossé la cuirasse 
et participé à leurs massacre..509 
 
Naturally, given their intended deterrent effect, these executions were given the widest 
possible publicity. In Bordeaux, where ‘des espions infestaient les marches et le port’, the 
walls were placarded with notices informing the town’s inhabitants of the arrests made by 
the  représentants en mission, the decrees issued by the national convention and a list of 
names of the most recent individuals tried by Commission militaire and sent to the 
guillotine.510 At the same, whilst the members of the comité de surveillance, national guard 
and soldiers of the revolutionary army patrolled the streets, equipped with arrest warrants 
and orders to conduct visites domicilaires, the roll of tumbrils could be heard, amidst loud 
cheering, transporting the condemned to the ‘trone des conspirateurs’, as the scaffold was 
 
508 Anonymous, Bulletins du département de Rhone et Loire: du 8 aout au 30 septembre 1793 Imprimés par 
ordre du Comité general de Surveillance et de Salut Public de Lyon (Lyon: Charavay frères librairie, 1843), 
p.11. 
509 A few days later, the brother of Jean Chouan, Pierre Cottereau was also arrested, judged and guillotined, 
Hervé de Lorgeril, Deux Généraux vendéens, Nicolas Stofflet, le comte Charles d’Autichamp; Chouans, Jean 
Cottereau dit “Jean Chouan”, (Imprimerie Bellanger, 1964) p.121. 





cynically called.511 Similarly, during the séance of 26 pluviose an II, the patriotic society of 
Angoulême agreed to print the contents of their proceedings in order to:  
 
…refroidir l’ardeur militaire de nos jeunes guerriers, livrer nos frontières et nos ports 
à nos perfides ennemis, faire rentrer les émigrés, ouvrir les prisons aux conspirateurs, 
aux hommes suspects, notre territoire aux espions de l’ennemi, nos cités aux 
puissances coalisées, et nos sociétés populaires au parti de l’étranger.512 
 
Of course, the punishment of spies was not just determined by these commission militaires 
and tribunal révolutionnaires. Several suspected spies were also brought before the short-
lived commissions populaires. By virtue of the national décree of 23 ventôse an II (13 March 
1794) and the law of 27 germinal (16 April) these had been created ‘pour juger promptement 
les ennemis de la Révolution détenus dans les prisons’ not just in Paris but throughout the 
départements of France.513 The key difference, however, was that the ruling made by the 
commissions populaires was not final. Once they had judged the guilt or innocence of the 
detainees, their decision was sent to the tribunal révolutionnaire for adjudication before the 
Comités de salut public et de sûreté générale appended their signature with approval or not. 
Through this procedure, the two national comités, which had presided over their creation, 
could ensure that every precaution had been taken so that the suspects were judged promptly 
but not precipitately.514 Such was the case with Samuel Baldwyn, an ‘agent britannique’ as 
Olivier Blanc has designated him. Baldwyn, a maître de langues, was arrested as a British 
 
511 ibidem, p39.  
512 Hugues Marquis, ‘Effort de guerre et de sortie de la Terreur en Charente (1794-1795)’ in Sortir de crise: 
Les mécanismes de resolution de crises politiques (XVI-XX siècle) (Rennes: Presses universitaires de Rennes, 
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513 AN/F7/4436/1, vol. 3, pièce 19.  
514 On 2 and 3 thermidor an II, two new decrees specified that the accused judged by the commissions- 
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See Recueil des Actes du Comité de Salut public,  XV, p. 316, 334 and AN/F7/4599. On these commissions 
populaires, see the following report of one its members Rapport au nom de la Commission des Vingt-Un fait 




citizen and imprisoned in l’Abbaye. He was subsequently  released in February 1794 
following pressure exerted by certain members of the Paris Commune and club des 
Cordeliers but was reincarcerated in germinal an II, summoned to appear before one of the 
commissions populaires and convicted of espionnage. The tribunal révolutionnaire in Paris 
sanctioned his sentence but, in a twist of fate, and for reasons still unaccountable today, 







In relation to securitization, the month of April 1794 was especially noteworthy, first 
with the re-organization of the Comité de sûreté générale. Following the regulation of 20 
germinal an II (9 April 1794), the comité’s activities were compartmentalised with the 
creation of several departmental units including a bureau central as well as a secretariat 
general established near the hall where its séances were convened. At the same time, its 
surveillance operations was divided into four regions (département de Paris, Nord et Est, 
Midi, Ouest) with strict security protocols also introduced to guard the integrity of its 
proceedings but not the personal safety of its members.515 This restructure went hand in hand 
 
515 The secrétariat général could be considered the essential cog of the Comité de sûreté générale. Its two 
general secretaries, Lauchet et Bourguignon were obliged to be present in their office during the séances of the 
comité and alone, with the secrétaire principal of each region, were authorized to enter its salle des séances. 
A huissier was also charged with keeping a registre in which it inscribed the names of the persons wanting to 
communicate with the comité. The comité also deployed agents d’éxecution, attached to the secretariat 
générale, who were openly charged with applying its decisions. These included issuing arrest warrants, 
conducting raids and interrogations and ordering prison transfers to the Conciergerie and Tribunal 
Révolutionnaire. It also recruited several other auxiliary agents, not from the comités de surveillance, who paid 
their own ‘indicateurs’, a few of whom seldomly appeared on its documents, and remunerated by the secret 
funds put at the comité’s disposition. Jacques Aubert, L'état et sa police, op. cit., p.19. Émilie Cadio, ‘Le 
Comité de sûreté générale (1792-1795)’, op.cit., pp.6-10. Jacques Aubert et al, L'état et sa police en France, 




with the broader process of administrative and political centralisation that the revolutionary 
state underwent. Having vanquished their rivals, with Georges Danton at their head, the 
triumphant leaders began to reconstitute the central organs of government with the six major 
ministries of state, including war and foreign affairs, replaced by twelve commissions 
exécutives reporting directly to the Comité de salut public. One of the key changes was, of 
course, the creation of the bureau de surveillance administrative et de police générale, 
otherwise known by the abbreviation, le Bureau de police.516 With Saint-Just and 
Robespierre increasingly suspicious (and disparaging) of the Comité de sûreté générale, the 
Bureau de police was deliberately formed to counter-balance its influence with Robespierre 
superintending its operations whilst Saint-Just was away on mission.517   
In terms of the development of counter-espionage, it is difficult to argue definitively 
either way whether these structural changes had any major short-term impact, at least in 
relation to immediate ground operations. In the first place, during the first few months of its 
existence, the Bureau de Police remained, in Robespierre’s words, ‘faiblement organisé’. 
Moreover, though his work remains a solitary effort, Arne Ording has shown that the number 
of decisions taken by the bureau de police were ‘très inférieur’ to those issued by the Comité 
de sûreté générale during the same period.518 Yet, this is not to say that the Bureau de Police 
was not directly engaged in counter-espionage activities. There is evidence to suggest that it 
was, at the very least, involved in domestic surveillance which may- but probably did not 
have -‘le caractère d’un espionnage organisé’ and which may possibly have overlapped with 
the direct arrest of individuals for conspiratorial crimes.519 During the séance of 28 floreal 
 
516 The function of the first of these twelve commissions, la Commission des Administrations civiles, police et 
tribunaux was to preside over all matters related to justice and policing. Created by the Convention on 
12 germinal an II, it replaced the Ministère de la Justice and ‘une partie de bureaux du Ministère de l'Intérieur’ 
and was partly inspired by the Rapport sur la police générale drafted and delivered by Saint-Just. Archives 
Parlementaires, op. cit., LXXXVIII, p. 613. Rapport sur la police générale, 26 germinal an II. 
517 Marisa Linton, Choosing Terror: Virtue, Friendship, and Authenticity in the French Revolution (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, p.235. 
518 Arne Ording, Le Bureau de police du Comité de salut public. Étude sur la Terreur (Oslo: 1930). Except by 
the publication by this Norwegian historian, there has been, to this day, no single, detailed study of the Bureau 
de Police. 




an II (17 May), for example, the Comité de salut public charged Claude Guerin with the 
domestic surveillance of Paris, a mission which he was not permitted to disclose to anyone 
and which he retained even after the fall of Robespierre. Moreover, every day, he was 
required to present a detailed report from his agents ‘sur les intrigants, les voleurs, les 
conspirateurs, dont il aura découvert les manœuvres et les refuges.520 However, of the reports 
that Guerin did submit to the Bureau de police, featuring the feebly transparent codename 
G+++++, one can find, in Ording’s estimation, ‘rien de sensationnel’.521 As the latter informs 
us, they essentially contained denunciations on a range of subjects, from financial 
speculation on the assignats, the existence of illegal gambling dens, the civisme of certain 
deputies but, in a couple of instances, the discovery of ‘correpondance en chiffres secrets 
avec les émigrés.’522  
Indeed, in an undated document submitted to the Comité de salut public, which can 
now be found among Robespierre’s papers, one can learn more about the mission objectives 
of these ‘secret agents’. Whether or not the author is Guerin or one of his agents is unknown- 
the document is unsigned- it nevertheless returns to this theme of overlap, in which the lines 
between domestic surveillance activities blurred with counter-espionage operations. Titled, 
‘Observations soumises aux Lumières patriotiques et Démocratiquement Républicaines du 
Comité du Salut Public’, it reveals in detail, the mission of the comité’s own appointed agents 
which, besides reporting on the proverbial esprit public, was to ‘déjouer les intrigants et les 
cabaleurs et de découvrir les trames ourdies dans les ténèbres contre la Révolution’. 
Moreover, although it did not entirely specify, the ‘bien public’ demanded that they employ 
 
520 Alphonse Aulard (ed.), Recueil des Actes, op. cit., supplement, I, p.139. 
521 The reports of Bureau de surveillance administrative et de police generale for the period between 4 floreal 
to 10 thermidor can indeed be found under AN/F7/4437, F7/3821, F7/3822. Ording assures us that they total 
3777 articles. To be sure, they are bountiful, although this author cannot verify the precise number or many of 
the reports’ contents except to say that they do contain several denunciations of non pertinence to this 
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‘les mêmes moyens et précautions pour découvrir les ennemis secrets de la Republique et 
les faux-patriotes.523 
None of this is to say that, for the first months of its existence, the Bureau de Police 
was anything but the personal fiefdom of Robespierre and Saint-Just. In terms of daily 
operations, there is little existing evidence to suggest that it played a major part in preserving 
national security against counter-revolutionary threats. In fact, it was not until messidor an 
II, when the Bureau de Police began to grow in size and steadily extend its influence, that it 
not only risked becoming ‘une police parallèle’ and veritable rival to the Comité de sûreté 
générale but also a mortal threat to the lives of its members.524 It was at this point that they, 
and certain représentants en mission, recognised that the Bureau de Police could potentially 
conduct enquiries into themselves, a fear that was not assuaged by Robespierre when he 
alluded to a new list of proscription on 8 Thermidor an II. Perhaps, an example in which the 
structural changes mentioned before had a bearing on counter-espionage efforts, albeit in the 
short term, was with the creation of the commission des administrations civiles. On 18 June 
1794 (30 prairial an II), just over a week after the revolutionaries modified the judicial 
procedures concerning the trial of counter-revolutionary suspects, Robespierre formally 
awarded Martial Jean Armand Herman, a former judge, and commissaire des 
administrations civiles, police et tribunaux, with special powers to interrogate all suspects 
sent to Paris following the receipt of denunciations made against them.525 Moreover, Herman 
 
523 AN F7/4433 doss 43. Reproduced in Georges Michon (ed.), Correspondance de Maximilien et Augustin 
Robespierre (Paris: Librairie Nizet et Bastard, 1941), II, pp.159-163. 
524 Michel Eude, ‘Le Comité de sûreté générale’, op.cit., p.302. Henri Calvet, Un instrument de la terreur à 
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of the comité révolutionnaire de la section de l'Indivisibilité (7 messidor an II, 25 June 1794). Michel Eude, 
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trials increased dramatically especially with the centralisation of counter-revolutionary trials. From March 
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was provisionally designated an interrogation centre at the maison des Quatre-nations to 
discharge this function as well as authorised to freely correspond with the comités 
révolutionnaires of any commune in order to procure and share intelligence relative to the 
individuals whom he was now empowered to interrogate.526 Weeks earlier, Herman had been 
charged with interrogating and verifying the claims of Benjamin Vaughan, a former member 
of Parliament, who had supposedly fled England after having been implicated in the trial for 
treason of John Hurford Stone’s brother, William. Vaughan had assumed the pseudonym, 
Jean Martin, presumably to evade arrest as an Englishman, but was arrested in Passy, a 
commune situated in the département de la Haute-Savoie, where he was living discreetly in 
retirement. From his local cell, Vaughan was subsequently transferred to Paris, incarcerated 
at Carmes prison and interrogated by Herman.527 
 In a striking example of how the identification of an unregistered foreigner was 
near impossible to verify, given the inaccessibility of international records, not to mention 
the wholly uncooperative spirit subsisting between France and Britain at the time, Herman 
solicited the assistance of his colleague, Buchot, the commissaire des relations extérieures, 
asking him: 
 
…de faire rechercher, sur les gazettes de Londres depuis le 17 mai dernier, s'il y est 
question de Benjamin Vaughan, membre de la Chambre des Communes de la 
Grande-Bretagne, et de me faire donner des extraits traduits de ce qui pourrait se 
trouver rélatif à cet individu. Je te prie de faire cette recherche de suite.528  
 
 
2020. Also see Patrice Gueniffey, La politique de la Terreur: Essai sur la violence révolutionnaire (Paris: 
Fayard, 2000). 
526 ibid, p.375. 
527 Mathiez suggests Vaughan was transferred from Passy. Albert Mathiez, Conspiration de l’Etranger (Paris: 
Armand Colin, 1927), p.262. It seems, however, that he was actually transferred from Cherbourg. In a bulletin 
dated 30 May 1794, Le Comité de salut public ordered the l'agent national du district of Cherbourg, in the 
département de la Manche, to remove him from his prison and transfer him to Paris, forbidding him to 
communicate with anyone along the way. Alphonse Aulard (ed.), Recueil, op. cit., supplement, I, p.186. 




Meanwhile, that same day, Herman was charged by the Comité de salut public to interrogate 
Vaughan a second time. From the outcome of his interrogation, for which he was extracted 
from the prison des Carmes, the commission presented two reports to Robespierre who 
concluded that the prisoner posed no security threat and ultimately qualified as a 
revolutionary sympathiser and de facto political refugee (in today’s parlance). Allocated a 
passport, and released from prison upon orders from the Comité de salut public, Vaughan 
was transported to the Swiss border late June by agents charged by the commission des 
relations extérieurs with assuring its execution.529 
 
Despite the leniency accorded to Vaughan, accusations later surfaced that Vaughan was 
actually an ‘agent de Pitt’ who had either manipulated, or had arrived at an understanding 
with, Robespierre. In his memoirs, Bertrand Barère - hardly an impartial observer- claimed 
that the Englishman had been despatched to France by the British government, under false 
pretences, on a secret diplomatic mission to gain territorial advantage over the Republic. As 
Barère characterised it:  
 
Voilà un espion de haut parage qui commence pour proposer le démembrement de 
la France, la fédération de l’Allemagne, enfin l’abandon de la Belgique et de la limite 
du Rhin….’530  
 
This interpretation of events was subsequently accepted by the French historian, Olivier 
Blanc who, in his book on the activities of British spies during the Terror, wrote how Barère, 
knowing of his true identity, had even ‘aida l’espion anglais Benjamin Vaughan à passer 
l’étranger sous le prétexte d’une mission en Suisse.’531 Whatever the truth of the matter, the 
 
529 Alphonse Aulard, Recueil, op. cit., supplement, I, p.540. 
530 Bertrand Barère, Mémoires de B. Barère: Membre de la Constituante, de la Convention, du Comité de Salut 
Public (Paris: Jules Labitte, 1842), II, p.232.  




case of Vaughan neatly shows how the motives of foreigners like him were now (almost) 
universally suspected of being disingenuous at best and counter-revolutionary at worst.532 In 
his famous rapport sur les faction de l’étranger, Saint Just expounded at length on the theory 
that, foreign (ie mostly British) agents habitually assumed a guise of false patriotism - or in 
Vaughan’s case, false victimhood - in order to perpetrate espionage in France. As he 
declared, ‘Si Pitt venait en France espionner le gouvernement, il prendrait les formes d’un 
honnête homme pour n’y être reconnu.’533 Saint-Just was, of course, re-treading familiar 
ground. Since the beginning of the revolution, any machination, even the attempted 
assassination of Collot d’Herbois and Robespierre on 4 prairial an II, was attributed to either 
the gold or ‘poignards de Pitt’.534 Equally, Saint-Just instructed his listeners on the ‘signes 
certains’ that could be discerned to distinguish true French patriots from the treacherous 
public functionaries and politicians whose corruption and avarice had enticed them into the 
dastardly ‘foreign plot’.535 This meassage was repeated by Georges-Auguste Couthon on 8 
prairial (27 May 1794), four days after the assassination attempt, but with the added counsel 
that his fellows deputies should not welcome anyone into their homes unless their ‘good 
 
532 Barère, Rapport et décret sur les manœuvres des ennemis du bien public, 16 ventôse an II, in Archives 
Parlementaires, LXXXVI, p. 126. 
533 Auguste Amic, Étienne Mouttet, Choix des discours et des rapports les plus remarquables prononcés dans 
nos Assemblées parlementaires avec ... le résumé des discussions les plus importantes et des notices 
biographiques sur les principaux orateurs dont les discours sont reproduits dans cet ouvrage, (Paris: Mairet 
et Fournier, 1841), II, p.439. Convention nationale. Rapport sur les factions de l'étranger, et sur la conjuration 
ourdie par elles dans la République française pour détruire le gouvernement republicain par la corruption et 
affamer Paris, fait à la Convention nationale, le 23 ventôse l'an II... / par Saint-Just, au nom du Comité de 
Salut public... (Paris: Impri. Nationale, 1794). In a curious overstatement, Sophie Wahnich argued how, with 
the report of 23 ventôse, the members of the Comité de salut public ‘analysent la stratégie effective de 
l'adversaire en employant tour à tour la définition générique de « l'étranger » et sa définition conceptuelle’. 
Sophie Wahnich, ‘L'étranger dans la lutte des factions’, op. cit., p.122. For more on the historical enmity 
against the English, see S Wahnich, M Belissa, 'Le Crime des Anglais: trahir le droit', Annales Historiques de 
la Révolution française, LXVII (1995), 233- 248 
534 Amiral de Lestapis, ‘Admiral et l'attentat Manqué (4 Prairial an II)’, Annales Historiques de la Révolution 
Française, 31.157 (1959), 209–226. Alphonse Dunoyer, ‘Un episode de la Conspiration de l’Etranger sous la 
Terreur’, Ed de la Revue des Idées, Paris (1907). For a dispassionate analysis of the existence of this plot see 
Norman Hampson, The Life and Opinions of Maximilien Robespierre (London: Duckworth, 1974), pp. 201-
23.    
535 Of course, these ‘signes certains’ were not entirely dissimilar from those invoked by the denunciators of 





intentions’ had been amply demonstrated. 536 Just what this elementary precaution was is 




In any case, the assassination attempt served as a pretext to conjure up the old fears 
of a foreign plot. Despite originally denounced in November the preceding year, Barère 
nevertheless reminded everyone that the Baron de Batz still remained at large.537 Given that 
the ‘conspiration de Batz’ has been the subject of several works, of varying academic rigour, 
it is unnecessary to recount its history except to examine some of the methods that the 
revolutionaries adopted in their pursuit of him and his accomplices.538 On 22 April 1794, 
just over a fortnight following the execution of Georges Danton, the members of the Comité 
de surveillance et de sûreté générale, including Amar and Vadier, sent a co-signed letter to 
the accusateur public du tribunal révolutionnaire, Antoine Fouquier-Tinville, enjoining him 
to ‘redoubler d 'efforts pour découvrir l'infâme Batz.’ In their instructions, they added: 
 
Souviens-toi , dans tes interrogatoires , que ses relations s'étendent par tout, et 
jusques dans les maisons d 'arrêt…Ne néglige , dans tes interrogatoires , aucun 
indice; n' épargne aucune promesse pécuniaire ou autre; demande-nous la liberté de 
tout détenu qui promettra de le découvrir ou de le livrer mort ou vif, ainsi que de 
 
536 ibidem, p.249. 
537 A de Lestapis, ‘Admiral et l'attentat Manqué, op. cit., pp.209-210. 
538 For the Baron de Batz, see Baron de Batz, La Vie et les conspirations de Jean, baron de Batz, 1754-1793, - 
Les conspirations et la fin de Jean, Baron de Batz, 1793-1822 (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1910-1911), René 
Batz, Études sur la contre-Révolution: La vie et les conspirations de Jean, baron de Batz (Paris: C. 
Lévy, 1908), Charles de Batz-Trenquelléon, Un aventurier gascon, le vrai baron de Batz, rectifications 
historiques (Librairie Feret et fils de Bordeaux et Librairie L. Mulo de Paris, 1908), Laurence Motoret, ‘De 
l'influence de l'espionnage sur le comportement des familles : le baron de Batz ‘, Sigila, n°30 (2012), Marina 
Grey, Le Baron de Batz, le d’Artagnan de la Révolution (Paris: Librairie académique Perrin, 1991), Munro 
Price, ‘The Foreign Plot’ and the French Revolution: A Reappraisal’, in Barry Coward, Julian Swann (eds.), 
Conspiracies and Conspiracy Theory in Early Modern Europe: From the Waldensians to the French 




ceux par qui on pourrait l'at teindre, en semettant, à leur insu, sur leurs pas; répète qu 
'il est hors la loi, que sa tête est à prix…539  
 
This letter is striking for its own admission. Far from applying coercive interrogation 
techniques, it would appear that, so desperate were the revolutionaries to apprehend de Batz, 
that they were prepared to concede the liberty of his accomplices should they either deliver 
him dead or alive (although it seems that they preferred that he be captured alive for the 
reward of 360,000 francs). This promise of a pecuniary reward, which is hardly the stuff of 
tradecraft, obviously had the adverse effect in some cases by feeding the venality of 
government agents and encouraging the wildest inventions by informers. In one colourful 
description, an observer describes how the method of arrest by these agents was conducted:  
 
The insolence of the agents, too, is beyond belief, and is but little counterbalanced 
even by their venality….When a prisoner is arrested it’s supposed to be the rule that 
a complete inventorium of his personal property, and especially of all arms and 
valuables found him on the time, be forwarded to the Police Committee, who forward 
a copy of it to the Tribunal, before the trial. But, as a matter of fact, not one-tenth of 
such articles is ever registered; and the plunder pays toll first to the agent of the 
arrest, then to Vadier and Héron, or some such other arch-spy.540  
 
Such was the case with Batz’s own property. When his house at Charonne was added to the 
list of émigrés and placed under seal, the Mayor of Belleville accused the officiating 
commissioners of misappropriating a number of his valued possessions, an accusation which 
 
539 This letter which has often been reproduced, but whose source is never quoted in full, can actually be found 
under AN/W389 doss 904. It is misquotated in Georges Lenotre, Un Conspirateur royaliste pendant la Terreur: 
Le Baron de Batz, 1792-1795, d’après des documents inédits (Paris: Perrin et Cie, 1896), p.234.   
540 Raoul Hesden, The Journal of a Spy in Paris during the Reign of Terror, January-July 1794 (New York: 
Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1896), p.151. While the original manuscript of this publication is not be found, 
and could quite equally be a work of historical fiction, it nevertheless does make persuasive evidence as being 




they did not deny on the grounds that ‘n’étant pas payés, il fallait bien que leur restat quelque 
chose’.541 
The promise of a pardon, in exchange for information, was also recommended by the 
Comité de salut public. In a letter dated 20 prairial an II, they authorised Fouquier-Tinville 
to interrogate Batz’s secretary, Michel Devaux, and offer him from the scaffold if he 
disclosed the fugitive’s whereabouts.542 Failing the allure of a bribe, the revolutionaries 
recommended that a different stratagem to discover de Batz’s whereabouts be adopted. 
Interestingly, given their (over)reliance on denunciations, the members of the Comité de 
sûreté générale did not credit the possibility that the presumed accomplices would give him 
up unlike such turncoats (or ‘des renégats’) as Francois Chabot, the deputy of Loi-et-Cher 
and former member of the Comité de sûreté général was deemed.543 As they concluded, after 
unsuccessful questioning, his accomplices preferred ‘leur honneur à leur tête’, such was their 
commitment to the cause.544 Indeed, for all the excesses of the Terror, it is striking, but no 
less the case, that the revolutionaries did not appear to resort to physical torture. No evidence 
has yet been presented that suggests that they applied thumbscrews etc, an interrogation 
‘technique’ that Napoleon’s imperial police did not shy from using when searching for 
Georges Cadoudal, General Charles Pichegru and their accomplices a decade later. Instead, 
having spared no promises, as the instructions to Fouquier-Tinville made clear, the Comité 
de sûreté générale recommended gathering all of de Batz’s suspected accomplices together 
and planting prison mouches among them. In this way, it may be possible to extract some 
corroborating leads from their inevitable discussions together. As they wrote:  
 
541 ibid, p.21. AN/F7 3688/2. 
542 ‘Tu es autorisé à offrir pardon à Devaux s'il indique où est caché Batz; tu enverras tout de suite au Comité 
l'interrogatoire, et tu viendras ce soir’. Cited in Charles Lacretelle, Histoire de la Convention Nationale, 1824-
1825, 3 Vols (Paris: chez Treuttel et Wuertz, 1825), II, p.453. A transcript of Deveaux’s interrogation is also 
found in the pièces justificatives, pp.454-456. 
543 Implicated with the Baron de Batz, and suspected of being an Austrian spy and financial speculator, Chabot 
was condemned to death in the company of Georges Danton, Camille Desmoulins and Herault de Séchelles. 
Norman Hampson, ‘François Chabot and His Plot’, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 26 (1976), 
pp.1-14. 





…si un interrogatoire ne présentait aucune chance de leur arracher leur secret, peut-
être arriverait-on à un résultat en les réunissant dans la même prison ; on verrait bien 
alors s'ils se connaissaient ; des espions habilement mêlés aux détenus surprendraient 
quelque conversation, quelque correspondance, quelque signe qui pourrait mettre la 
police sur la piste du baron de Batz. La concordance des dates et des faits est ici si- 
gnificative….Les membres du Gouvernement, on le voit, ne dédaignaient pas de 
s'aboucher directement avec un geôlier : ils dressèrent avec lui la liste de tous les 
détenus qui, disséminés dans les diverses maisons d'arrêt de Paris, pouvaient avoir 
eu, de près ou de loin, avant leur arrestation, des accointances avec le baron de Batz, 
et auxquels on allait tendre le piège de les réunir dans la même prison pour les mieux 
espionner.545 
 
The grouping together of suspected conspirators actually departs from standard security 
protocols that would normally prescribe their separation. The obvious reason is that prison 
authorities prefer to avoid mutual contamination and the risk of further conspiracies being 
hatched. It was for this reason that many political prisoners were imprisoned au secret, away 
from public access and in isolation from one-another. Prison separation, in other words, was 
(and remains) a preventative measure taken to minimize risk.546 The stratagem obviously did 
not work, nor did the proposed measure to stop every carriage, on all the routes, in order to 
intercept first, ‘toutes les correspondances qui partent de Paris’ and second, ‘toutes les 
correspondances qui arrivent à Paris’, the same day and for one time only. As the (unknown) 
proponent of this measure declared, ‘La Nécessité’ demanded its implemention.547 In reality, 
 
545 ibid, p.236. Lenotre cites AF/II/273 as the source but a thorough consultation of this series has failed to 
uncover this document. Given the language that is employed and faith in the integrity, if not necessarily the 
academic rigour of the historian, there is no reason to doubt its existence.  
546 See, for example, Shane Bryans (ed.), Handbook on Dynamic Security and Prison Intelligence (New York: 
United Nations, 2015), p.20. 




for all the obsession (and historical interest) about the Baron de Batz and his small clique of 
followers, his pursuit hardly constituted a national security priority. Besides the propaganda 
coup that would probably have been gained for publicising his capture, it ultimately made 
little difference to la sûreté de l’état either way. Moreover, for all the criticisms levelled 
against the revolutionaries for supposedly failing to apprehend the ‘right men’, the fact that 
he was running scared is sufficient proof that the security measures which the revolutionaries 
put in place- from the presence of armed patrols, the conduct of house to house searches, the 
deployment of roadblocks, not to mention the spectre of the tumbrils and guillotine- together 
achieved its deterrent effect.548    
The Baron de Batz was not the only fugitive to elude the authorities. For three months, 
between September and December 1793, the former ministre des affaires étrangères, 
Lebrun, had successfully evaded capture following the denunciation made against him by 
one of his assistants, Louis Antoine Pio.549 Faced with imminent danger, and beseeched by 
his friends and confidants to flee, Lebrun had managed to evade the surveillance of the 
gendarmes, dodge the police hot on his heels, and seek refuge in different ‘safehouses’ across 
Paris. On Christmas Eve, after having been betrayed by his hostess, he was finally arrested 
in ‘la maison dite Dharcourt’ on the rue de l'Égalité, formarly called rue de Condé. That 
same evening, he was incarcerated in the Conciergerie prison, immediately tried (with Pio 
acting as a prosecution witness) and three days later, on 27 December 1793, was executed.550 
 
548 Hampson even goes so far to suggest that Baron de Batz was being protected by certain members of the 
Comité de sureté générale, perhaps a sure recipe for his evasion of capture. Norman Hampson, ‘François 
Chabot’, op. cit., p.13. 
549 AN/W305 doss 365, Dossier d’accusation contre Lebrun-Tondu. ‘Qu’en effet, il est notoire que Lebrun 
appelé au ministère par les Brissotins, les Girondistes, les Rolandistes tout puissants, à l’époque de sa 
nomination était pour ainsi dire l’âme du parti d’Orléans qu’il voulait mettre sur le trône, soit personnellement 
soit par un de ses fils, que pour faire appuyer ce parti par l’Angleterre, Lebrun, ministre des Affaires étrangères, 
n’a pas craint de laisser entrevoir au machiavel Pitt, l’espoir d’un démembrement de la France au profit du fils 
du tyran anglais.’ See also, Suzanne Tassier, ‘Aux origines de la Première Coalition: le Ministre Le Brun 
Tondu’ Revue du Nord, 36.142 (1954), 263-272. 
550 The circumstances relative to the arrest and trial of Lebrun, as well as the Acte d'Accusation against him of 




Of course, the denunciation levelled against him was full of inventions.551 Essentially, it 
claimed the existence of an elaborate counter-revolutionary network within the Ministère 
des Affaires étrangères that tied together the different disgraced political factions (Girondins 
on one side, Orléanistes and Fayettistes on the other). Lebrun was thus rendered suspect, a 
situation that was further endangered by accusations that he also protected supposedly 
enemy agents such as the Marquis de Chauvelin and the Baron de Mackau.552 None of this 
made much sense but then, during these dangerous times, that was not really the point. As 
Virginie Martin argues persuasively, the accusations pointed at Lebrun had little to do with 
verifiable facts and everything to do with power.553 At stake was not so much whether the 
overall security of the Ministère des Affaires étrangères had been compromised by foreign 
influence –although this always remained an underlying concern-but which of the splintered 
factions would attain supreme control not just of diplomatic correspondence but the direction 
of French foreign policy now that the monarchy had fallen and a political vacumn had been 
created.    
VI 
Measures were nevertheless taken to securitize the ministry and protect it from 
infiltration. On 26 frimaire an II (16 December 1793), François-Louis-Michel Chemin 
Deforgues, its new minister, issued an edict outlining the new precautions that were to be 
introduced. In the preamble, he conceded that ‘dans les bureaux des indiscrétions qui 
pourraient compromettre les intérets de la République’ had been committed, an obvious 
 
551 According to Virgine Martin, Louis Antoine Pio was a ‘sorte de dénonciateur professionnel’ who owed his 
career to spreading calumnies. Virginie Martin, ‘La Révolution française ou « l'ère du soupçon »’, op. cit., 
p.137.  
552 ibidem, p137. AN/F7/4644 doss 2, Dénonciation contre Chauvelin de Pio au comité de surveillance de la 
section des Piques, 30 brumaire an II (20 November 1793), AN, F7/4774/28 doss 3, Dénonciation du citoyen 
Cranvin au citoyen Arthur, section des Piques, 22 brumaire an II (12 November 1793) et Tableau de 
dénonciation contre Mackau, comité de surveillance de la section Le Pelletier 





allusion to the failings (and supposed perfidy) of his predecessor. As the first four articles 
set out:  
 
« Art. 1. — Aucun employé du département des Affaires étrangères ne pourra, sous 
peine de destitution, s'entretenir des affaires politiques du département avec un 
individu quelconque qui ne sera pas membre de cette administration. 
 
« Art. 2. — Aucun commis subalterne d'une division ne pourra communiquer à un 
commis d'une autre division les détails qui concernent son bureau. 
 
« Art. 3. — Les chefs de bureau seront tenus de ne permettre l'entrée des bureaux 
d'expédition à aucun étranger et de dénoncer au ministre les commis qui, au mépris 
du règlement existant, auront accueilli des étrangers, de même que les garçons de 
bureau qui les auront introduits. 
 
« Art. 4. — Tout commis ou garçon de bureau convaincu d'avoir communiqué des 
papiers ou des informations de la correspondance pour en tirer un avantage personnel 
ou pécuniaire sera dénoncé aux tribunaux554 
 
These measures were designed to restrict, as far as feasible, any communications and access 
with the outside, especially with étrangers, and prohibit the unauthorised exchange of 
information within the ministry’s walls. The purpose of these precautions, in other words, 
was to protect diplomatic secrets, especially those that could compromise the security of the 
Republic.555 Months before, during the séance of 20 July 1793, the Montagnard deputy, 
 
554 Frédéric Masson, Le département des Affaires étrangères pendant la Révolution (1787-1804) (Paris: Ed 
Plon et Cie, 1887), p.287. 
555 Lebrun was not the only employee to be arrested for his supposed loyalty to the Girondins. On 1 October 




Philippe Rühl, also cautioned the Convention about the possibility of spies breaching the 
ministry’s security. As he told the Convention, ‘‘il nous importe de connaître quels sont les 
espions qui nous entourent’.556 Rühl’s concern was twofold. First, he was concerned about 
the possibility of France’s overseas diplomats being contaminated by their contact with 
foreign powers. It was for this reason that he demanded that an assessment be made about 
‘leur civisme et leurs talents’.557 At the same time, he complained about the number of agents 
that the Conseil Exécutif had despatched throughout the country adding how their 
deployment was ‘inutile’ and contrary to the interests of the Republic.558 With domestic 
surveillance missions being conducted on multiple fronts, sometimes in tandem but often in 
conflict, the inevitable result, as Ruhl implied, was that it would create a general air of mutual 
mistrust, a situation that clearly befell France’s diplomatic corps. Not only did diplomatic 
agents habitually spy on eachother, sometimes out of competition for the same post, but also 
moles were surreptitiously planted within the ministry itself.559 Moreover, in an assertive 
demonstration of its authority, the Comité de salut public, reserved the right to monitor the 
activities of its diplomatic agents, even legitimising, with the decree of 13 prairial an II (1 
Juin 1794), the use of ‘un espion officiel’ for this purpose.560 According to the decree, each 
commission was required to nominate a vetted citizen who, each day, was to report on the 
 
of the ministry’s employees, Jean Baptiste Charles Joly. As the comité explained, the arrest of Joly had been 
ordered by the département de Police à la Mairie. ‘Quant à l'emploi qu'il occupe dans votre Département, il 
est étonnant qu'il y soit encore, car il n'a point de certificat de civisme, ou, s'il en a un, ce certificat est nul, car 
il n'a point été visé à notre comité, condition indispensable. En résumant, nous pensons que Joly est un intrigant 
d'autant plus dangereux qu'il a quelques talents, de l'audace, du jargon et des poumons. Il ne cherche qu'à faire 
son profit personnel de la Révolution, et il se vendra toujours à celui qui le payera. Vos secrets seraient très-
hasardés dans de si mauvaises mains II faut, quand il aura obtenu sa liberté, qu'il retourne à son premier métier 
de tailleur, où il sera bien moins à craindre que dans les fonctions publiques.’ ibid, p.250. Pierre Serna, ‘Pistes 
de recherches: du secret de la monarchie à la république des secrets’, Secret et République (1795-1840), 
Bernard Gainot, Pierre Serna (eds.) (Clermont-Ferrand: Presses Universitaires Blaise-Pascal, 2004), pp. 13-37.   
556 Réimpression Moniteur Universel, op. cit., XVII, p.299. 
557 ibid, p.299. 
558 ibid, p.299. It perhaps did not help their cause that at the centre of this ‘nuée d’espions, agents 
révolutionnaires et delegues du conseil exécutif’ which Lebrun had ‘lachait sur la France’ was Ysabeau, the 
head of the Bureau central and reputedly one of the ‘bourreaux’ of the Revolution. Frédéric Masson, Le 
département des Affaires, op. cit., p.253. 
559 In one acte d’accusation, for example, it was revealed that the former chef du sixième bureau, Mendouze, 
had been planted by the former mayor of Paris, Pétion ‘comme espion et comme son agent principal dans le 
departement des Affaires Etrangeres’. ibid, p.255.  
560 According to articles XII and XIII, the ‘Comité de salut public se reserve le droit d’envoyer des agents, 




punctuality and behaviour of every employee in their departments. In other words, this 
individual was to act as a de facto police spy over the employees, a function for which he 
was renumerated with an annual salary of 2,400 livres.561  
With such a proliferation of agents, it was little wonder that no one felt safe and 
everyone was perceived to be a potential threat.562 This general level of insecurity further 
deteriorated with the passage of the loi du 22 prairial an II (10 June 1794) which now 
accorded every citizen with the ‘droit’ to seize and bring before the magistrates anyone 
perceived to be a counter-revolutionary.563 Invariably, given the climate of suspicion, the 
law triggered a spate of arbitrary arrests by simple individuals who now found themselves 
endowered with powers to judge for themselves who was an enemy of the state. This 
incendiary situation was already aggravated by the fact that denunciations had increasingly 
become the acte d’accusation itself. Under the Terror, denunciation was no longer conceived 
as the initial basis of a police enquiry in cases involving conspirational crimes but, as Lebrun 
found out for himself, a valid substitute for material evidence.564 According to article II of 
the decree of 5 April 1793: 
l’accusateur public près dudit tribunal est autorisé à faire arrêter, poursuivre et juger 
tous prévenus desdits crimes, sur la dénonciation des autorités constituées ou des 
citoyens.565 
 
561 Frédéric Masson, op. cit., p.318. 
562 For the state of paranoia and insecurity before 9 Thermidor an II, see E Ducoudray ‘Le main de l’étranger’ 
en l’an II: Fantasme populaire et paranoïa gouvernemental’ and Olivier Blanc, ‘Aux origines du IX Thermidor’, 
in Mélanges, Michel Vovelle (ed.) (Paris: Société des Etudes Robespierristes’ 1997). 
563 Michel Eude, ‘La loi de Prairial’, Annales historiques de la Révolution française, 254 (1983), 544-559, 
p.545. According to article IX, ‘tout le citoyen a le droit de saisir et de traduire devant les magistrats les 
conspirateurs et les contre-révolutionnaires. Il est tenu de les dénoncer dès qu’il les connaît. ‘ Jean-François 
Fayard, ‘Annexe VII - Loi du 22 prairial (10 juin 1794)’, La Justice révolutionnaire. Chronique de la 
Terreur, sous la direction de Fayard Jean-François (Robert Laffont (programme ReLIRE), 1987), pp. 
294-297. 
564 Virginie Martin, ‘La Révolution française ou « l'ère du soupçon »’, op. cit., p.135. 
565 Archives Parlementaires, LXI, p. 337. Décret rélatif à la poursuite des crimes de conspiration et des délits 




Equipped with a special bureau specifically charged with receiving and reviewing the 
dispositions of ‘voluntary’ denunciators, the tribunal révolutionnaire had already been hard 
at work before the loi du prairial overloaded it with more spurious cases. Among the many 
individuals who fell victim to this ‘ordre du jour’ was the celebrated German adventurer, the 
Baron de Trenck. Trenck had been residing in Paris since 1788 and had engaged in the 
Revolution.566 In 1794, during the height of the Terror, he suddenly found himself the object 
of suspicion and was denounced as a spy working for the King of Prussia. Incarcerated in 
the prison de Daint-Lazare in the company of the poets Jean-Antoine Roucher and André-
Marie Chénier, he was brought before the Tribunal révolutionnaire on 5 thermidor an II (23 
July 1794), condemned to death for espionage and transferred to la Conciergerie where he 
passed his final hours. Two days later, at the age of sixty eight years old, Trenck was 
executed.  
 
Trenck’s execution took place three days before the Terror officially ended.567 Nor 
did it matter. His fate was sealed once the revolutionaries had embarked upon their quest to 
purge the nation of foreign spies. As Trenck and countless others had discovered, Joseph Le 
Bon had not issued an idle threat when he, in unison with other militant Jacobins, declared 
‘guerre aux espions’. Moreover, after almost ten months of the Terror, there was no simply 
conceivable possibility that the climate of hysteria would simply dissipate overnight with 
the fall of one man, even if it was Robespierre. For real and imagined spies, in other words, 
9 thermidor did not spell a day of deliverance. As we know, the historical journée did not 
usher in a change in the system of government but a switch in leadership. Also, the principal 
structures of surveillance and control that were implemented before September 1793 
remained largely intact in the ensuing months. Equally, the arrest warrants that had been 
 
566 Jacques Berchtold, ‘Énergie des « récits d’évasion » au XVIIIe siècle’, Les Cahiers du Centre de Recherches 
Historiques, 39 (2007), 183-203.  
567 His dossier is AN/W431 doss 969. See also Alexandre Tuetey (ed.), Répertoire générale, op. cit., VIII, p.32. 




issued the day before for several staff in the reconstituted Ministère des Affaires étrangères, 
were not revoked. In fact, it would appear that the Comité de sûreté générale were still eager 
to enforce them and continued purging the diplomatic corps of suspects and undersirables.568 
Elsewhere in France, despite the tumultuous events that took place in Paris, counter-
espionage operations continued unabated, with the représentants en mission (with some 
more zealous than others) still propagating the perception that the nation was abound with 
spies surreptiously supporting the allied war effort.569 Not only had the Terror created a 
momentum of its own but with the war raging on, the realities of the military situation did 
not change simply because there occured a change in political leadership in the capital. 
Counter-espionage, in other words, still remained a matter of national and transnational 
security. In La Vendée and Brittany, for example, the pursuit of spies continued to overlap 
with counter-insurgency operations. As the civil war continued to spread, despite occasional 
lulls in activity, the local revolutionary authorities were hard pressed to disrupt 
communications between the insurgents and the émigrés exiled in the Channel Islands.570 In 
the Low Countries, where the republican armies were occupying large swathes of territories, 
the comités de surveillance, with their expanded remit, were preoccupied with neutralising 
acts of enemy sabatoge and espionage, both of which were judged to be counter-
revolutionary in nature. Furthermore, even though French power had been projected abroad, 
the perceptions and practices that governed their security polices there were not entirely 
 
568 Frédéric Masson, Le département des Affaires, op. cit., p.320. On 12 brumaire an III (2 November 1795) 
one of the employees at the ministry, Otto, was suddenty arrested, conducted to Luxembourg where he was 
incarcerated au secret. The seals of his papers were lifted upon special orders of Merlin de Douai, the Minister 
of Justice, implicating him in a conspiracy. According to the acte d’accusation he was suspected of having 
maintained illicit communications with a ‘agent secret à Londres’ cloaked under the guise of ‘une 
correspondance mercantile’. In his defence, Otto responded that correspondence with secret agents was always 
cloaked by using ‘les phrases commercales.’ 
569 In the south, for example, a Représentant attached to l’armée des Pyrenées Occidentales reported to the 
Comité de salut public: ‘l’ennemi qui était instruit par ses nombreux espions de tous nos mouvements’. 24 
vendémiaire an III (15 October 1794), Alphone Aulard (ed.), Recueil des Actes, op. cit., XVII, p.449. 
570 As the représentant in le Morbihan complained to the Comité de salut public on 18 November 1794, ‘Les 
fuyards, et les émissaires de la Vendée, qui viennent y formenter la guerre civile, les communications suivies 
qui existent entre les côtes du nord de la ci-devant Bretagne et l’Angleterre ou les isles de Jersey et de 
Guernsey…On nous attaque avec des transfuges et des espions. Alphone Aulard (ed.), Recueil des actes, op. 




dissimilar to the ones adopted in the maritime towns, military strongholds and other 
vulnerable areas within the interior itself.571 To protect military installations, for example, 
securitized zones were created. At the same time, in order to search for, and punish, the 
authors of counter-revolutionary crimes, as Antoine Renglet informs us, the comités de 
surveillance continued to work in conjunction with the représentants en mission and the 
tribunaux révolutionnaires, all of which were now subordinated to the Comité de salut 
public. To gather intelligence on opponents of the French regime, they drew on the same 
channels, principally the use of secret agents, the control of correspondence entering and 
exiting the occupied territories and, of course, the steady stream of denunciations. Also, to 
dispense punishment, they applied their legislative arsenal, creating, in turn, additional 
provisions to address some of the new conditions in which they were operating.572 All of this 
is to say that the Terror may have ended in Thermidor an II but the security situation 
remained in a state of flux with counter-espionage continuing to play an integral role in both 







571 Antoine Renglet, ‘Les comités de surveillance et l’occupation du Brabant, (1794-1795)’, Annales 
historiques de la Révolution française, 368 (2012), 105-128 (pp.110-113). Alternatively, for a comprehensive 
study of the comites de surveillance’s activities in Belgian occupied territory, see Antoine Renglet, Une police 
d’occupation? Les comités de surveillance du Brabant sous la seconde occupation française (1794-1795) 
(Bruxelles: Archives générales du Royaume, 2011). 
572 On 27 thermidor an II (14 août 1794), for example, the revolutionary authorities issued a decree to expand 
on their definition on what constitutes délits d’émigration. According to article VI, ‘Tous les individus déportés 
de France, en vertu des lois de la république, qui se trouveraient encore dans l’étendue de la Belgique et des 
autres parties du territoire conquis, […] seront definitivement reputés émigrés et traités comme tels’. 
Meanwhile, article VII prescribed the death penalty to ‘Tous absens du pays évacué par l’ennemi, qui l’ont 
quitté ou le quitteraient pour porter les armes contre la république, ou favoriser de quelque manière que ce soit 
des projets de contrerévolution…’ Arrêté des réprésentants du peuple pres les armées du Nord et de Sambre-
et-Meuse, du 27 thermidor an II. Pasinomie, Collection des lois, décrets, arrêtés et règlements généraux qui 




















In July 2019, exactly two and a quarter centuries after the Terror officially ended, 
La Direction générale de la sécurité intérieure, otherwise known by its acronym DGSI, 
opened its mission statement with the following declaration:  
Plus que jamais, la menace de l’espionnage étranger sur notre territoire demeure 
prégnante. Elle est de nature à fragiliser profondément nos équilibres institutionnels, 
à saper notre indépendance nationale et à piller nos richesses.573 
 
Recalling the rhetoric of the revolutionary period, with its emotive use of terms such as 
‘pregnant’ and ‘pillaging’, the author(s) of the document continued with expounding on the 
role of the DGSI citing how it is in charge: 
 
(d’) une mission de sécurité qui vise à protéger les intérêts nationaux et les 
institutions contre les actions de renseignement, d’ingérence et d’influence inspirées, 
engagées ou soutenues par des puissances ou organisations étrangères.574 
 
According to its view, these ‘grandes puissances’ conduct clandestine operations in French 
territory with the purpose of collecting sensitive information relative to national security and 
interfering in certain ‘processus décisionnels’.575 Reading the mission statement, one is 
immediately struck by certain similitudes with the revolutionary period, not just in terms of 
perceptions and rhetoric but also the central role that counter-espionage plays in neutralising 
the threats that are posed to the nation’s institutions and fundamental interests. As the 
 
573 According to the website, the statement was published on 5 July 2019. https://www.interieur.gouv.fr/Le-
ministere/DGSI/Missions/Le-contre-espionnage 
574 ibid 





document makes plain, counter-espionage essentially combines preventative action with 
active surveillance and control, in this instance, of the intrusive activities of foreign 
intelligence agencies who are either hostile to, or in competition with, France and its position 
within the ‘international plan’. It involves uncovering their strategies and pre-empting their 
measures as well as regularly keeping the various French authorities implicated in state 
security (from the police and gendarmerie, border patrols, customs etc) informed of the 
operations that it was conducting. In this sense, the purpose of counter-espionage has little 
changed in the course of its long evolution. Its aim, as they say, remains not just to neutralise 
the activities of foreign agents within the interior but also to prevent the theft of state secrets 
and protect vital national infrastructure from being infiltrated and compromised. Yet, whilst 
these missions lie at the core of France’s counter-espionage strategy today, as they do in all 
nation-states, the conditions that determine their conduct have, quite obviously, no corollary 
or bearing with the security problems which the revolutionaries were beset with during the 
period in discussion.576  
In attempting to chart the development of French counter-espionage during the early 
revolutionary period, this thesis has presupposed that the term itself was not in use until the 
late nineteenth century and therefore, the revolutionaries did not possess - or perhaps more 
accurately - did not share our conceptual understanding of it.577 It is for this reason that 
retracing its activities, especially from a fixed point during the French Revolution, presents 
no easy task. With the transfer of sovereignty from the person of the king, however, the 
interesting possibility does arise to approach counter-espionage through the broader prism 
of la sûreté de l’état, or more specifically, national security, as enshrined in the constitution 
of 1791 and enumerated in various articles in the Penal Code enacted in September that same 
 
576 This same reasoning could probably apply to any major period in French history but of course, this is beyond 
the scope of discussion.  
577 The closest use, as this thesis has revealed, can be found with the title of the pamphlet ‘Contr’Espion’ seen 
on p. However, as a reading of its contents show, the author is only concerned with offering instructions on 
both the employment of cipher and techniques of decryption and not the measures to neutralise spies on the 




year. Yet, as we have seen, the constitution did not banish the concept of monarchical 
sovereignty entirely, and with the continued existence of the royal executive, the security of 
the nation-state- as some revolutionaries perceived it- was continuously being undermined 
by not just the functionaries staffing its institutions but also the presence of the Revolution’s 
most intransigent opponents, the émigrés, who had mostly sought refuge beyond the Rhine. 
578 Not everyone, of course, had reconciled themselves to the institution of the Constitutional 
Monarchy, let alone the prospect of a republican regime. Indeed, despite the existence of pur 
royalists among both the émigré communities and within France itself, some of whom were 
openly brandishing swords and boasting loudly of the coming Restoration, not everyone was 
convinced that these rebels posed much of a threat either. As Tackett has demonstrated, the 
fears of conspiracies fears were largely periodic during the first years of the Revolution with 
some deputies to the Legislative Assembly even doubting their existence.579 It was perhaps 
for this reason, as well as concerted efforts to reach a political consensus among some 
revolutionaries, that the response to, and measures taken to quash, these real or imagined 
conspiracies were scarcely robust during the first six or so months of the Constitutional 
Monarchy.  
Yet, with signs pointing to the build up of émigré formations and royalist collusion 
with the foreign powers, the vociferous voices in the assembly and press denouncing their 
existence not only grew louder but more credible. As the year 1792 progressed, and evidence 
mounted that agents within the interior were actively engaged in auxiliary operations, such 
as procuring munitions, recruiting volunteers and suborning army officers, the warnings of 
outspoken deputies such as Brissot could no longer be dismissed as mere alarmist. Gradually, 
opinion gained ground that these émigrés, supported by their domestic correspondents and 
foreign hosts, were not just an annoying irritant but, potentially, a danger to the existence of 
 
578 Geoffrey Cubitt, ‘Conspiracism, Secrecy and Security in Restoration France: Denouncing the Jesuit 
Menace.’ Historical Social Research / Historische Sozialforschung, 38. 1 (143), (2013), 107–128.  




the revolutionary state. As the officer corps continued to disintegrate, and further waves of 
emigration took place, the reality finally sank in that an implacable enemy had amassed on 
their borders. Even so, the measures taken to combat the counter-revolutionary threat from 
both within and without the interior, appear to have been slow and indecisive. Despite the 
enactment of the 1791 penal code, and increasingly severe legislative measures taken against 
the émigrés, there is little evidence to suggest that the revolutionaries took anything but 
small, tentative steps to escalate a response during the period of the constitutional monarchy. 
With the formation of the Legislative Assembly’s Comité de surveillance, for example, the 
revolutionaries made an attempt to extend their capability to monitor the population en masse 
and at the same, encourage both the inflow of denunciations and self-policing of local 
communities. The trouble, of course, was that this also encouraged vigilante behavior with 
National Guardsmen and other bands of volunteers, essentially acting as self-arbiters of 
justice, staging punitive expeditions into villages killing supposed royalist conspirators, 
sometimes sanctioned by local administrators and other times, censored by them.580 Similar 
acts of vigilantism took place in the fortress towns in Lille and Douai, where rumours of an 
impending attack sowed alarm among the local inhabitants and incited mob violence against 
supposed spies in their midst. Indeed, it was only when the prospect of war became a stark 
reality that we begin to see small rumblings of l’espionnite. Until mid 1792, there actually 
appeared few mentions in public or political discourse pertaining to the existence of spies or 
practice of espionage within France. Even the drafters of the penal code, as formerly argued, 
failed to create provisions for it, albeit only by inference. Instead, the conception of 
espionage was never fully defined, even with the creation of the military penal code in 1793, 
and continued to be conflated with acts of conspiracy, treason, subversion, incivisme, 
malveillance and other forms of opposition or non-compliance including desertion from the 
 
580  The recruitment of local volunteers to self-police their communities during revolutionary times was not 
particular to France. In the United States of America, civilian colonists, called the Minutemen, formed 




army.581 None of this made much theoretical sense, of course, but it did conveniently serve 
a purpose in not only dealing with opponents but in also helping to bind large swathes of 
France’s populace to the Revolution itself. The fear and loathing of spies is as old as the term 
espion itself and with hostilities breaking out, and the patrie declared en danger, the 
revolutionaries were apt to propagate the message that the source of these troubles was the 
omnipresence of foreign and domestics agents working surreptitiously with the monarchy to 
undermine the security of the state and the safety of its citizens. 
By invoking the message that the nation faced an existential crisis the revolutionaries 
were able to justify the series of restrictive emergency measures that they enacted just hours 
following the storming of the Tuileries on 10 August 1792. As this thesis has attempted to 
argue, these emergency measures formed part of a broader process that has recently become 
to be known as ‘securitization’. Just as the great wave of royalist purges swept the nation, 
the revolutionaries took steps to expand and restructure the apparatus of the state with the 
attempted creation of strong central organs such as the Comité de sureté générale and Comité 
de salut public. At the same time, given the practical advantage of having themselves 
conduct ground operations in their own jurisdiction, the revolutionaries devolved 
responsibility for the ‘fonctions de sûreté générale’, including the investigation of high 
crimes, to the départements, districts and municipalities whilst simultaneously imposing a 
measure of oversight. Of course, already across France, in fortress towns like Lille and 
Douai, measures had been taken independently by local authorities to reinforce  their 
security protocols and control the influx of refugees and returning soldiers, some of whom 
were suspected of being contaminated by contact with the enemy. As is so common during 
times of war and upheaval, the fear of a fifth column had largely determined their actions to 
stop, interrogate and arrest suspect individuals. None of these actions, however, pointed to a 
 
581 In French occupied territory, any infraction was treated by the authorities as counterrevolutionary in nature, 
from attacks on the symbols of the Republic, the maintenance of suspect correspondence with foreigners, acts 




coordinated or consistent response. With the reforms decreed by the Convention, the 
revolutionaries sought to redress this problem by not only attempting to tighten 
communications on a local and central level but also to impose a degree of uniformity 
throughout the country. Whilst far from complete, this formation of a national security 
system, as proposed by Gensonné and Brissot, could not have been possible as long as a 
weakened royal executive pursued its de facto position of non-compliance. But with the 
deposition of the monarchy, and the country beset by war and disorder, the conditions had 
seemingly been met for the revolutionary state to under the process.  
Yet, the security challenges facing the nation were of such enormity that they could 
scarcely have been met by these structural reforms alone. They also required the consensus, 
vigilance and revolutionary zeal of the local populace to surveil and denounce the enemies 
hiding within. One of the products of this vigilant spirit was, of course, the famous comités 
révolutionnaires that were spontaneously forming in all corners of the country. As the 
months progressed, the Revolution witnessed, as Geoffrey Cubitt expresses it, the ‘escalating 
development of a security culture’ that was not just manufactured from above but also guided 
from below.582 Moreover, this ‘security culture’, as he argued, was ‘grounded in an almost 
delirious vision of conspiracy.’583 This thesis, on account of the limited word count, and 
concerns over derivation, has made no effort to account for the existence of these 
conspiracies. The fact that it only takes collusion in secret to form a conspiracy is sufficient 
proof to be certain of their existence. In other words, it is not important – at least as far as 
this discussion is concerned- whether these conspiracies posed an existential threat or even 
if they existed, but whether the revolutionaries believed them to be true, of which there is 
little doubt. The historical interest here is to examine how far the perception of their existence 
determined the development of counter-espionage during the early revolutionary years that 
 





form the focus of this discussion. Just as the Revolution witnessed the development of a 
‘security culture’, manifested by the formation of the sociétés populaires, comités 
révolutionnaires and comités de surveillance, so too did it witness French counter-espionage 
develop correspondingly in scope and practice. To be sure, some of the precepts, perceptions 
and practices that determined the conduct of counter-espionage did predate the Revolution, 
as the introduction has demonstrated, but it is no less a fact that the unprecedented security 
challenges, engendered by war and insurrection etc, led not just to the expansion of counter-
espionage but the formation of parallel structures, like the comités de surveillance, which 
discharged some of its operations. As we have seen, they owed their formal existence to the 
belief that foreigners in France were perpetrating espionage related crimes. Without arguing 
the merits in favour or against the revolutionaries’ increasingly discriminatory policies 
(including, most controversially, the arrest of British subjects in October), the undoubted 
fact remains that the measures against them, both legislatively and operationally, were 
designed to root out spies. Therefore, just as the counter-revolution played a determinant 
role in the development of counter-espionage so, conversely, did the development of 
revolutionary ‘doctrine and action’.584  
This duality is no better explained than by the role that espionage played in support 
of the allied war effort.  For all the inflated discourse about foreign plots and the 
machinations of secrets agents, especially British sponsored ones, it is the contention of this 
thesis that the real challenge lay in neutralizing the influence that these military spies, most 
of whom were French and not foreign, exerted over the direction of the war.585 As far as the 
 
584 To paraphrase the title of the work by Jacques Godechot, La Contre-révolution, doctrine et action, op. cit. 
585 According to Hugues Marquis, with whom this author is in agreement, it was only fom the end of 1794, 
after this thesis terminates, that the British government began to form ‘centres of action’ and lay the 
groundwork in the interior for the restoration of the Bourbons. From this point, British espionage activities 
appear to have been ‘an essential element in its war effort’ both in terms of subversion and intelligence 
gathering. Beforehand, it limited its activities to learning more about the political factions, royalist prospects 
etc See Marquis Hugues, Les Agents de l’Ennemi, op. cit. p. iv. In his study of the ‘Channel Island 
Correspondence’ that subsisted between the British authorities, the émigrés and the insurgents, Alfred Cobban, 
meanwhile concludes that ‘the best possibility of effective cooperation with the royalists of the West to 
overthrow the Republic had already been lost in 1793.’ Moreover, he adds, ‘Possibly even then it was only a 




interrelated counter-revolution and war effort was concerned, this is obviously seen with the 
recruitment of traitors -a key function of espionage- and the supply of intelligence to the 
Austrians and Dutch armies on republican dispositions etc. Similarly, it has been shown how 
spies were perceived to have played a significant role in supporting the insurgency in the 
west, with women and children acting as the partisans’ eyes and ears. To neutralize these 
multiple threats of espionage, the représentants en mission, attached to the republican 
armies, played a central role, overseeing the comités de surveillance, compiling lists of 
suspects, investigating and interrogating them and perhaps most importantly, establishing 
both military commissions and tribunaux révolutionnaires to enforce the penal codes and 
other series of legislative measures that were enacted to punish spies, traitors, deserters, 
counter-revolutionaries, émigrés, all of whom were either treated synonymously at various 
points. The evident success that some of these représentants enjoyed in reducing, if not 
clearing, their zones of spies is most amply demonstrated with Joseph le Bon whose 
imposition of the Terror at Cambrai was lauded by Saint-Just for its perceived deterrent 
effect. To be sure, the sight of a spy hanging from a tree, executed before a firing squad or 
decapitated by the guillotine before his head was paraded before a crowd, undoubtedly 
induced a number of fellow spies to think twice. Indeed, demonstrated deterrence became 
one of the key strategies employed by the revolutionaries to thwart espionage and its related 
crimes. This shift in dispositive happened gradually, however. To be sure, during the Terror, 
the revolutionaries pursuit and punishment of spies too a far more aggressive turn. Not for 
nothing did Joseph Le Bon declare ‘guerre aux espions’. Yet, it should not be forgotten that 
most of the legislative measures that were cited to execute spies were, to recall, enacted 
before the Terror was instituted and the Loi des Suspects passed. Already by then, the onus 
on priority had shifted perceptibly from an essentially defensive and preventative position, 





Just how far this shift was the product of design is, on the other hand, less easy to 
determine. As this thesis has attempted to show, ultimately there did not exist a single body 
which possessed supreme authority for counter-espionage. Whilst the Comité de sureté 
générale retained its supremacy over the direction of domestic security, particularly 
following the passage of the Loi des Suspects, the Comité de salut public, meanwhile, 
continued to exert its authority over the war effort. And, as we have just seen, espionage and 
its suppression played a key auxiliary role. Today, in modern day France, counter-espionage 
is the exclusive preserve of the domestic security service which, itself is a single branch of 
the French intelligence community.586 It is a professionalised service which has evolved 
originally from the Sixième Bureau over the course of more than a hundred and fifty years. 
During the revolutionary period, no such service existed. For all its pretentions of power and 
expertise, the Comité de sureté générale was still seen by Robespierre and Danton as a ‘fief 
of low-life policemen’ run by André Amar and Marc Guillaume Vadier and was never 
conceived, or ever attained, despite its reorganisation, the status of a professional, agence de 
renseignement clandestine, a contradiction itself given the publicity of its persons and 
proceedings.587 Moreover, whilst orders were invariably passed down, very often, ground 
operations were the product of local initiative. Indeed, despite the centralizing tendencies of 
the revolutionaries, which became ever more pronounced during the Terror, it remains 
 
586 In an interesting side-point, the UK’s national security strategy reveals striking similitudes between the 
revolutionaries’ counter espionage operations and today’s efforts to combat terrorism. The following is an 
excerpt from a text that has been reproduced from the original. It explains how the strategy is based on four 
principals otherwise known as CONTEST. The first three are: 
i) Pursue: stopping terrorist attacks. ‘This includes: covert intelligence and police work to detect and disrupt 
the current terrorist threat, continuing to work to strengthen our legal framework to ensure successful 
prosecutions of terrorist crimes through our criminal justice system or, where appropriate, deportations; 
proscription of terrorist groups and exclusion of dangerous individuals; information-sharing with our allies and 
partners to support counter-terrorist operations overseas’. 
ii) Protect: ‘strengthening our protection against attack improve the protection of our critical infrastructure’.  
iii) Prepare: ‘mitigating the impact of attacks, Prepare includes: work to improve resilience at national, regional 
and local – people’s surveillance level – with the Government, the police and emergency services operating in 
partnership with the private sector, local government’. Cabinet Office, The National Security Strategy of the 
United Kingdom: Security in an independent world (London: 2008). 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/228539/72
91.pdf 




undoubtedly true that they still encouraged this initiative, albeit up to a point. Equally, the 
revolutionaries appeared to have been susceptible to pressure exerted on them, as 
demonstrated following the creation of the military penal code whose provisions the army 
generals had professed a vehement dissatisfaction with. This is all to say that, until July 
1794, when this thesis terminates, the decisions over counter-espionage operations were 
mostly reached on the ground with the multiple organs of the state – ie the représentants en 
mission, comités de surveillance, army and paramilitary forces, juges de paix, municipalities 
etc, all discharging their functions in co-operation (despite inevitable juridictional rivalry), 
sometimes receiving orders from the Convention’s comités, other times just applying the 
succession of laws and decrees passed down to them. Of course, with hinsight, given the 
‘complex interdependence of the threats, risks and drivers of insecurity’ that characterized 
these early years of Revolution, Brissot and Gensonne were undoubtedly right to advocate 
the creation of a single overarching strategy and institution that governed national security. 
But, of course, it is easy to have the benefit of hindsight. In today’s world, such national 
security administrations do exist but even they are beset with interdepartmental rivalries that 
can lead to tragic outcomes.588 In fact, given the unprecedented security environment in 
which they operated, not to mention the inherent instability of the state, it is no small 
achievement that the revolutionaries managed to reduce, if not neutralize, many of the 
espionage threats that they faced. Ultimately, it is not our place to judge whether the 
measures that they took were ‘draconian’ or ‘illiberal’, at least as they related to espionage 
and espionage related crimes. These were extraordinary times calling for extraordinary 
measures. And in the process, despite all the political vicissitudes, a security dispositive did 
emerge that transcended these conditions that not only was adopted by the successive 
 
588 Without running the risk of digression, it should be remembered that one of the attributed causes for the 
terrorist attacks on 911 was the jurisdicational rivarly between the CIA and FBI that essentially prevented any 
meaningful exchange of intelligence prior to that event.  See Lawrence Wright, The Looming Towers: AL 
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Figure 1 :  Pamphlet by unknown author, otherwise credited to a ‘Dlandol’, providing instructions on how 








Figure 2 : Excerpts from Contr’Espion pamphlet giving examples of codes employed for protecting or 








Figure 3 : Report by a local military commission on the capture of a 19 year old ‘espion des Brigands’ 








Figure 4 : Declaration of the captured spy made in year II revealing, among other things, the dispositions 























Figure 5 : Register of judgements rendered by the famous revolutionary tribunal in Arras including for 
both military spies and ‘conspirators’.  
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